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vAbstract
Managers in organizations are continuously confronted by an array of ambiguous data and
-vaguely felt stimuli which they must somehow order, explicate and imbue with meaning
before they decide on how to respond. This study of -162 -members of organizations' top
management teams employed a cross-level analysis to investigate how individual-, group- and
organizational-level factors relate to how managers diagnose strategic issues. Findings show
that managers' cognitive style, the information processing structure of top management teams,
and organizational scanning, 'each are uniquely related to how managers makes sense of
environmental trends or events. Thus, contrary to previous issue interpretation research,
individual characteristics were found to be related to strategic issue diagnosis. Moreover,
different forms of organizational scanning were differently associated with managers'
sensemaking. Finally, the relationship between cognitive style and strategic issue diagnosis
was moderated by the level of organizational information processing. The discussion
addresses the implications of these findings for future research on strategic issue diagnosis.
1INTRODUCTION
How organizational members conceptualize and make sense of their organizational
worlds has been an important topic in organizational science during the past twenty
years (Porac, Meindl, and Stubbart 1996). This dissertation is an attempt to contribute
to this research by identifying and empirically testing the impact of factors
influencing how managers' diagnose strategic issues. It intends to add to research
literature on strategic issue diagnosis by: (1) refining and extending the conceptual
and empirical basis of strategic issue diagnosis; (2) empirically testing antecedents at
the individual, group and organizational level of analysis; and (3) introducing
previously untested antecedents to strategic issue diagnosis.
1.1 Strategic issue diagnosis
The open system metaphor underlying most research on strategy and organizational
decision making emphasizes organizations' dependence on their surrounding and
ever-changing environments (Aldrich and Marsden 1988). Classical work on
organization-environment relations have treated these ever changing environments
either as pools of information (e.g. Dill 1958; Duncan 1972) or as stocks of resources
(e.g. Aiken and Hage 1968; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Thompson 1967). In both
these perspectives, organizations depend on the environment for scarce and valued
resources and must often cope with unstable, unpredictable external events, which in
tum create organizational uncertainty. In order to reduce this uncertainty,
organizations gather information from the environment and seek cooperative
arrangements with other environmental agents (e.g. Thompson 1967). However, such
uncertainty-reducing behavior should not be seen as simple organizational techniques
used to cope with their external environment. As Weick (1979a) argued,
organizational environments are created through processes of selective attention.
Managers in organizations are continuously confronted by an array of ambiguous data
and vaguely felt stimuli which they must somehow order, explicate and imbue with
meaning before they decide on how to respond (Dutton, Fahey, and Narayanan 1983).
In other words, they must diagnose strategic issues, which is the overall topic of the
present study.
2When environmental data and stimuli signify some kind of importance to the firm,
they are often referred to as strategic issues. Following Ansoff (1980) and Dutton,
Fahey and Narayanan (1993), strategic issues refer to emerging developments, trends
or events which in the judgment of some strategic decision makers is likely to have
the potential to affect organizational performance. Thus, no issue is inherently
strategic. Rather, an issue becomes strategic when managers believe that it has
relevance for organizational performance (Dutton and Ashford 1993). However, this
does not preclude the possibility that managers fail to notice or misinterpret important
developments, trends or events.
Strategic issues involve matters other than tactical or operational concerns and usually
concern whole organizations and their goals (Dutton 1986b; Ginsberg 1988). The
potential impact of such issues is uncertain (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Theoret
1976), which make them ill structured and ambiguous (Lyles 1981), and open to
multiple interpretations (Daft and Weick 1984). As such, strategic issues are not
"prepackaged"; rather, managers identify, interpret and formulate them by selectively
attending to some aspects of their environment while ignoring others (Cowan 1986;
Thomas, Shankster, and Mathieu 1994). Such mental processes refer to the concept
strategic issue diagnosis, which in the present study is defined as the individuallevel,
cognitive process through which managers notice and form interpretations about
environmental developments, trends or events.
Strategic issue diagnosis is the starting point for the formulation of strategy and
strategic decision making in organizations (e.g. Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Theoret
1976). Its importance stems from its pervasiveness and centrality in the context of
strategic decisions, its impact upon later decision phases and its potential for changing
managers understanding of their internal and external environment (Dutton, Fahey,
and Narayanan 1983). Strategic issue diagnosis is held to critically' affect both the
process and content of subsequent phases of strategic decision making (Dutton,
Fahey, and Narayanan 1983) and thus organizational choice and action (e.g. Daft and
Weick 1984; Thomas, Clark, and Gioia 1993). In other words, the responses to an
organization's environment, and ultimately, the organization's performance, may be
highly dependent on managers ability to notice and adequately interpret the strategic
3environment of the organization (Daft and Weick 1984; Dutton, Fahey, and
Narayanan 1983; Huber and Daft 1987). Over the past ten years, empirical evidence
has also shown that managers' strategic issue diagnosis makes a difference in terms of
patterns of action, commitments to organizational change, and organizational
performance (Ginsberg and Venkatraman 1992; Ginsberg and Venkatraman 1995;
Lant, Milliken, and Batra 1992; Meyer 1982; Thomas, Clark, and Gioia 1993).
Accordingly, strategic issue diagnosis is arguably crucial to the organization (e.g. Daft
and Weick 1984).
..
1.2 Purpose and contribution of the study
There are two particular findings from research in strategic issue diagnosis and related
topics that have stimulated the present investigation.
First, even when exposed to identical developments, trends or events, different
managers often understand them differently. For example, a situation that is viewed as
a threat by some managers may be viewed as an opportunity by others (e.g. Dutton
1993a; Ginsberg and Venkatraman 1992; Jackson and Dutton 1988; Thomas, Clark,
and Gioia 1993; Thomas and McDaniel 1990). Such differences in strategic issue
diagnosis have been attributed to differences in managers' individual attributes (e.g.
Dutton 1993a; Dutton, Fahey, and Narayanan 1983; Ramaprasad and Mitroff 1984). It
is also suggested that the differences may be, in part, the result of frameworks or
contexts that direct information, attention and interpretation .in organizations (Daft
and Weick 1984; Kiesler and Sproull 1982). Accordingly, several authors have
suggested that organizational and group characteristics are key determinants of how
managers interpret the environment (e.g. Denison et al. 1996; Ginsberg and
Venkatraman 1992; Huber and Daft 1987; Meyer 1982; Milliken 1990; Sutcliffe
1994; Thomas, Clark, and Gioia 1993; Thomas and McDaniel 1990; Thomas,
McDaniel, and Anderson 1991; Thomas, Shankster, and Mathieu 1994). Thus,
strategic issue diagnosis should be seen as a product of multiple sources of influence
(e.g. Thomas, Shankster, and Mathieu 1994). However, multiple context approaches
to strategic issue diagnosis have mainly been theoretical (Denison et al. 1996;
Thomas, Shankster, and Mathieu 1994). One purpose of the present study is to extend
the inquiry to explore and empirically test the question of whether and how
4antecedents at different contextual levels influence managers' noticing and
interpretation of environmental developments, trends and events.
The second finding that has stimulated this study is that managers sometimes make
serious mistakes in strategic issue diagnosis. That is, they fail to notice or misinterpret
developments, trends or events (e.g. Dutton 1993b; Kiesler and Sproull 1982; Lai
1994; Lant, Milliken, and Batra 1992; Milliken and Lant 1991; Schwenk 1984;
Starbuck and Milliken 1988; Zajac and Bazerman 1991). However, most previous
strategic issue diagnosis research has not focused on mistakes or success in managers'
noticing and interpretation. It has been predominantly occupied with a single strategic
issue diagnosis dimension; whether or to what extent decision makers frame or label a
particular environmental situation as an opportunity or a threat (e.g. Dutton, Walton,
and Abrahamson 1989; Jackson and Dutton 1988; Thomas, Clark, and Gioia 1993;
Thomas and McDaniel 1990; Thomas, McDaniel, and Anderson 1991). Therefore,
research that goes beyond the threat-opportunity issue and includes other dimensions
of strategic issue diagnosis and interpretation in general is now needed (Sutcliffe
1994). Thus, the second purpose of the proposed research is to move beyond the
investigation of whether antecedents at different levels are associated with threat-
opportunity differences to explore whether multiple contexts affect other dimensions
of strategic issue diagnosis.
Finally, to the extent that individual characteristics have been included in studies of
strategic issue diagnosis, researchers have primarily been occupied with demographic
variables like managers' age, organizational or executive tenure, education level and
functional or occupational background. Psychological measures allow more specified
explanations of the relationships under study, and they usually contain less noise than
observable managerial characteristics (Hambrick and Mason 1984). Thus, research
that goes beyond directly observable managerial characteristics and focuses on
cognitive abilities or skills might be an important way to increase our understanding
of strategic issue diagnosis.
Consequently, the present study adds to the research literature on strategic issue
diagnosis by: (1) empirically testing antecedents at the individual, group and
organizational level of analysis; (2) refining and extending the conceptual and
5empirical basis of strategic issue diagnosis; and (3) introducing previously untested
antecedents to strategic issue diagnosis.
1.3 Multiple contextual effects on strategic issue diagnosis
Despite the extensive research on strategic issue diagnosis 'over the last decade, little
is known about the effect multiple contexts have on strategic issue diagnosis
(Thomas, Shankster, and Mathieu 1994). Some contributions have examined
individual, group, and organizational antecedents to strategic issue diagnosing and
decision making (e.g. Hitt and Tyler 1991; Thomas and McDaniel 1990; Thomas,
Shankster, and Mathieu 1994). Still, there is a need to continue to focus on
antecedents at more than a single level of analysis if we are to develop our
understanding of strategic issue diagnosis and its outcomes (Thomas and McDaniel
1990; Thomas, Shankster, and Mathieu 1994). The overall conclusion from existing
research is that strategic issue diagnosis or decision making cannot be accurately
modeled with one contextuallevel alone (Hitt and Tyler 1991; Thomas, Shankster,
and Mathieu 1994). However, the link between multiple contexts and strategic issue
diagnosis is a general research topic too broad to be thoroughly explored in a single
contribution. Therefore, the scope of the present investigation is narrowed to one
particular antecedent to strategic issue diagnosis at each of three following contextual
levels; the individual, group and organizationallevel.
1.3.1 Organizational scanning
At the organizational level, the present study will investigate the effects of
organizational scanning on managers' strategic issue diagnosis. Organizational
scanning is defined as structured and deliberate efforts in acquisition, availability and
use of environmental data, stimuli and information in order to monitor the
organizational environment. Availability refers to how easily available environmental
data, stimuli and information are for managers in the organization. Descriptive as well
. as normative literature stress the importance of monitoring and analyzing the external
environment in-order to provide early warning signals from emerging developments,
trends and events, to create a better understanding of the environment, and to increase
organizational responsiveness (e.g. Daft and Weick 1984; Stoffels 1994). The
6significanc~ of organizational scanning derives from the notion that managers can
only interpret, disseminate and analyze data and stimuli that enter the organization
(Hambrick 1982).
Researchers still report considerable gaps of knowledge concerning how
organizations process information and possible effects of different modes of
information processing (e.g. El Sawy and Pauchant 1988; Lenz and Engledow 1986a;
Lenz and Engledow 1986b; Schick, Gordon, and Haka 1990). While there are several
studies predominantly occupied with individual and/or more problem oriented or
active modes of scanning (e.g. Aguilar 1967; Choo 1994; Daft, Sormunen, and Parks
1988; O'Reilly 1980; O'Reilly 1982), research on organizational scanning aimed at
monitoring the environment has been less exhaustive. In addition, the primary focus
of research on organizational scanning has been to assess the state-of-the-art of
environmental analysis among different organizations (e.g. Diffenbach 1983; Fahey
and King 1977; Fahey, King, and Narayanan 1981; Jain 1984; Lenz and Engledow
1986a; Stubbart 1982). Moreover, researchers interested in organizational scanning
effects have shown a tendency to translate organizational scanning directly to output
like organizational response or financial performance (e.g. Dollinger 1984; Gannon,
Smith, and Grimm 1992; Jennings and Lumpkin 1989; Reid 1984; Smith et al. 1991),
without paying attention to individual decision makers, their strategic issue diagnosis
or decisions within the organization.
1.3.2 The information processing structure of the top management team
At the group level, the present investigation will focus on the information processing
structure of the top management team, which is defined as the rules, procedures and
patterns of interaction and participation that characterize the top management team
when it addresses strategic issues. In general, structure influences the flow of
information and the context and nature of human interactions (Miller 1987). It
channels collaboration, specifies modes of coordination, allocates power and
responsibility, and prescribes levels of formality and complexity (Bower 1970). The
main reason to investigate the effects of the information processing structure of top
management teams is that these relatively small groups at the tops of organizations
7provide the structural context for top managers' strategic issue diagnosis (Thomas and
McDanieI1990).
The information processing structure of the top management team is a concept
developed by Duncan (Duncan 1973; Duncan 1974) and refined and used in strategic
issue diagnosis research (e.g. Thomas and McDaniel 1990; Thomas, McDaniel, and
Anderson 1991; Thomas, Shankster, and Mathieu 1994). It is conceptualized on a
mechanistic-organic continuum, where "organicness" or "looseness" is defined by (1)
the degree to which the team' s members participate in strategic decision making, (2)
the inverse degree to which strategic decision making is formalized, and (3) the
degree of interaction among the team's members. The notion of "information
processing structure" relates to findings that indicate that these structural
characteristics influence the team's capacity to process information (Duncan 1973;
Duncan 1974; Galbraith 1973). Moreover, strategic issue diagnosis research has
provided both strong theoretical arguments (e.g. Dutton 1993a) and some empirical
evidence (e.g. Thomas and McDaniel 1990; Thomas, McDaniel, and Anderson 1991;
Thomas, Shankster, and Mathieu 1994) that suggest that the information processing
structure of the top management team will influence strategic issue diagnosis.
However, previous strategic issue diagnosis research has only studied the effects on
threat-opportunity interpretations.
1.3.3 Managers' cognitive complexity
At the individual level, this study will investigate the effects of managers' cognitive
complexity. Following the general principles in contemporary complexity theories
(e.g. Streufert and Streufert 1978; Streufert and Swezey 1986), cognitive complexity
is defined as the ability to differentiate and integrate stimuli and information in
perception and evaluation. Differentiation refers to the ability to perceive several
dimensions in a stimulus array, and integration refers to the development of
connections among the differentiated characteristics.
Despite the increasing focus on the role of managerial cognition and its influence on
organizational decision making, strategy and performance outcomes (e.g. Walsh
1995), research within organization theory and strategic management have rarely
8studied managers' cognitive complexity empirically (McGill, Johnson, and Bantel
1994). The most commonly used indicators of personal characteristics in empirical
research have been demographic characteristics like managers age, industry,
organizational or executive tenure, educational level and functional or occupational
background (Bluedorn et al. 1994). In strategic issue diagnosis research, empirical
studies have indicated no or only weak effects of such demographic characteristics on
strategic issue diagnosis (Schneider and DeMeyer 1991; Thomas, Clark, and Gioia
1993; Thomas, Shankster, and Mathieu 1994). However, instead of viewing these
findings as reasons to downplay the role of managerial characteristics in strategic
issue diagnosis, research should move on to test previously untested individual
characteristics. In that respect, cognitive complexity represents a promising
alternative to demographic characteristics. Strategic issue diagnosis is a typical
example of a complex and ill-structured managerial task, and previous research on
cognitive complexity provides strong theoretical arguments and some empirical
evidence that suggests that in complex and ill-structured tasks, cognitively complex
individuals are more effective than their less complex counterparts (e.g. Bartunek,
Gordon, and Weathersby 1983; Calori, Johnson, and Samin 1994; Denison,
Hooijberg, and Quinn 1995; McGill, Johnson, and Bantel 1994; Streufert and
Streufert 1978; Streufert and Swezey 1986; Weick 1979b).
1.4 General research question
As we have seen, empirical studies of each of these three antecedents to strategic
issue diagnosis have the potential to contribute to research occupied with managers'
noticing and interpretation. In investigating all three antecedents, the primary aim of
the present study is to explore the question of whether and how antecedents at
different contextual levels influence managers noticing and interpretation of
environmental developments, trends and events. The investigation is based on a cross-
level analysis (Klein, Dansereau, and Hall 1994; Rousseau 1985) of strategic issue
diagnosis. Hence, the focal or target unit of the study is the strategic ..issue diagnosis
performed by individual top managers. To that end, the more general research
questions can be formulated as:
9RQ: Do the cognitive complexity of managers, the information processing structure of
an organization's top management team, and the organizational scanning of an
organization, each uniquely affect managers' strategic issue diagnosis?
1.5 Theoretical perspectives
Given the interest in antecedents to strategic issue diagnosis at different contextual
levels, a multidisiplinary perspective is the most appropriate for the present study.
Consequently, research from the fields of cognitive psychology, behavioral decision
making, strategy and organizational theory provides knowledge about the potential
effects of the chosen antecedents on strategic issue diagnosis. In later years, research
interested in the relationship among mind, management and organization have
become known under the notions of "strategic cognition" (Schwenk 1988) or
"managerial and organizational cognition" (e.g. Meindl, Stubbart, and Porac 1994;
Walsh 1995). A typical feature of this perspective, which also applies for the present
investigation, is the use of basic psychological research in studying realistic
managerial tasks of substantive organizational importance (Walsh 1995).
At a more specific level, the present study adopts an organizational and a managerial
information processing perspective. While information processing theories of
strategic issue diagnosis or related topics usually reflect either an organizational or a
managerial (individual) perspective (Comer, Kinicki, and Keats 1994; O'Reilly 1983;
Streufert and Swezey 1986), this study adopts both. Moreover, it integrates them, as
far as acknowledging both levels of information processing, and developing
theoretical explanations of the proposed relationships by connecting individual, group
and organizational information processing can be considered an integrative approach.
.A managerial or individual information processing perspective refers to the view that
managers are assumed to be information workers (McCall and Kaplan 1985). That is,
they spend their time seeking, absorbing, processing, and disseminating information
about issues, opportunities, and problems (e.g. Lord and Maher 1991; Walsh 1995).
Managerial thinking and behavior is viewed as a function of individualIevel cognitive
processes, which is heavily dominated by their knowledge structures (Comer, Kinicki,
and Keats 1994). Moreover, managers, like all individuals, have limited cognitive
10
capacity (Simon 1957a). These capacity limits mean that scarce attentional resources
are preserved through more or less automatic modes of schematic information
processing (e.g. Dutton 1993b; Dutton, Fahey, and Narayanan 1983; Lord and Foti
1986; Louis and Sutton 1991; Shaw 1990) and reliance on heuristics or judgmental
short-cuts to form inferences (e.g. Jackson and Dutton 1988; Nisbett and Ross 1980;
Schwenk 1984; Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Theories of cognitive complexity are
central to an individual information processing perspective, since they address the
structural dimensions that underlie the flow, processing, and use of information
(Streufert and Swezey 1986).
An organizational information processing perspective refers to attempts to explain
organizational behavior by examining the flows of information occurring in and
around organizations (Knight and McDaniel 1979). According to this perspective, the
acquisition and processing of environmental information is seen as one of the most
critical tasks of the organization (Shank et al. 1988; Weick 1979a). Organizational
information processing, of which organizational scanning and information processing
structure of top management teams are important concepts, are conceptually linked to
managerial information processing through its filtering and distributive mechanisms
(e.g. Huber and Daft 1987). In essence, organizational and group level information
processing influence the amounts and types of data, stimuli, information and
perspectives available to individual organizational members. Thus, different elements
of organizational information processing, like organizational scanning and top
management team structure, might be viewed as instruments to overcome some of the
limitations in individual information processing (March and Simon 1993; O'Reilly
1983).
1.6 Delimitation and scope
This study focuses on individual managers' strategic issue diagnosis. Although.
several organizational actors take part in strategic issue diagnosis, members of the top
management team are responsible for providing organizations' interpretations of their
environment and strategic responses (e.g. Daft and Weick 1984). Moreover, the top
management team members are the only individuals whose information processing
has a direct influence on strategic decisions (Corner, Kinicki, and Keats 1994). Thus,
11
in the pres~nt study, managers (or top managers) refers to members of the top
management team, defined as an organization's chief executive officer or executives
who report directly to the chief executive officer or top administrator (e.g. Bourgeois
1985; Sutcliffe 1994).
Strategic issue diagnosis, seen as the early phases of strategic decision making, is an
organizational phenomenon (e.g. Dutton, Fahey, and Narayanan 1983; Hambrick
1994). Strategic decisions require a variety of organizational members for their
recognition, formulation, evaluation and implementation. Consequently, the focus on
individual top managers' diagnosis could be seen as a serious limitation of the study
in terms of its face validity. However, studying strategic issue diagnosis at the group
or top management team level would require both additional and alternative
theoretical and methodological foci and approaches (e.g. Klein, Dansereau, and Hall
1994). In such a perspective, the question of the appropriate level of analysis for
strategic issue diagnosis becomes a question of priority, not a question of the right or
wrong level. In that respect, it seems like a more natural development in strategic
issue diagnosis research to further develop the notion of strategic issue diagnosis from
the threat-opportunity focus to other dimensions of strategic issue diagnosis and to
empirically test untested antecedents, than to study threat-opportunity diagnosis at the
team level.
Another delimitation of the present investigation is that it focuses on managerial
diagnosis without paying much attention to later phases of strategic decision making
or its link to organizational outcomes. This specialized focus is largelya consequence
of the combination of the importance of the early phase of strategic decision making
represented by strategic issue diagnosis (e.g. Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Theoret
1976) and the complexity of the phenomenon (e.g. Dutton, Fahey, and Narayanan
1983). However, the emphasis on other dimensions of strategic issue diagnosis than
threat-opportunity interpretations, is an attempt to make a closer link between
-
managerial noticing and interpretation and organizational outcomes than found in
.previous strategic issue diagnosis research. As will be further explicated in the next
chapter, one of the criteria used to identify and select previously untested dimensions
of strategic issue diagnosis, is the potential to affect subsequent cognition and
behavior at the individual, group or organizationallevel in a favorable manner.
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1.7 Organization of the study
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. In the next chapter the overall
concept of "strategic issue diagnosis" is developed and defined. Then, in chapter
three, the -theoretical perspective is further -elaborated and followed by literature
reviews and the development 'Of the .conceptual framework relating the central
concepts to each other. In chapter four, these relationships are translated into more
specific and testable hypotheses, while the research methodology is discussed in
chapter five. Chapter six deals with the development and evaluation of measures,
while the hypotheses are tested in chapter seven. Finally, in chapter 8 the results are
discussed and interpreted.
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CONCEPTUALIZING STRATEGIC ISSUE
DIAGNOSIS
Along with the increased interest in strategic, managerial and organizational cognition
over the last decade (e.g. Meindl, Stubbart, and Porac 1994; Porac, Meindl, and
Stubbart 1996; Schwenk 1988; Walsh 1995), a growing body of research by Jane E.
Dutton, James B. Thomas and others have paid particular attention to the phenomenon
called strategic issue diagnosis. In this chapter, the meaning of strategic issues and
strategic issue diagnosis are explicated, and the relationship between the process of
diagnosis, strategic issues and the organizational environment are clarified. Next, the
cognitive structures and processes that are assumed to be involved in strategic issue
diagnosis are discussed and related to schema theories and theories of cognitive
heuristics and biases. Then, strategic issue diagnosis is discussed from the perspective
that some types of diagnosis may have more or less potential to contribute to
effectiveness in strategic decision making than others. Based on this perspective, four
concepts of strategic issue diagnosis that extend previous conceptualizations are
developed.
2.1 The organizational environment, strategic issues and
strategic issue diagnosis
Strategic issues are defined as emerging developments, trends or events which in the
judgment of some strategic decision makers are likely to have a significant impact on
the organization's present or future strategy. Therefore, no issue is inherently
strategic, but becomes strategic when managers believe that it has relevance for
organizational performance (Dutton and Ashford 1993). Moreover, strategic issue
diagnosis is defined as the individuallevel, cognitive process throughwhich managers
notice and form interpretations about environmental developments, trends or events.
Finally, it has been emphasized that managers identify, interpret and formulate issues
by selectively attending to some aspects of the environment, while ignoring others.
This selectivity in diagnosis is rooted in the assumption of limited cognitive capacity,
i.e. that man has limited capacity to notice, seek, store, handle and make sense of data
(Simon 1957a). Besides, motivational and emotional factors may also influence
14
managerial thinking (e.g. Fiske and Taylor 1991). In the terminology of strategic issue
diagnosis, one implication of these assumptions is that strategic issues will never be
perfect representations of environmental developments, trends or events. Rather, there
is a reciprocal influence between the subject (managers) and the object
(developments, trends and events). On the onehand, developments, trends and events,
the raw material of issues, do have some objective reality to them which affects how
individuals notice, perceive, bound, and act on them. On the other hand, managers
interact with and affirm the existence of developments, trends and events, which
create and cast them in particular light for themselves and for other organizational
members (Dutton1993a).
To clarify the relationship between the process of strategic issue diagnosis, strategic
issues and environmental developments, trends and events, a modified version of
Haukedals (1994) scheme of stimulus objects (SO), strategic stimuli (SS) and
strategic issues (SI) is presented in Figure 1. The objective environment refers to a
stimulus object (SO) or simply "what is going on in the environment", registered or
not by managers. The stimulus object is the source of the strategic stimulus (SS),
which is seen as the data associated with the stimulus object reaching the perceiver. In
the language of perception psychology (e.g. Coren, Lawrence, and James 1994), the
stimulus object would be a distal stimulus while the strategic stimulus would be
referredto as a proximal stimulus (Coren, Lawrence, and James 1994). Strategic issue
diagnosis, i.e. the process through which decision-makers notice and form
interpretations about environmental developments, trends or events, refers to the
complete cognitive process. Strategic stimuli (SS) can be seen as the point of
departure of this process, while a strategic issue (SI) represents the end product
(Dutton, Fahey, and Narayanan 1983; Haukedal 1994). In the current research, like
most work in strategic issue diagnosis, the end product, i.e. strategic issues, is the
main focus.
Strategic issue diagnosis
so--- .....SS ----------~ SI
Figure 1.1: The environment, strategic stimuli and strategic issues
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The essential point so far, is that strategic issues are not identical to the developments,
trends and events in the environment. Some data are not registered, others are missed,
added and changed during the process of diagnosis. Thus, there will always be a gap
between the stimulus object (SO) and the strategic issue (SI).
2.2 The cognitive foundation of strategic issue diagnosis
The distinction between noticing and interpretation is related to the notion that
diagnosis involves two conceptually different cognitive processes (e.g. Daft and
Weick 1984; Dutton, Fahey, and Narayanan 1983; Kiesler and Sproulll982; Starbuck
and Milliken 1988).
Noticing refers to those activities and acts by which data and stimuli are translated
into focused issues (i.e. attention organizing acts), while interpretation refers to the
exploration and the construction of meaning in relation to an issue. This is admittedly
a difficult distinction in practice because people simultaneously notice stimuli and
make sense of them, and each of these activities depends upon the other (Starbuck and
Milliken 1988). Thus, a strategic issue can be seen as an outcome ofboth noticing and
interpretation (Dutton, Fahey, and Narayanan 1983). It is determined in part by which
data are registered and how these data are given meaning and constructed into an
issue. However, in strategic issue diagnosis research, one is particularly interested in
explaining and understanding why different managers interpret the same
development, trend or event differently, i.e. how and why they differ in diagnosis
output. Since interpretation is conceptually closer to diagnosis output than noticing,
the primary focus in strategic issue diagnosis research has usually been interpretation.
The focus on the output of diagnosis in strategic issue diagnosis research, along with
the strong links to strategy and organization theory rather than to cognitive
psychology, can explain why most descriptions and discussions of the cognitive.
foundation of strategic issue diagnosis have been somewhat restricted in detail and
depth (important exceptions include Dutton and Duncan 1987a; Dutton, Fahey, and
Narayanan 1983; Dutton and Jackson 1987). However, this should not be considered
as a serious weakness of strategic issue diagnosis research. Applying basic
psychological research when studying realistic managerial problems, corresponds to
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the partnership between the basic and applied sciences that has emerged over the past
decade in managerial and organizational cognition (Walsh 1995). Basic psychological
research has established that knowledge structures affect information processing in
predictable ways, while the management research community has taken the lead in
examining how the use of knowledge structures and processes relate to consequences
of substantive organizational importance. However, in order to provide a basis for the
development of other strategic issue diagnosis dimensions than threat-opportunity
interpretations, a more detailed description of the cognitive structures and processes
that are assumed to be involved in noticing and interpretation are discussed next.
. .
2.2.1 Schema theories
According to Walsh (1995), most work in managerial cognition relies on a "top-
down" or "theory-driven" human information processing paradigm. The basic idea is
that managers use existing cognitive structures referred to as schemas, maps,
categories, prototypes or scripts to transform data into information.
The term schema is used here as a general term that describes internal knowledge
structures that organize information about "things", i.e. objects, people, events,
situations and so on (Jackson and Dutton 1988; Markus and Zajonc 1985). Although
the terms schema and scripts are often used interchangeably, a script is a narrower
. .
term referring to a well-structured sequence of events associated with a highly
familiar activity that happen across a period of time (Matlin 1998). A cognitive map
may be defined as a mental device that codes and simplifies the way our spatial
environment is arranged (e.g. Kitchin 1994). Finally, categories are cognitive
structures organized according to prototypes, which are items that are most typical of
a category (Rosch 1973).
Schemas can be seen as parts of a persons overall or more general cognitive structure
or framework (e.g. Cowan 1986; Shaw 1990). Schemas, which are mental
representations of concepts and beliefs, provide interpretive lenses through which
individuals view the world. The interpretive lens of a cognitive schema selects certain
aspects of an issue as important, ignores others, and links them to certain actions or
consequences (Dutton, Fahey, and Narayanan 1983). Thus, the existing knowledge
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base of individuals, developed through past experience and learning and organized in
cognitive schemas, should heavily influence strategic issue diagnosis.
This does not imply that "data-driven" or "bottom up" information processing, where
the current information context guides the processing (Walsh 1995), does not occur.
While top-down processes might interact with "bottom-up" processes (Neisser 1976),
top-down information processing is supposed to be the dominant response in most
managerial situations (Walsh 1995).
Despite the importance of schemas and schema-driven information processing, it is
impossible to predict diagnosis outputs from cognitive schemas alone (Dutton, Fahey,
and Narayanan 1983). The "messy" characteristics of strategic issues imply that
managers rarely have ready-made appropriate schemas for the environmental
developments, trends or events in the environment. When an environmental situation
is incongruent to a schema, managers often fill in gaps in the existing data and draw
inferences beyond the existing evidence in order to fit the situation to the schema
(Dutton, Fahey, and Narayanan 1983; Dutton and Jackson 1987). Another option is to
deploy additional cognitive resources (Lord and Foti 1986; Schwenk 1988).Managers
can respond by using a more bottom-up or data-driven processing mode, that is to
continue to process registered data until an existing schema is made to account for the
situation or until a new schema is generated (Dutton,' Fahey, and Narayanan 1983).
This process refers to more conscious, controlled or active modes of cognition, as
opposed to automatic or "habits of mind" modes (e.g. Dutton 1993b; Lord and Foti
1986; Louis and Sutton 1991; Shaw 1990). In active modes of strategic issue
diagnosis, greater attentional resources are expended to form multiple interpretations,
to sort relevant from irrelevant information and to search beyond the information that
is readily available (Dutton 1993b). Automatic diagnosis on the other hand, involves
the fitting' of situations to schemas, using less cognitive effort or expenditure of
attentional and analytic resources in understanding an issue (Dutton 1993b). Given the
-
complex nature of the raw material of strategic issues, strictly schema-driven
automatic processing might be an inappropriate way of giving meaning to strategic
issues (Comer, Kinicki, and Keats 1994; Dutton 1993b; Lord and Foti 1986; Louis
and Sutton 1991). In practice, however, fully automatic or "mindless" processing is
hard to imagine in managers' strategic issue diagnosis. Even when top-down
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processes dominate managerial thinking, there are room for flexible use of schematic
knowledge. When managers respond as if a particular situation fit a particular schema,
they appear to be determining that the situation is analogous to those situations from
which the schema was originally derived (Dutton, Fahey, and Narayanan 1983;
Rummelhart and Ortony 1977; Schwenk 1988). Analogies can be applied strictly and
narrowly or rather broadly and loosely, and it is this quality that produces flexibility
in human thought (Markus and Zajonc 1985).
At a very basic level, we know very little about how managers actually organize issue
knowledge in memory (Dutton, Fahey, and Narayanan 1983; Walsh 1995) and what
kinds of processing modes that best describe managerial thinking (Stubbart 1987).
According to Markus and Zajonc (1986), schemas are multidetermined and multiply
activated and have diverse and varied consequences. Even though we have limited
knowledge of how schemas influence managerial thinking in general, and strategic
issue diagnosis in particular, schema theories offers a framework that provides a
deeper understanding of important managerial and organizational phenomena (e.g.
Lord and Foti 1986; Schwenk 1988; Schwenk 1995; Stubbart 1989; Walsh 1995).
Moreover, it might well be the case that schemas have most to offer when individuals
are confronted with ambiguous and conflicting stimuli, which requires some structure
to be processed meaningfully or efficient (Markus and Zajonc 1985). An important
implication is that while schema theories emphasize a tendency to inflexibility in
human thought, flexible and open cognition might be the most appropriate response
for managers confronted with unique and complex environmental developments,
trends or events.
2.2.2 The heuristic and bias approach
The behavioral decision theory literature provides a somewhat different material for
.<.-. -
the study of cognition in organizational settings. While paying less attention to
knowledge structures and theoretical explanation as such, researchers in the field have
empirically demonstrated systematic departures from the rational model of human
choice. By studying such departures, errors or biases in the laboratory, Tversky and
Kahneman (1974) and other behavioral decision researchers have identified that
people rely on a number of simplifying strategies, rules of thumb, or heuristics in
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making inferences and judgments. These heuristics may provide efficient short cuts in
information processing, but sometimes they lead to severe and systematic errors
(Tversky and Kahneman 1974). The difficulty with heuristics is that individuals
typically do not recognize that they are using them, and consequently fail to
distinguish between situations in which their use is more or less appropriate. The
errors emanating from heuristics are often termed cognitive biases, which refers to
situations in which a heuristic is inappropriately applied by an individual making a
judgment or a decision (e.g. Bazerman 1994; Haley and Stumpf 1989).
While schema theories and heuristic decision making usually are treated separately in
the literature, cognitive heuristics can be understood in relation to the schema-concept
(Lord and Foti 1986; Nisbett and Ross 1980; Schwenk 1988). Many cognitive biases
in human inferences and judgment are the results of invoking inappropriate schema-
knowledge (Markus and Zajonc 1985; Schwenk 1988) and automatic modes of
information processing (Louis and Sutton 1991). Take for instance the availability
heuristic. It suggests that decision-makers assess the frequency, probability, or likely
causes of an event by the degree to which instances or occurrences of that event are
readily "available" in memory (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Thus, an event that
evokes emotions and is vivid, easily imagined, and specific will be given more weight
in inferential processes than will an event that is unemotional in nature, bland,
difficult to imagine or vague. This mechanism may be called the ease of recall bias
(Bazerman 1994). The point is that what is vivid, easily imagined and so on, will be
affected by schematic knowledge, and vivid, easily imagined events will affect which
schemas are activated. Thus, when an inappropriate schema is activated, setting an
inference process in motion that may lead to wrong conclusions, the result might be a
cognitive bias.
While most heuristics and biases have been demonstrated .in .laboratory settings,
several researchers have begun to suggest that they may influence strategic issue
diagnosis and decision making in the "real world" as well (e.g. Barnes 1984; Dutton
1993b; Lai 1994; Lant, Milliken, and Batra 1992; Milliken and Lant 1991; Schwenk
1984; Schwenk 1986; Schwenk 1988; Zajac and Bazerman 1991). In relation to
strategic issue diagnosis, the identification of typically used heuristics along with
systematic biases are particularly useful in the explanation of pathological diagnosis.
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The threat bias for example, i.e. that managers view strategic issues as threats unless
there is strong evidence to do otherwise, is the tendency for managers to be more
sensitive to data that suggests the presence of a threat than t.o data that suggests the
presence of an opportunity (Jackson and Dutton 1988).
To sum up, managers confronted with strategic issues, like all individuals, have
limited cognitive capacity. These capacity limits mean that scarce attentional
resources are preserved through more or less automatic modes of schematic
information processing and reliance on heuristics or judgmental short-cuts to form
inferences. Cognitive schemas provide managers with a knowledge base that serves as
a guide for noticing and interpretation and help simplify and manage strategic issues.
Thus, different cognitive schemas and different modes of information processing offer
cognitive explanations of the broad question of why different managers give different
meaning to the same environmental development, trend or event. In the rest of this
chapter, this knowledge provides the foundation for the discussion and development
of four concepts of strategic issue diagnosis that goes beyond previous
conceptualizations.
2.3 The focus on threat-opportunity interpretation in strategic
issue diagnosis
The importance of strategic issue diagnosis stems from its pervasiveness and
centrality in the context of strategic decisions, its impact upon later decision phases
and its potential for changing managers understanding of their internal and external
environment (Dutton, Fahey, and Narayanan 1983). It critically affects both the
process and content of subsequent phases of strategic decision making (Dutton,
Fahey, and Narayanan 1983) and thus organizational choice and action (e.g. Daft and
Weick 1984; Thomas, Clark, and Gioia 1993). In other words, how managers
diagnose developments, trends or events is critical since variations in diagnosis can
lead to different strategic responses (Dutton and Dukerich 1991; Dutton and Duncan
1987b; Lant, Milliken, and Batra 1992). Finally and most importantly, some diagnosis
may result in more effective strategic decisions and higher levels of performance than
others (Gooding and Kinicki 1995; Meyer 1982). How diagnosis can affect
performance is less than clear.
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Most empirical strategic Issue diagnosis research has been occupied with effect
valence, or the extent to which managers frame an issue in positive or negative terms.
The typical approach has been to present managers with a case scenario describing a
development, trend or event and ask them to complete a questionnaire. The
questionnaire contains items assessing different dimensions strongly associated with
the labels of threat and opportunity (usually the positive-negative, gain-loss and
controllability-uncontrollability dimensions). While there are conflicting evidence as
to whether managers actually use such labels in their strategic thinking, or how such
labels are related to managers cognitive representations of the environment (e.g.
Cowan 1990; Dutton 1993b; Smith 1995; Thomas, Shankster, and Mathieu 1994),
there have been more consensus about two other features of such labels. First, while
labels like threat and opportunity might be too simplistic and summarized to actually
capture managers thinking, managers apply them to express meaning if they are given
the labels (or their dimensions) or when provided overt linguistic prompts for a label
(Smith 1995). Second, when such labels are used as simplifying or communicative
devices, they are thought to have predictable framing effects on later cognition and
behavior (e.g. Dutton 1993a; Dutton and Ashford 1993; Tversky and Kahneman
1981). Thus, how an issue is framed might produce or interact with cognitive biases in
later phases of diagnosis and influence different patterns of organizational decision
making. More specifically, it is usually assumed that seeing an issue as an opportunity
is associated with more open and creative individual cognition, together with greater
level of participation and motivation at the group and organizational level (e.g. Dutton
1993a; Dutton, Stumpf, and Wagner 1990; Dutton and Webster 1988; Nutt 1984;
Schneider and DeMeyer 1991). Indeed, Dutton (1993a) suggests that the potential
power of opportunities is so strong that organizations should actively construct
opportunities. This is partly a reflection of the threat bias suggested by Jackson and
Dutton (1988). They found that managers were more sensitive to data that suggests
the presence of a threat than they were to data that suggests the ·presence of an
opportunity. Managers concluded that threat was present when available data was
ambiguous, and they did not conclude that threat was absent even when available data
was clearly contrary to the presence of threat. Thus they tended to view strategic
issues as threats unless there was strong evidence to do otherwise, suggesting a threat
bias, and Dutton (1993a) argues that opportunity construction can suppress this bias.
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Moreover, opportunities are powerful issue frames also because of their potency as
legitimating and motivating symbols for issues in organizations (Dutton 1993a).
These findings suggest, as most researchers in strategic issue diagnosis claim, that
positive effect valence would be more effective than negative effect valence, because
of desirable framing effects on future treatment of the issue, and as an indication of
less threat biased interpretation. There are however conflicting evidence concerning
this assumption. Mintzberg et al. (1976) observed that managers most frequently meet
problems or threats with process actions intended to be comprehensive and rational,
but responded to opportunities without using formal, analytical decision aids.
Similarly, Fredrickson (1985) found that MBA students endorsed actions that were
significantly more comprehensive when faced with problems than when faced with
opportunities. However, upper-middle level executives responded more or less
equally to problems and opportunities. Furthermore, Thomas et al. (1993) in a
longitudinal study, found that positive effect valence was directly and negatively
linked to profit, suggesting that profit was enhanced when managers interpreted
strategic issues negatively. Finally, research on cognitive processes in sensemaking
suggests that managers use relatively automatic categorization processes to interpret
positive events, but more effortful attributional processes to interpret negative events
(Gooding and Kinicki 1995). Similarly, Dunegan (1994) found that subjects receiving
positive performance feedback during a project exhibited characteristics associated
with "mindless" information processing, while negative or mixed feedback were
associated with "mindful" processing of information. Thus, both cognitive and
behavioral effects of differences in effect valence are inconclusive, at lest for
moderate values of effect valence.
Previous research on strategic issue diagnosis has not considered the potential effects
of extremity in effect valence, implicitly indicating a linear positive relationship
between effect valence and desirable subsequent cognition and behavior. There are
however, reasons to assume that diagnosing an issue as extremely positive or negative
might be. associated with poor performance. First, extreme valence is for most
situations a strong indicator of stereotyped or in other ways biased thinking caused by
lack of knowledge or simplicity in the representation of knowledge within a domain
(e.g. Linville 1982; Lord and Foti 1986). Second, simple cognitive representations
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seem to be associated with both too negative and too positive evaluations (Linville
1982; Linville and Jones 1980). Thus, extremity in effect valence is likely to be poor
and oversimplified images of the environmental situations they represent, no matter
the direction of the valence. Third, the evidence that suggests that extreme effect
valence is likely to have negative framing effects on later cognition and behavior, is
relatively consistent for both extremely negative and extremely positive valence.
More than moderate positive diagnosis may curtail managers' desire to understand an
issue (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Theoret 1976) because they may assume that they
can simply exploit opportunities without conducting extended analysis (Fredrickson
1985). This may lead managers to act in an overly simplistic manner toward strategic
issues even though they are ill-equipped to capitalize on possible opportunities
(Thomas, Clark, and Gioia 1993). In a similar fashion, research on crises and disasters
demonstrates that there is a tendency for individuals, groups, or organizations to
behave overly rigidly in extremely threatening situation (e.g. Dutton 1986a; Lai 1994;
Starbuck, Greve, and Hedberg 1978; Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton 1981; Turner
1976). Based on this research, it is reasonable to consider extremity in effect valence
to be a potentially counterproductive dimension of strategic issue diagnosis.
2.4 Strategic issue diagnosis and effectiveness
From the discussion above, one can conclude that the consequences of moderate
values of effect valence are unclear, and that extreme valence might have negative
consequences on later phases of issue .resolution at .both the individual and
organizational levels. Thus, there is a need to develop strategic issue diagnosis
dimensions that are less ambiguously related to effectiveness.
Diagnosis effectiveness could be defined in terms of correspondence between the
stimulus object and the corresponding strategic issue, usually referred to as
interpretive accuracy (e.g. Dess and Keats 1987; Shank et al. 1988; Sutcliffe 1994) or
veridicality (e.g. Walsh 1995). But, given the unstructured nature of the task of
interpreting the environment, it is both difficult and controversial to specify criteria
that could measure accurately the performance of such a task (e.g. Lyles 1981;
Milliken and Vollrath 1991; Salancik and Porac 1986; Weick 1990; Weick and Daft
1983). One difficulty is that the quality of managers' noticing and interpretation
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becomes u~derstandable only after results from the diagnosis have occurred (Smircich
and Stubbart 1985; Starbuck and Milliken 1988). However, even for post-decisions or
post-diagnosis, it is difficult to separate good from bad because good .and bad results
may arise from very similar processes (Starbuck and Milliken 1988). Furthermore, it
is difficult to think of any accurate, or right or wrong description of an environmental
development, trend or event that can be used as a benchmark to compare an issue
against a stimulus object (Walsh 1995). The raw material of interest in strategic issue
diagnosis, i.e. the environmental developments, trends or events or stimulus objects,
are in a relative sense more uncertain, unpredictable, complex, ill-structured and
difficult to isolate than stimulus objects used in most basic psychological research.
For example, while finding the way out of a maze or solving a mathematical problem
can be structured as tasks with a definable and single best solution, the raw material of
interest in strategic issue diagnosis are open to multiple interpretations not only due to
human cognitive limitations, but because they might have multiple potentially
successful "solutions" (Dutton, Fahey, and Narayanan 1983).
frxsPite these difficulties, and in contrast to most work in strategic issue diagnosis,
J/ one of the potential contributions of the present study is to develop strategic issue
Idiagnosis dimensions that are less ambiguously related to effectiveness in strategic
I
I. decision making. After all, the dominant view in both theory and practice is that
trying to make sense of the environment is an important and crucial activity closely
related to organizational effectiveness and survival (e.g. Daft and Weick 1984;
Stoffels 1994). Moreover, this activity is active and intentional (e.g. Stubbart and
Ramaprasad 1990). Consequently, it is an important task for researchers interested in
managerial and organizational cognition to propose concepts that can better determine
if one interpretation can be said to be more effective than another. In approaching this
task, the present study relies on the principle that diagnosis can be more or less
reasonable rather than right or wrong (Weick and Daft 1983). To conceptually differ
between what is more or less reasonable or what have the potential-to contribute to
.
effectiveness in decision making, two criteria are used. First, diagnosis that is likely to
be a result of the application of appropriate schemas and appropriate modes of schema
processing is considered to have the potential to contribute to effectiveness. Second,
so is diagnosis that is likely to affect subsequent cognition or behavior at the
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individual, group or organizational level in a favorable manner. Thus, each of the
following diagnosis concepts will be discussed in relation to these two criteria;
• an extended conceptualization of effect valence,
• issue sorting,
• causal understanding, and
• data search.
The ordering of the concepts do not reflect a sequential view of the strategic issue
diagnosis process. What is important is that the four concepts to be discussed next
refer to different dimensions of strategic issue diagnosis and that they are more
closely related to effectiveness than previous conceptualizations.
2.4.1 An extended conceptualization of effect valence
Based on the discussion of previous strategic issue diagnosis research and two criteria
listed above, the traditional effect valence perspective of threat and opportunity
interpretations is extended by including extremity in effect valence. Extreme valence
is likely to be a result of stereotyped or in other ways biased thinking (e.g. Linville
1982; Lord and Foti 1986) and it might have counterproductive framing effects of
later cognition and behavior (e.g. Dutton 1986a; Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Theoret
1976). Effect valence extremity is defined as the perceived positive effects an
opportunity has on a manager' s own organization compared to other organizations,
and the perceived negative effects a threat has on a manager' s own organization
compared to other organizations.
Most studies of threat and opportunity have treated them (and their underlying
dimensions) as two ends of a single dimension and assessed this dimension through
"neutral" or ambiguous developments, trends or events (e.g. Fombrun and Zajac
1987; Ginsberg and Venkatraman 1992; Thomas, Clark, and Gioia 1993; Thomas and
McDaniel 1990). Work by Jackson and Dutton (1988) and Denison et al. (1996), in
contrast, suggests that threat and opportunity represent distinct dimensions relevant to
issue interpretation. In order to address this concern, and be able to assess extremity in
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effect valence for both opportunities and threats, a distinction is made between threat
and opportunity interpretations.
Finally, in order to build on and to compare the present investigation with previous
work, the traditional dimensions of positive-negative, gain-loss and controllability-
uncontrollability interpretations are included. Since the positive-negative and gain-
loss dimensions have been shown to be operationally indistinguishable and highly
correlated (e.g. Thomas and McDaniel 1990), they are collapsed into a single
positive-gain interpretation and a negative-loss interpretation dimension. Thus, as in
'most studies since Thomas and McDaniel (1990), positive-gain and negative-loss are
defined as the perceived advantage/disadvantage and probability of gainlloss
associated with an issue. Controllability and uncontrollability refer to the perceived
capability to capitalize on an opportunity and to manage a threat.
In summary, effect valence refer to opportunity and threat interpretations where
opportunity interpretation will be conceptualized in terms of positive-gain,
controllability and opportunity extremity perceptions, and threat interpretation in
terms of negative-loss, uncontrollability and threat extremity perceptions.
2.4.2 Issue sorting
Issue sorting refers to the act of distinguishing relevant developments, trends or
events from less relevant environmental changes. With limited cognitive capacity
(Simon 1957b) and scarce attentional resources to be invested in further elaboration of
issues (Dutton, Stumpf, and Wagner 1990), the task of sorting the wheat from the
chaff in the fields of potential issues facing managers becomes an important
managerial task with the potential to strongly influence the performance and even
survival of organizations (Dutton, Walton, and Abrahamson 1989). First, explanations
of crises, disasters, or organizational decline often focus on how managers failed to
spot major environmental threats or opportunities or failed to heed well-founded
warnings (Starbuck, Greve, and Hedberg 1978; Starbuck and Milliken 1988; Whetten
1988). Furthermore, explanations of organizational success often cite managers'
awareness of environmental changes or the ability to sort out the important aspects of
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the environment (e.g. Gannon, Smith, and Grimm 1992; Lant, Milliken, and Batra
1992;Meyer 1982).
One way that managers differentiate between developments, trends and events is
through judgments of importance and feasibility (Dutton, Stumpf, and Wagner 1990).
Importance is defined as the perceived urgency and impact associated with an issue,
while feasibility is the perception of how easy it is to understand an issue. To
effectively differentiate between developments, trends and events in terms of
importance and feasibility imply an ability to register vague and ambiguous
environmental data and stimuli, to classify signals from noise, to construct issues out
of noticed data and to compare issues against each other. Several studies have
demonstrated that decision makers and people in general sometimes pay too much or
too little attention to data and stimuli with certain properties (e.g. Bazerman 1994;
Hogarth 1987; Kiesler and Sproull 1982; Starbuck and Milliken 1988; Tversky and
Kahneman 1974). Consistent with the availability and representativeness heuristics
(Tversky and Kahneman 1974), data that are easy to understand, concrete,
quantitative and memory or schema-consistent are shown to attract people's attention
(e.g. Hogarth 1987). Moreover, when managers engage in more automatic modes of
processing, they are more likely to make impressionistic interpretations of strategic
data and less likely to differentiate across types and sources of data (Comer, Kinicki,
and Keats 1994). Hence, high levels of differentiation would imply application of
appropriate modes of schema processing. Finally, in terms of influence on subsequent
cognition or behavior at the individual, group or organizational level, differentiation
in terms of importance and feasibility is important since it determines the allocation of
time and priorities to issues (Dutton, Stumpf, and Wagner 1990).
2.4.3 Causal understanding
In the process of issue resolution, managers generate understanding that relate various
events or concepts together in a causal manner (Dutton, Fahey, and Narayanan 1983).
These beliefs are stored in cognitive schemas as parts of the more specific schema
content. Thus, causal understanding represents relational statements which allow
diagnosing participants to impose a logic for understanding an issue as well as a logic
for resolving it if necessary (Dutton, Fahey, and Narayanan 1983). Such relational
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statements are critical dimensions of strategic issue diagnosis, as they frame an issue
in a particular way thus affecting subsequent interpretations and actions (Dutton,
Fahey, and Narayanan 1983).
The relative superiority of any particular understanding of and environmental
development, trend or event is difficult to demonstrate. However, in order ·to generate
several interpretations and understandings of environmental situations so that the
"variety" in the understanding becomes more equivalent to the variety in the situation
(Bartunek, Gordon, and Weathersby 1983), nuanced causal understanding in terms of
being open to multiple cause-effect relationships will most likely be more reasonable
than understanding issues in terms of universal, unambiguous or simple one-to-one
causal relationships. More specifically, nuanced causal understanding increases the
probability that individuals will perceive complex events more accurately, synthesize
diverse perceptions and experiences more completely.
According to schema theory, this kind of "rich" understanding requires highly
developed cognitive schemas, application of multiple schemas and controlled as
opposed to automatic cognition. Unnuanced or simple and narrow causal
understanding on the other hand, is likely to be a result of too simple or in other ways
inappropriate cognitive schemas, use of single schemas, or the application of more or
less appropriate schemas in a too rigid or automatic manner (e.g. Dutton 1993b~
Kiesler and Sproull 1982; Lord and Foti 1986; Louis and Sutton 1991). While being
cognitively effective in terms of relatively effortless understanding of complex
phenomena, unnuanced causal understanding might lead to outdated and overly
simplified subsequent cognition and action (e.g. Gioia 1986~ Kiesler and Sproull
1982~ Louis and Sutton 1991), in addition to inhibitation of learning and schema
development (Lord and Foti 1986).
2.4.4 Data search
Data search is more related to the strategic issue diagnosis process than the diagnosis
concepts discussed so far. Gathering, use and interpretation of data are interactive
processes, where search does not unambiguously precede interpretation and
interpretation influence further search activities (Dutton, Fahey, and Narayanan
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1983). Thus, when effect valence, issue sorting and causal understanding are more
easily understood as endproducts of strategic issue diagnosis (although temporal),
data search is a concept describing overt behavior in the process of strategic issue
diagnosis.
Data search is defined in terms of the amount and type of data managers- gather and
use in diagnosing strategic issues. Given that some data are more closely related to an
issue and more difficult to gather than other data, different types of data are
categorized as core data, additional data and new data. While accepting the notion that
more information is not necessarily better (e.g. Feldman and March 1981; O'Reilly
1980; Schick, Gordon, and Haka 1990), it is reasonable to assume that the use of large
amounts and different types of data is crucial in strategic issue diagnosis. The raw
material of interest in strategic issue diagnosis research is complex and unique
environmental situations that are difficult to isolate and understand. Accordingly,
managers faced with such situations should search for and use large amounts and
different types of data in order to clarify and understand them (e.g. Daft, Sormunen,
and Parks 1988; Thomas and MeDaniel 1990). However, managers often demonstrate
heuristics and biases in data search behavior, leading to limited search in terms of
amount, scope and type of data. Individuals are frequently biased towards schema-
consistent data and towards data with certain properties (e.g. Bazerman 1994; Hogarth
1987;Kiesler and Sproulll982; Starbuck and Milliken 1988; Tversky and Kahneman
1974). They tend to have little understanding of what they do not know (McGee,
Dowling, and Megginson 1995), have little appreciation for the value of additional
data (e.g. Cooper, Folta, and Woo 1995), and rarely rely on high quality sources of
information (e.g. O'Reilly 1982; O'Reilly, Chatman, and Anderson 1987). Confronted
with strategic issues, this type of biased data search behavior is less likely to lead to
sufficient understanding and subsequent appropriate behavior than more
comprehensive search. For example, if a manager starts out with a poor or overly
simplified initial or preliminary understanding, he is likely to limit data search, which
in tum might preserve or even further simplify his or her understanding of the issue.
Hence, the search for and use. of large amounts and different types of data is
considered to contribute to effectiveness in strategic issue diagnosis.
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2.5 Summary of the chapter
In this chapter, the meaning of strategic issues and strategic issue diagnosis was
explicated and the relationship between the process of diagnosis, strategic issues and
the 'organizational environment was clarified. In addition, strategic issue diagnosis
was related to schema theories and theories of- heuristics and biases. Finally, four
different concepts of strategic issue diagnosis that extend previous conceptualizations
were presented. The development, refinement or choices of these concepts were
guided by the principle that these strategic issue diagnosis concepts should be less
ambiguously related to effectiveness in strategic decision making than the traditional
effect valence approach.
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LITERATUREREVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL
FRAMEWORK
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss managers' cognitive complexity, the
information processing structure of organizations' top management .teams and
organizations' environmental scanning as antecedents to strategic issues diagnosis.
The chapter begins with a presentation of the theoretical perspective applied. Then,
the selection, definitions and potential effects of each antecedent are discussed. In this
discussion, previous theory and empirical research on each of the antecedents are
reviewed in order to provide initial support for their effects on strategic issue
diagnosis. Furthermore, the relative effects of the contextual and individual
antecedents, and possible moderating effects of the contextual antecedents on the
relationship between the individual antecedent and strategic issue diagnosis are
discussed. The review is summarized in a figure presenting the conceptual framework
for the study.
3.1 A multiple context information processing perspective
Information processing theories of strategic issue diagnosis or decision making
usually reflect either an organizational or an individual (or managerial) level of
analysis. The single level focus of these theories makes them incomplete
representations of.how strategic decisions actually are made in organizations (Comer,
Kinicki, and Keats 1994; Streufert and Swezey 1986). The present study adopts both
the individual and the organizational information processing perspectives in the
investigation of strategic issue diagnosis. Moreover, it integrates them as far as
acknowledging both levels of information processing and developing theoretical
explanations of the proposed relationships by connecting individual, group and
organizational information processing can be considered an integrative approach.
The individual or managerial information processing perspective refers to the view
that managers are seen as information workers (McCall and Kaplan 1985). That is,
they spend their time absorbing, processing, and disseminating information about
issues, opportunities, and problems (Lord and Maher 1991;Walsh 1995). Managerial
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thinking and behavior is viewed as a function.of individual level cognitive processes,
which is dominated by their knowledge structures (Comer, Kinicki, and Keats 1994).
This perspective rests on the description of the cognitive foundation underlying
strategic issue diagnosis discussed in the previous chapter. In short, managers have
limited capacity to process information and these limits mean that scarce attentional
resources are preserved through more or less automatic modes of- schematic
information processing and reliance on heuristics or judgmental short-cuts to form
inferences.
The organizational information processing perspective refers to attempts to explain
organizational behavior by examining the information flows occurring in and around
organizations (Knight and McDaniel 1979). In this perspective, the acquisition and
processing of environmental information is seen as one of the most critical tasks of
the organization (Shank et al. 1988; Weick 1979a). This is not a new or infrequently
applied perspective in organizational research. Organizational performance and
behavior are seen so closely linked to organizational information processing that a
number of organizational scientist have advocated that organizations should be
viewed as information processing systems (e.g. Galbraith 1977; Huber 1982; O'Reilly
1983; Simon 1973; Streufert and Swezey 1986; Tushman and Nadler 1978).
Organizational information processing can be conceptually linked .to individual
information processing through its filtering and distributive mechanisms. In essence,
it influences the amounts and types of data, stimuli and information available to
individual organizational members. Thus, organizational information processing can
be seen as a basis or an instrument to overcome some of the limitations in individual
information processing capacity (e.g. Dutton and Ottensmeyer 1987; Glynn 1996;
Goldstein and Zack 1989; Hedberg 1981; March and Simon 1993; O'Reilly 1983).
Earlier attempts to integrate these two perspectives have mainly been theoretical (e.g.
Comer, Kinicki, and Keats 1994; Hambrick and Mason 1984; Macdonald 1995;
O'Reilly 1983; O'Reilly, Chatman, and Anderson 1987) and/or typically biased
toward one perspective where the other is partly assumed away (Comer, Kinicki, and
Keats 1994). Despite the convincing assumption that information plays a vital role in
the cognitive process through which decision-makers notice and form interpretations
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about environmental developments, trends or events, there are relatively few studies
taking an organizational information processing view on strategic issue diagnosis
(Thomas and McDaniel 1990). If environmental data and stimuli are important input
in managers effort to understand and make sense of the environment, one should
expect that factors related to organizational acquisition, distribution and sharing of
such data and stimuli would influence managers' strategic issue diagnosis. Such
factors can include a variety of organizational and group characteristics (e.g. O'Reilly,
Chatman, and Anderson 1987). The present study focuses on two different concepts
within organizational information processing that are frequently discussed in the
organizational information processing literature; organizational scanning and
information processing structure of top management teams. These concepts represent
essential antecedents to managerial noticing and interpretation since they relate to the
channeling of available stimuli to the manager from which he selects a subset (Kiesler
and Sproull 1982).
To summarize, in the multiple context information processing perspective applied in
the current research, managers' strategic issue diagnosis is assumed to be affected by
both organizational, group and individual level information processing characteristics.
This argument will be further explicated below, where the selection, definitions and
potential effects of the three antecedents are discussed in relation to previous theory
and empirical research, starting with organizational scanning.
3.2 Organizational scanning
Organizational scanning is defined as structured and deliberate efforts in acquisition,
availability and use of environmental data, stimuli and information in order to monitor
the organizational environment. Scanning profile refers to (a) the degree of scanning
in terms of how frequently an organization scan the enviro:nment and (b) the degree of
availability and use of different types of information in an organization. Both
descriptive and normative literature stress the importance of monitoring and analyzing
the external environment in order to provide early warning signals from emerging
developments, trends and events, to create a better understanding of the environment
and to increase organizational responsiveness (e.g. Daft and Weick 1984; Stoffels
1994). The significance of organizational scanning derives from the notion that
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managers c~ only interpret, disseminate and analyze data and stimuli that enter the
organization (e.g. Hambrick 1982). In short, in order to keep an organization in touch
with the environment, it must be designed to ensure that decision makers receive
information in an amount and form that facilitates effective interpretation and
decision making (Daft, Bettenhausen, and Tyler 1993).
Organizational scanning is a broad concept that might involve several modes of
information behavior by organizations and their members. Scanning is sometimes
differentiated between the searching for data, stimuli and information about a specific
question, and viewing data, stimuli and information without a specific need in mind
(e.g. Aguilar 1967; Auster and Choo 1994). Following Huber and Daft (1987), who
use scanning versus probing to denote the differences between viewing and searching,
organizational scanning will refer exclusively to the viewing or monitoring mode in
the present investigation. Furthermore, scanning can include both formal and informal
modes (e.g. Aguilar 1967; Hambrick 1982), and be studied as an organizational
phenomenon (e.g. Lenz and Engledow 1986a) or as managerial information behavior
or practice (e.g. Hambrick 1982). Given the possibility that managers in organizations
that do not use formal systems for environmental scanning tend to focus on their own
short -term interests and fail to share information with other managers (Reinhardt
1984; Thomas 1974), the present study focus on the organizationallevel, formal and
deliberate practice of viewing or monitoring the environment.
There are several reasons why organizational scanning as defined above should be
included in the study of strategic issue diagnosis. The most obvious one is the
combination of its potential to influence managers noticing and interpretation and the
lack of previous empirical research. Turning to the latter first, researchers still report
considerable gaps of knowledge concerning how organizations process information
and possible effects of different modes of information processing (e.g. El Sawy and
Pauchant 1988; Lenz and Engledow 1986a; Lenz and Engledow ·1986b; Schick,
Gordon, and Haka 1990). While there are several studies predominantly occupied
with individual and/or more active or problem oriented modes of scanning (e.g.
Aguilar 1967; Auster and Choo 1994; Choo 1994; Culnan 1983; Daft, Sormunen, and
Parks 1988; Hambrick 1981a; Hambrick 1982; Keegan 1974; Kefalas and Schoderbek
1973; O'Reilly 1980; O'Reilly 1982; Sawyerr 1993; Stoffels 1994), contributions on
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formal or institutionalized organizational scanning are less exhaustive (Yasai-
Ardekani and Nystrom 1996).
The primary focus of studies on organizational scanning has been to assess the state-
of-the-art of environmental analysis among different organizations (e.g. Diffenbach
1983; Fahey and King 1977; Fahey, King, and Narayanan 1981; Jain 1984; Lenz and
Engledow 1986a; Stubbart 1982). Moreover, researchers interested in organizational
scanning effects have demonstrated a tendency to translate organizational scanning
directly to output like response or financial performance (e.g. Dollinger 1984;
Gannon, Smith, and Grimm 1992; Jennings and Lumpkin 1989; Reid 1984; Smith et
al. 1991), without paying attention to decision makers' interpretations or decisions
within the organization. Despite this lack of research, we do know that the scanning
effort varies from organization to organization (e.g. Daft and Weick 1984; Jain 1984;
Lenz and Engledow 1986a; Meyer 1982; Yasai-Ardekani and Nystrom 1996).
Moreover, organizational scanning is usually a relatively stable and routinized
organizational feature (Huber and Daft 1987) with an explorative character
(Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Theoret 1976). In general, it is often designed and
conducted without any clear notion of when data, stimuli and information will benefit
the organization (O'Reilly 1980). In fact, it is suggested that only a small part of an
organization's total informational effort is directly related to strategic decision making
(Aguilar 1967; Huber and Daft 1987; Sabatier 1978). However, organizational
scanning can still be seen as-a deliberate and intentional organizational task and a top
priority in many organizations (e.g. Jain 1984; Lenz and Engledow 1986a; Lenz and
Engledow 1986b), although the motives for scanning the environment probably go
beyond the search for threats and opportunities (e.g. Huber and Daft 1987). The most
important question in the present investigation, however, is whether it updates the
knowledge of managers and provides early input for noticing and interpretation, and
thereby actually influences strategic issue diagnosis?
This question is at the heart of the relationship between organizational and individual
information processing. There are several arguments that suggest that organizational
scanning might not influence strategic issue diagnosis. First, several organizational
members and units others than those responsible for strategic issue diagnosis are
engaged in scanning (e.g. Daft and Weick 1984; Hambrick 1982), and empirical
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studies indicate that organizations are usually not successful in having their
informational input integrated into the strategic management process (e.g. Diffenbach
1983; Jain 1984; Lenz and Engledow 1986a; Stubbart 1982). Such findings are
usually explained as a distribution problem, i.e. that data, stimuli and information is
often blocked or distorted as it travels in organizational communication networks (e.g.
O'Reilly 1978). Consequently, the input used in diagnosis is not necessarily the same
as what is collected at organizational boundaries. This explanation is also consistent
with the observation that managers often rely primarilyon their individual scanning,
i.e. their self designed information system of sources outside the organization's
formal scanning system (e.g. El Sawy 1985; Kotter 1982). Finally, even in cases of
successful distribution and where managers rely on input from organizational
scanning, the effects on strategic issue diagnosis are questionable. Organizations and
their members often collect more information than they use or have the capacity to
process (e.g. Feldman and March 1981; O'Reilly 1980; Schick, Gordon, and Haka
1990). The combination of more information and limited information processing
capacity can lead to the phenomenon called information overload, which is assumed
to negatively influence managerial thinking and decision making effectiveness (e.g.
Schick, Gordon, and Haka 1990; Schneider 1988; Schwenk 1986).
In contrast to these arguments and findings, the literature review will demonstrate that
there are several studies indicating that organizational scanning actually will influence
strategic issue diagnosis. Included in the review are contributions that have
investigated organizational scanning or other closely related conceptualizations of
organizational information processing as antecedents to strategic issue diagnosis or
similar forms of managerial sensemaking.
3.2.1 Review of the literature
Due to the vast literature on organizational contextual effects on different aspects of
managerial cognition (see Walsh (1995) for an extensive and recent review), this
review is rather selective. It only includes studies that are .occupied with
organizational scanning or closely related organizationallevel antecedents to strategic
issue diagnosis, unless there are other particular reasons to include them.
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Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) provided early arguments for the relationship between
organizational context in terms of the structure of the organization, the structure of the
information system in the organization, and the activities of the organization on the
one hand, and attentional processes in organizations on the other. By an information
system, they mean the reports, statistics, facts, or information that are regularly
collected and their pattern of transmission through the organization. According to
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), regularity of information collection focuses the
organization's attention. The collection of certain information occupies the time and
attention of the organization. Moreover, the existence of the information conveys the
" "
impression that it is important, and the availability of the information will create a
demand for the use of the information. Organization structure is suggested to
influence attention through integration and coordination of the organization units that
collect and control information. Finally, critical organizational activities, either
because they constitute a major share of the organization's total activities or due to
their importance for other activities, define the importance of information and thus
organizational attention.
In a similar vein, Hedberg (1981) argued that organizations use attention-directing
mechanisms to cope with both individual and organizational level limitations in
information processing capacity. Among several such mechanisms, he stressed the
importance of "formal information systems. Organizations can determine what
information to acquire and how accurate, timelyand exhaustive that information shall
be. Furthermore, organizations can increase their attention through decentralization
and participative decision making that will reduce managers' cognitive work load and
improve the quality of upward communication.
Daft and Weick (1984) provided a framework that relates organizational context to
organizational sensemaking. This framework describes four different organizational
interpretation modes; enacting, discovering, undirected viewing, and conditional
viewing. The proposition made by Daft and Weick (1984) is that each mode is
determined by the management' s assumptions about analyzability of the environment
and organizational intrusiveness, and that different interpretation modes will affect
managers' attention and interpretation of issues. Intrusive organizations, as opposed to
passive ones, actively search the environment by actively detecting facts through
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comprehensive formal data gathering and questioning (discovering mode) or actively
gathering information through experimentation, testing and inventing the environment
(enacting mode). Passive organizations accept whatever information the environment
gives them and respond actively only when crisis occurs.
Several studies by Dutton and colleagues have addressed contextual antecedents to
attention, and these are more specific in using the language of strategic issue
diagnosis. In one of these studies, Dutton and Duncan (1987a) argued that
differentiated belief structures in terms of high complexity (breadth and variety of
factors which are present and legitimate in a particular belief system) and low
consensus are particularly important in determining the activation of strategic issues,
the urgency and feasibility assessments and the resulting momentum for change.
Differentiation of beliefs in organizations is supposed to increase the frequency of
triggering of issues, assessment of urgency and identification of feasible alternatives.
Relating their ideas to previous research, they suggested that analyzer organizations
(Miles and Snow 1978) and organizations with organic structures (Lawrence and
Lorsch 1967), have more differentiated belief structures.
In another study (Dutton and Duncan 1987b), they developed a framework describing
the effects strategic planning processes has on an organization's issue array, or the set
of strategic issues attended to in an organization. They argued that planning focus
(bottom-up vs. top-down), formality, diversity and intensity, influence the scope, size,
variety and turnover of an organization's strategic issue array. Among these
relationships, it is suggested that formalized planning processes increase the array
size, since such processes systematize information collection and dissemination and
thus facilitates the identification and storage of strategic issues. Moreover, they
proposed that planning diversity (horizontal involvement) broadens the scope of
issues and increases the variety and the number of issues in an issue array, because
such processes imply multiple perspectives and heterogeneity of informational input.
Milliken, Dutton and Beyer (1990) elaborated further on the processes by which
changes are noticed, interpreted, and elicit action. Of particular interest for the present
study, is their discussion of two sets of factors affecting the noticing of changes. The
first set of factors has to do with the external visibility of issues. It is argued that
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independent of the organization that encounters them, some issues are simply more
visible than others (due to for instance the intensity of media coverage). The external
visibility of an issue is important because it increases the probability that an issue will
be noticed, and because more visible issues provide greater ammunition for
organizational members to claim that an issue is significant and worth further
elaboration. The second set of factors deals with organizational contextualfactors that
affect the extent of exposure managers will get to issues. Among such factors are the
strategy and structure of organizations. For instance, organizations pursuing product
differentiation strategies were assumed to be more likely to notice and pay attention to
changes since they need to figure out how to create and maintain an image of
distinctiveness for their products. Finally, greater participation, less formalization and
more interaction were supposed to increase managers' exposure to information and
thus increase the probability that change will be noticed.
Dutton and Ottensmeyer (1987) discussed different forms, functions and contexts of
strategic issue management (SIM) systems. Such a system is rather broadly defined as
a set of organizational procedures, routines, personnel, and processes devoted to
perceiving, analyzing, and responding to strategic issues. Dutton and Ottensmeyer
(1987) developed four forms of SIM systems dependent on whether they are active or
passive and internally versus externally focused. SIM systems have instrumental
functions such as timeliness, efficiency and accuracy of issue identification and issues
awareness, as well as symbolic functions like detailed issue knowledge, legitimacy of
decision making and perceived decision-maker control. While the authors did not
develop a complete set of propositions according to their framework, they do argued
that SIM systems are important in understanding the processes of sensing,
formulating, and interpreting strategic issues.
In a more prescriptive article,· Ansoff (1980) discussed how SIM systems can be
developed for early identification and fast response to important trends and events
both inside and outside the organization. Early identification can be assured in two
ways. First, by engaging in continuously strategic issue management, for instance by
monthly reviewing and updating a list of key strategic issues. Second, by performing
continuous surveillance both inside and outside the organization for "fast" issues
which may arrive between reviews of the issue list, and by employing a "red light
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signal" to alert management when such issues arise. To assure fast response,
organizations should give the responsibility for managing the system to a senior
management group which has the resources and authority to initiate prompt action
without unnecessary delays, organize SIM activities across normal hierarchical
organizationallines, and assign responsibilities not only for planning response, but for
resolving the issue. As a parallel to what Milliken et al. (1990) referred to -as extemal
visibility, Ansoff (1980) emphasized the importance of weak signals. A SIM system
based on detecting such signals requires a trained staff and a substantial investment
time. Therefore, its use should be reserved for environments in which very fast
changes are frequent.
Thomas et al. (1993) directly addressed scanning and strategic issue diagnosis.
Although they conceptualized and measured individual scanning, their study is
included in the review since it is one of the few empirical contributions that have
investigated information processing and strategic issue diagnosis, as well as action
and organizational performance outcomes. Using data from 156 hospitals over a
period of three years, they provided support for the hypothesis that information use
among managers is positively related to positive-gain and controllability perceptions
of two environmental changes. However, the hypotheses that external information use
is positively related to positive-gain and controllability was not supported.
Consequently, .there are mixed results concerning the relationship between individual
scanning and interpretation. Their test of the link between interpretation and
organizational action also provided mixed evidence. While controllability perception
was positively related to product-service changes (action), positive-gain perception
was not. Finally, product-service changes was significantly related to all performance
measures, including profit. Thomas et al. (1993) also controlled for managers' age,
education and organizational experience, but found no significant effects on either
interpretation or action.
Denison et al. (1996) did not study organizational scanning, but their contribution is
included in this review since they investigated organizational-level antecedents to
strategic issue diagnosis that are relevant from an organizational information
processing perspective. For instance, one of the antecedents, organizations'
experience in the issue domain, was closely related to organizational scanning, as its
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assumed effects have to do with availability and use of information in sensemaking.
The two other antecedents included were organizational inertia (age and size) and
organizational resources (prior performance, slack, growth and capability). Using data
from 320 organizations, they found that global business experience, firm size, and
perceived capability to respond to the issue were significant predictors of managers'
perception of threat and opportunity. Another interesting finding, was that threat and
opportunity perceptions were generallya "mirror image", since the same features of
organizational context influenced both types of interpretation. Finally, using a split
sample analysis based on level of global experience, they found that the results were. .
greater for more experienced organizations, which indicates that the value of
organizational context in predicting issue interpretation is dependent on issue
salience.
Meyer (1982) did not study scanning either, but included several strategy and
ideology variables closely related to organizational scanning. In a natural experiment,
he investigated organizational adaption to an environmental jolt (a sudden and
unprecedented event). Using data from 19 hospitals that experienced a doctors' strike,
the study focused on the impact of hospitals' strategy, ideology, organizational slack
and structure on the hospitals' ability to anticipate and adapt to the environmental jolt.
Of particular interest, it was found that hospitals with strategies characterized by
innovativeness, extensive boundary spanning and attention to the environment, and
ideology in terms of perceived importance of the environment, detected the potential
for a strike earlier than other hospitals. Although structural variables accounted for
less variance than the strategy and ideology variables, both formalization and
centralization were negatively related to anticipation of the strike. Organizational
slack variables were not significantly related to anticipation.
Goldstein and Zack (1989) adopted Daft and .Weick's (1984) framework of.
organizations as interpretive systems and investigated the relationship between
organizational information processing and knowledge acquisition. These researchers
did not study managers' interpretation of specific trends, events or developments like
Thomas et al. (1993), but knowledge acquisition, which was defined as the process of
developing insights into the relationship between the organization and its
environment. Employing a structured focused comparison method of two
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organizations, they examined how information use was influenced by the supply and
distribution of information and how knowledge among product managers was related
to information use. In addition, the existing knowledge base and culture were
compared to information supply and use, and knowledge acquisition. Their findings
suggest that managers in the organization that had the greatest supply of internal and
external data and analytic tools, used more information, had more factual.knowledge
and a better understanding of causality between elements in the environment. The
same organization, Beta, integrated its external information sources, facilitating more
sophisticated and extensive environmental analysis. Product managers at Alpha, the
other organization, did not know the impact of previous promotions and found it
difficult to plan new promotions. At Beta, in contrast, product managers examined the
impact of previous promotions and used this knowledge to plan new ones.
Additionally, Beta had considerable more knowledge about their competitors and
their activities than Alpha did. Goldstein and Zack (1989) tentatively concluded that
culture, level of knowledge, and information supply and usage represent a self-
reinforcing web of causal links. For instance, greater knowledge among Beta' s
product managers, allowed them to be more directed in defining and meeting their
information needs. As knowledge increases, more variables and relationships are
identified and made explicit, and more facts are demanded. As more facts are
gathered and analyzed, knowledge increases and the cycle repeats. Based on these
findings and speculations, Goldstein and Zack (1989) argued that the prescription of
fit between an organization' s information requirements and its information processing
capabilities (e.g. Galbraith 1973; Tushman and Nadler 1978) becomes a stationary
objective. If the information uselknowledge relationship is reciprocal, "good" fit at
low levels will further decrease the information processing requirements and
capabilities in organizations.
Sutcliffe (1994) studied a previously underexamined aspect of managers'
interpretation, namely the accuracy of their perceptions. She investigated whether
organizational scanning, top management team characteristics and organizational
structure influence the extent to which managerial perceptions of environmental
instability and munificence (resource levels or trends) are congruent with objective
measures of these environmental conditions. Using a sample of 345 managers from 65
organizations in several industries, it was found that intensity and frequency of
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organizational scanning and the inverse degree of centralization were the two
variables that had the strongest positive relationship with perception accuracy of
environmental instability. This 'finding was attributed to the assumption that both
organizational scanning and decentralized structures increase the breadth and variety
of informational inputs. Top management team tenure and organizational scanning
were both positively related, while functional diversity of the top management team
was negatively related to perception accuracy of environmental munificence. Sutcliffe
(1994) suggested that environmental munificence may be more difficult to detect and
understand than instability, since it seems that accurate perceptions is enhanced by
factors (low diversity and high tenure) that increase the depth and integration of team
information processing, as opposed to breadth and variety of informational inputs.
The studies reviewed so far are particularly relevant due to their direct focus on the
relationship between organizational information processing and strategic issue
diagnosis or similar forms of managerial sensemaking. However, additional insight
into this relationship might be provided by empirical studies that link organizational
information processing to organizational action or performance. For instance, Lenz
and Engledow (1986a) examined organizational scanning in ten "leading edge" high
performing corporations that were known for their serious commitment to
environmental analysis activities. One of their findings was that each firm was using a
continuous process of information gathering, similar to the discovery mode described
by Daft and Weick (1984) and as prescipted by Ansoff (1980). Another finding
consistent with Ansoff (1980), was that integrated scanning, as opposed to free-
standing scanning units, seemed to be the most promising way to organize
organizational scanning activities.
Jennings and Lumpkin (1989) studied organizational scanning activities among
savings and loan companies in Texas after a deregulation of the industry. Using data
from 44 companies classified as high on strategic momentum and 71 that were '
classified .as low on strategic momentum, they found that the first group was more
active in scanning for. opportunities and obtaining information' about customer
attitudes. Companies low on strategic momentum, on the other hand, tended to use
scanning activities to identify threats and largely scanned competitors and the
regulatory environment.
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Smith et al. (1991) investigated the relationship between organizational information
processing and response to competitors' moves arnong 32 U.S. domestic airline
companies over an eight-year period. Using structured content analysis of an industry
magazine, they detected 418 competitive responses to 191 tactical and strategic
actions during the period. An important finding in this study was that an
organization's external orientation (in terms of the relative number of vice presidents
located in marketing and customer services) was significantly positively related to
response likelihood and negatively related to response lag and order. In commenting
this finding, the authors suggested that organizations with an external orientation have
more and richer information on competitors' actions because these organizations are
better at sensing and interpreting the competitive environment. It was also found that
structural complexity (the number of organizationallevels and departments relative to
size) was significantly negatively related to response likelihood, which is linked to the
finding that increasing structural complexity might increase the probability that the
information being transmitted will be distorted or blocked. Among several other
findings, Smith et al. (1991) found that management tearns with fewer years of
experience were more likely to respond and to respond early than more experienced
tearns.
Based on the sarne data as Smith et al. (1991), Gannon et al. (1992) conducted a study
of organizational information processing characteristics and first-mover activity. The
hypotheses that first-mover activity is positively related to boundary spanning and
negatively related to structural formalization were supported. Top management tearn
characteristics were also examined, and it was found that educational level was
positively, and years of industry-specific experience was negatively, related to the
level of first-mover activity. These findings were explained with reference to research
that has indicated that both less-experienced andmore educated managers tend.to be
more exhaustive in searching out information than their more-experienced and less-
educated counterparts (Harnbrick and Mason 1984). Finally, they did not find support
for hypotheses that suggest that the level of first-mover activity increases with product
specialization and market share and decreases with absorbed slack. Based on their
findings, Gannon et al. (1992) constructed an organizational profile of first movers.
Such organizations tend to avoid formalization, stress boundary-spanning activities,
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possess an ample amount of resources or at least are not experiencing financial
difficulty, possess a major but not dominant share of the market, and are managed by
more-educated and less-experienced top management teams than firms that do not
move first.
Table 3.1: Summary ofresearch on the relationship between organizational information processing,tocusing on scanning
and strategic issue diagnosis or response.
Organizational
information
Source processing SID/sensemaking or response
Hypothesized
effects
Empirical
support
Pfeffer and Salancik
(1978)
Information systems, structure, and Attention
organizational activities
Association N.appl.
Hedberg (1981) Information systems, decision Attention
making structure, etc.
Association N.appl.
Daft and Weick
1984
Interpretive modes Attention and interpretation Association N.appl.
Dutton and Duncan Differentiated belief structures
(1987a)
Issue activation, assessment of urgency and Pos. ass.
feasible alternatives, and response
N.appl.
Dutton and Duncan Focus, formality, diversity, and
(I987b) intensity of strategic planning
Scope, size, variety and turnover of issue Association
array
N.appl.
Milliken et al. (1990) External visibility and
organizational exposure (e.g.
strategy and structure)
Noticing Positive ass. N.appl.
Dutton and
Ottensmeyer (1987)
Different forms of SIM systems Sensing, formulation and interpretation Association N.appl.
Identification and response Pos. ass. N.appl.
Positive-gain and controllability Pos. ass. +
Positive-gain and controllability Pos. ass.
Product and service changes Pos. ass.
Product and service changes Pos. ass. +
Performance Pos. ass. +
OpportunitylThreat Pos./neg. ass. +/+
OpportunitylThreat Neg./pos. ass. +/+
OpportunitylThreat Neg./pos. ass. -/-
OpportunitylThreat Pos./neg. ass. -/-
OpportunitylThreat Pos./neg. ass. -/-
Opportunity/Threat Pos./neg. ass. -/-
OpportunitylThreat Pos./neg. ass. +/+
Anticipation of environmental jolts Association +/-
Information use Pos. ass. +
Knowledge acquisition Pos. ass. +
Perception accuracy of:
environmental instability/munificence Pos./pos. ass. +/+.
environmental instability/munificence Neg./neg. ass. +/-
environmental instability/munificence Pos./pos. ass. .i»
environmental instability/munificence Pos.lpos. ass. -/+
Ten "leading edge" corporations Association N.appl.
Competitive response Pos. ass. +
Pos. ass. +
Ne . ass. +
First-mover activity . Pos. ass. +
Neg. ass. +
Pos. ass. +
Neg. ass. +
Pos. ass.
Pos. ass.
Neg. ass.
Ansoff (1980) Continuously SIM, top
management responsibility and
integration of SIM
Thomas et al. (1993) Information use
Use of external information
Positive-gain
Controllability
Product and service changes
Denison et al. (1996) Global experience
Organizational size
Organizational age
Prior performance
Organizational slack
Growth
Capability
Meyer (1982) Strategy, ideology, structure and
organizational slack
Goldstein and ,zack Supply and distribution of
(1989) information
Information use
Sutcliffe (1994)
Organizational scanning
Centralization
TMT diversity
TMTtenure
Lenz and Engledow
(1986a)
Continuous and integrated
environmental scanning
Smith et al. (1991) External orientation
Structural complexity
Management's years of experience
Gannon et al. (1992) Boundary spanning
Formalization
TMT educationallevel
TMT experience
Product specialization
Market share
Organizational slack
"Marginally significant
"Significantly negative relationship
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Although the latest studies reviewed did not assess strategic issue diagnosis or
sensemaking directly, they contribute in establishing the importance of organizational
information processing to strategic issue diagnosis. First, the availability of
information and managers' use of information are the mechanisms used to explain the
empirical relationship between organization information processing and response or
performance. An important part of this explanation, i.e. that information availability is
an important predictor of information use, is supported by studies of individual
information behavior (e.g. Culnan 1983; Culnan 1984; O'Reilly 1982) as well as by
Goldstein and Zack (1989).
To conclude, the literature review indicates that organizations with high scanning
profiles tend to be more responsive to environmental changes than organizations with
lower scanning profiles. Furthermore, previous research strongly suggests that
managers in organizations with high scanning profiles use more data, stimuli and
information in strategic issue diagnosis. Finally, organizational scanning or other
closely related conceptualizations of organizational information processing, seem to
predict attention, interpretive accuracy, causal understanding of the environment, and
threat and opportunity perceptions. Based on this review and the four concepts of
strategic issue diagnosis explicated in the previous chapter, it is proposed that the
scanning profile of an organization will influence managers' strategic issue diagnosis.
3.3 Top management team information processing structure
While organizational scanning primarily refers to the acquisition and availability of
environmental input, the information processing structure of the top management
team deals more directly with face to face intra-organizational distribution, sharing
and processing of data, stimuli and information. The information processing structure
of the top management team is defined as the rules, procedures and patterns of
interaction and participation that characterize the top management team when it
addresses strategic issues.
In general, organization structure influences the flow of information and the context
and nature of human interactions (Miller 1987). It channels collaboration, specifies
modes of coordination, allocates power and responsibility, and prescribes levels of
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formality and complexity (Bower 1970). The present study focuses on the structure of
the organization's top management team, because this relatively small group at the
top of an organization provide the structural context for top managers' strategic issue
diagnosis (Comer, Kinicki, and Keats 1994;Thomas and McDanieI1990).
The information processing structure of the top management team is- a concept
developed by Duncan (Duncan 1973; Duncan 1974) and refined and used in previous
strategic issue diagnosis research (e.g. Thomas and McDaniel 1990; Thomas,
McDaniel, and Anderson 1991; Thomas, Shankster, and Mathieu 1994). It is
conceptualized on a mechanistic-organic continuum, where "organicness" or
"looseness" is defined by (1) the degree to which the team's members participate in
strategic decision making, (2) the inverse degree to which strategic decision making is
formalized, and (3) the degree of interaction among the team's members. The notion
of "information processing structure" relates to findings that indicate that these
structural characteristics influence the team' s capacity to process information
(Duncan 1973;Duncan 1974; Galbraith 1973) and thus facilitate or impede the use of
data, stimuli, information and perspectives in strategic issue diagnosis (e.g. Daft and
Lengel 1986;Thomas and McDaniel 1990;Thomas, McDaniel, and Anderson 1991).
3.3.1 Review of the literature
Several of the studies reviewed in relation to organizational scanning effects on
strategic issue diagnosis, also discussed or empirically explored organization structure
(e.g. Ansoff 1980; Dutton and Duncan 1987a; Dutton and Duncan 1987b; Gannon,
Smith, and Grimm 1992; Hedberg 1981; Lenz and Engledow 1986a; Meyer 1982;
Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Smith et al. 1991; Sutcliffe 1994). Below, some additional
studies that have addressed structural influence on strategic issue diagnosis or
sensemaking are reviewed. At the end of the review, the particular dimensions of top
management team information processing structure, participation, flexibility and
interaction, are related to strategic issue diagnosis.
Shank et al. (1988) developed an information processing model of environmental
perceptions where organization structure, top management team interaction and
individual scanning are seen as predictors of environmental perception accuracy. The
48
model suggests that formalization, centralization and complexity are negatively
related to accuracy of individual perceptions because such structural characteristics
limit organizational information processing. Furthermore, a curvilinear relationship
between individual scanning and accurate perceptions was suggested. The idea is that
as scanning reach very high levels, only a marginal increase in accuracy is possible
and this marginal gain may be offset by information overload. Finally,
communication density and openness within the top management team were expected
to be positively related to perception accuracy, due to greater information sharing and
acceptance and analyses of conflicting and diverse information.
Milliken (1990) examined the interpretation of a specific environmental change (a
decline in the number of 18-22-year-olds) among 211 top managers representing 122
colleges and universities. Among several organizational antecedents to strategic issue
diagnosis, she investigated how decentralization and participation in strategic decision
making was related to state certainty (noticing), effect certainty (interpretation of
effects) and response certainty (confidence about response options and their
effectiveness). Milliken (1990) argued that decentralization of strategic decision
making allows managers to be exposed to the opinions of others who may be more
active boundary spanners than themselves, thus becoming more informed about
environmental changes. Contrary to the hypotheses, decentralization was not related
to effect or response certainty, but was positively related to the likelihood that the
environmental change had been noticed.
Of particular interest for the present study, Thomas and McDaniel (1990) examined
how the top management team (TMT) information processing structure and
organizational strategy were related to managers' information usage and effect
valence. In their study of 151 hospital top managers, they found that high levels of
participation, interaction and flexibility, i.e. "organic" or "rich" TMT information
processing structures, were positively related to information usage, and positive,
potential gain and controllability interpretations. It was also found that managers in
organizations oriented toward domain offense strategies used more information and
were more likely to interpret issues as controllable than managers in domain defensive
organizations. The hypotheses that strategy was related to positive and potential gain
interpretations were not supported.
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Thomas et al. (1994), shifted from the focus on threat and opportunity interpretations
toward the interpretation labels of "strategic" and "political" in order to better capture
how certain issues affect an organization in terms of both its strategic positioning and
the issue's political underpinnings. Additionally, they empirically investigated the
relationship between several individual, group and organizational level variables and
issue interpretation. Using data from 611 executives from 372 colleges and
universities, it was found that neither executive level, position tenure, institutional
tenure or academic background were related to strategic interpretation, but that
. .
executive level and position tenure were significantly negatively related to political
interpretation. TMT information processing structure was not significantly related to
strategic interpretation, but significantly negatively related to political interpretation.
Overall, organizational level variables did not produce significant findings. The only
significant findings for strategic interpretation were found for two additional group
level variables, namely group identity and political activity, that were both positively
related to strategic interpretation. The finding that low levels of participation,
interaction and flexibility were linked to strong perceptions of political implications is
seen in relation to absence of information exchange among top management team
members, leading managers to see issue as arenas for protecting or enhancing their
control.
In a follow-up study, Gioia and Thomas (1996) conducted a two-phase research
approach that progressed from a grounded model anchored in a case study to a
quantitative, generalizable study of interpretation processes. Using the same data as
Thomas et al. (1994), but with different analytical techniques (path and mediation
analyses), the quantitative part of the study showed that the TMT information
processing structure played a key role in interpretation. First, as Thomas et al. (1994),
a direct negative relationship between organic TMT structures and political
interpretation was found, but no significant relationship between TMT information
structure and strategic interpretation. However, Gioia and Thomas (1996) found that
organic TMT structures were related to stronger identities, present image and desired
future image. These findings suggest that if the emphasis is on "who we are" (present
image), information processing structure provides the means for justifying and
reinforcing the status quo. On the other hand, if the emphasis is on "who we want to
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be" (desired future image), information processing structure becomes a driver for
legitimizing an altered image. Finally, from the grounded part of the study, Gioia and
Thomas (1996) found that managers did not use the threat/opportunity labels in
interpretation, a finding in line with Smiths (1995) study of managers' classification
of problems.
Table 3.2: Summary of research on the relationship between organizational information processing, focusing on
organization or top management team structure, and strategic issue diagnosis or response.
Organizational
information
Source processing SID/sensemaking or response
Hypothesized Empirical
effects support
Association N.appl.
Pos. ass. +/.
Pos. ass. +/+
Pos. ass. +/.
Association ./.
Association
Association .t:
Association ./+
Association +/+
Association +/+
Association ./+
Association ./+
Association ./.
Association ./.
Association ./+
Association +
Association +/+
Shank et al. (1988) Organization structure, top
management team interaction and
individual scanning
Perception accuracy
State certainty, effect certainty and
response certainty
Milliken (1990) Decentralization
Information usage and effect valenceThomas and TMT info. processing structure
McDaniel (1990) Strategy
Thomas et al. (1994) Ownership
Organizational type
Organizational size
TMT info. processing structure
Group identity
Political activity
Executive level
Position tenure
Institutional tenure
Academic background
Strategic/political interpretation
Strategic interpretation
Strategic/political interpretation
Strategic/political interpretation
Strategic/political interpretation
Strategic/political interpretation
Strategic/political interpretation
Strategic/political interpretation
Strategic/political interpretation
Strategic/political interpretation
Gioia and Thomas TMT info. processing structure
(1996)
Strategic/political interpretation
Identity
Present image/desired future image
While there are numerous empirical .investigations on different forms of
organizational structure and its antecedents and multiple effects, empirical studies
linking structure to strategic issue diagnosis are still rare. However, several studies (in
addition to those reviewed here) have given strong theoretical linkages between how
the top management team is structured to process information about strategic issues,
and how it might limit or enhance recognition of stimuli, impede the search for data,
and influence the use and exchange of perspectives and understanding in strategic
issue diagnosis (e.g. Duncan 1974; Dutton 1993a; Dutton 1993b; Dutton and Duncan
1987b; Dutton and Jackson 1987; Fredrickson 1986a; Hedberg 1981; Knight and
McDaniel 1979; O'Reilly, Chatman, and Anderson 1987; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978;
Shank et al. 1988; Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton 1981). Moreover; strategic issue
diagnosis research by Thomas and colleagues have empirically demonstrated that
organic' or rich 'information processing structures are associated with greater data
search efforts and a tendency to view issues as opportunities (Thomas and McDaniel
1990) and negatively related to political interpretation (Gioia and Thomas 1996;
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Thomas, Shankster, and Mathieu 1994). Furthermore, research on diagnosis relevant
topics have provided empirical support in the same direction on the recognition of
environmental jolts (Meyer 1982), emerging environmental events (Milliken 1990),
and interpretive accuracy (Sutcliffe 1994). Additionally, studies of perceived
environmental uncertainty (PEU) and structure have also shed some light on the
relationship of interest here. Some researchers have found indications of higher PEU
in tightly structured than in loosely structured groups (e.g. Huber, O'Connell, and
Cummings 1975; Schmidt and Cummings 1976) while other contributors have found
support for the opposite (e.g. Leifer and Huber 1977). However, the conflicting
findings are not explained with reference to the effects of structure, but to the effects
of flows of information. Leifer and Huber (1977) argues that limited flows of
information buffer and simplify "real" uncertainty and thus result in low PEU. Huber
et al. (1975) and Schmidt and Cummings (1976) on the other hand, argue that limited
flows of information increase PEU as a reflection of lack of information. Thus, all
studies referred to above support the view that loosely structured groups are
characterized by greater flows of information.
Finally, the particular dimensions of top management team information processing
structure, participation, flexibility and interaction, are related to strategic issue
diagnosis. More participation in decision making by members of the top management
team increases the number and variety of information processors, thus increasing the
total information processing capacity. Hence, increased participation can increase the
number of variables considered, the number of possible cause-and-effect relationships
suggested, and the number of possible outcomes that potentially will result from
strategic issue diagnosis (Thomas, McDaniel, and Anderson 1991). If the team
members have different functional experience, additional variation in knowledge and
perspectives can be expected, providing the group and its individual members with a
more complete image of the organization's environment (e.g..Hambrick and Mason
1984;Milliken and Vollrath 1991;Wiersema and BanteI1992).
Several organizational members and units others than those responsible for strategic
issue diagnosis are engaged in scanning (e.g. Daft and Weick 1984; Hambrick 1982).
Therefore, data, stimuli and information might be blocked or distorted as it travels
from boundary spanning personnel to decision makers (e.g. O'Reilly 1978). The level
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of participation in the top management team might influence such distribution
problems since the team members are important links between other organizational
members and the top management team. Thus, increased participation might enhance
the channeling of environmental .data, stimuli and information from other
organizational members, through top management team members, to the top
management team. This argument might also hold for the channeling of perspectives
and goals from the top management team to the rest of the organization. For example,
low levels of participation in the top management team reduces the team members'
knowledge of important issues, which in turn distorts the link between the top of the
organization and other organizational members. Then, team members as well as other
organizational members, might fail to recognize important environmental signals (e.g.
Fredrickson 1986a), or recognize potentially important signals but not rely
information to the top management team because they question its value or relevance
for the top management team (Shank et al. 1988; Sutcliffe 1994). Finally, to the extent
that low participation implies low diversity in goals and preferences of team
members, they may tend to look for and accept data that conforms to existing
expectations, preferences and believes (Schwenk 1984). Norms of consistency may
facilitate use of narrow and homogenized perspectives, increase commitment to past
actions, and reinforce old ways of seeing the world (Staw 1981). Thus, even if top
managers are exposed to potentially important and relevant data, they may ignore or
disregard it.
Flexibility refers to the inverse of specification of behaviors in advance of their
execution through the use of rules, programs, and standard operation procedures
(Galbraith 1973). Low flexibility or high formalization is best applied in situations of
low uncertainty where issues that arise are anticipated and well understood, and where
information is routine, which is not the case for strategic issues. Therefore, low
degrees of flexibility may limit the number of variables considered, the number of
possible causal relationships identified, and the number of possible outcomes that
might result from strategic issue diagnosis (Thomas, McDaniel, and Anderson 1991).
Interaction among top management team members may occur both within and outside
formal group settings and will increase the amount of information processed (Duncan
1974). Reliance on informal networks will especially increase the capacity to process
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non-routine information (Galbraith 1973). Such networks will not only supplement
formal communication patterns, but also sometimes represent alternatives to formal
interaction arrangements (Stevenson and Gilly 1991). Thus, both formal and informal
interaction will increase the information capacity of the top management team, and
informal interaction will provide freedom to exchange and develop new perspectives
in viewing strategic issue.
In conclusion, there are strong theoretical arguments and some empirical support that
suggest that the information processing structure of the top management team will
influence strategic issue diagnosis. Since participation, flexibility and informal
interaction directly influence the quality, quantity and diversity of the availability and
use of data, stimuli, and information (e.g. Miller 1987; O'Reilly, Chatman, and
Anderson 1987), the differentiation of team members' belief structures (e.g. Dutton
1993a; Dutton and Duncan 1987a), the challenge of managers perspectives and
understanding, and thus the degree to which decision makers become subjects to
biases and errors in strategic issue diagnosis (e.g. Dutton 1993a; Dutton 1993b; Leifer
and Huber 1977; Schweiger, Sandberg, and Rechner 1989; Schwenk 1984), it is
proposed that the characteristics of an organization's top management team will
influence managers' strategic issue diagnosis.
3.4 Cognitive complexity
Theories of cognitive complexity lies at the heart of an individual information
processing perspective as they address the structural dimensions that underlie the
flow, processing, and use of information. Following the general principles in
contemporary complexity theories (e.g. Streufert and Streufert 1978; Streufert and
Swezey 1986), cognitive complexity can be defined as the extent to which individuals
differentiate and integrate data and stimuli in perception and evaluation.
Differentiation refers to the ability to perceive several dimensions in a stimulus array,.
and integration refers to the development of connections among the differentiated
characteristics. A third dimension occasionally used is discrimination, which refers to
the extent to which an individual sees shades of grey among dimensions (Streufert
and Swezey 1986).
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Cognitive schemas have been described as simplified models of some parts of the
environment, and heuristics as simplifying strategies in managerial information
processing. While such simplification might be associated with errors in judgment and
decision making, simplification is both useful and necessary. Without it, managers
would become paralyzed by the need to analyze extensive ambiguous data (e.g.
Bazerman 1994; Daft and Weick 1984; Kiesler and Sproull 1982; Tversky and
Kahneman 1974; Walsh and Fahey 1986; Weick 1979b). This duality raises the issue
of the adequate level of cognitive simplicity versus complexity (Calori, Johnson, and
Sarnin 1994; Streufert and Swezey 1986). It is generally assumed that in complex and
ill-structured tasks, like dealing with strategic issues, high cognitive complexity will
lead to more accurate perception and more effective behavior (Bartunek, Gordon, and
Weathersby 1983; Calori, Johnson, and Sarnin 1994; Denison, Hooijberg, and Quinn
1995; Streufert and Swezey 1986; Weick 1979b). Weick (1979b:261) argued that it is
difficult to overemphasize the importance of developing complexity in managers, and
advised them to "complicate" themselves. Moreover, since there is evidence that the
complexity of managerial work is generally increasing (e.g. Peters 1988), cognitive
complexity will be an even more important managerial attribute today and in the
future than it has been in the past.
While it is generally acknowledged that an accurate understanding of strategic
decisions require consideration of the effects of managers' personal characteristics
(e.g. Gupta 1988; Norbum 1989), there is a dearth of knowledge about this topic in
general (Jackofsky and Slocum 1988). More specifically, and despite the increasing
focus on the role of managerial cognition and its influence on organizational strategy
and performance outcomes, research within organization theory and strategic
management have rarely studied managers' cognitive complexity empirically (e.g.
McGill, Johnson, and BanteI1994). The most commonly used personal characteristics
in empirical research have been demographic characteristics like managers age,
industry, organizational or executive tenure, education level and functional or
occupational background (Bluedom et al. 1994). While these individual factors are
generally believed to influence managers' cognitive complexity (e.g. Calori, Johnson,
and Sarnin 1994) or serve as indicators of managers cognitive base or style (e.g.
Hambrick and Mason 1984; Wiersema and Bantel 1992), research that goes beyond
directly observable managerial characteristics and focuses on cognitive abilities or
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skills might be an important way to increase our understanding of the more general
question of whether and how the individual manager matters in strategic decision
making (e.g. O'Reilly and Chatman 1994). Psychological measures allow more
specified explanations of the relationships under study, and they usually contain less
noise than observable managerial characteristics (Hambrick and Mason 1984).
3.4.1 Review of the literature
Since studies of cognitive complexity have been thoroughly reviewed elsewhere (e.g.
Hooijberg, Hunt, and Dodge 1997; Streufert and Nogami 1989; Streufert and Streufert
1978; Streufert and Swezey 1986), and most studies have been conducted in
structured laboratory settings (Chang and McDaniel 1995), the review below will be
based on more general findings from these reviews along with some examples of
cognitive complexity research in field or other ill-structured settings.
Cognitive complexity has not yet been studied in strategic issue diagnosis research. In
fact, even within cognitive complexity theory, relatively few researchers have focused
on complex or ill defined or ill structured issues, problems or decision making
(Streufert and Streufert 1978; Streufert and Swezey 1986). Despite this lack of
research, cognitive complexity theory provide strong arguments for an association
between cognitive complexity and strategic issue diagnosis. The overall impressions
from previous research is that cognitively complex individuals are more effective in
complex tasks (Streufert..and Streufert 1978). They generally tend to search for more
information (Tuckman 1964), different kinds of information (Dollinger 1984; Karlins
and Lamm 1967) and engage in more effective integration of that information in their
decision processes (Schwenk 1986; Stone, Sivitanides, and Magro 1994; Streufert and
Swezey 1986). Moreover, research reviewed by Streufert and Nogami (1989) suggest
that less cognitively complex individuals are more directly responsive to the quantity
of information present in the environment, i.e. they search more when information is
inadequate and less when information overload exists, independently of the relevance
of information. In general, cognitively complex individuals seem to be more actively
information orientated and "their search activities are more a function of information
need than of environmental conditions (Streufert and Nogami 1989). Finally, they are
more sensitive to and more able to utilize minimal cues that might have been obtained
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through information search (Harvey 1966). Turning to evaluation, impression
formation and attribution, cognitive complexity is positively related to more abstract
reasoning (Neuliep and Hazleton 1986), increased capacity to reconceptualize
problems (Lepsinger et al. 1989; Merron, Fisher, and Torbert 1987), tolerance for
ambiguity and diversity (Streufert, Streufert, and Castore 1968) and more accurate
and balanced perceptions (Miller 1969). Moreover, cognitively complex .individuals
tend to be more capable of taking the perspectives of others (Triandis 1977) and
generally demonstrate more moderate attributes in evaluation (Linville 1982; Linville
and Jones 1980). Finally, Streufert and Nogami (1989) points to several studies
occupied with leadership and task performance, where cognitive complexity has been
found to be positively related to strategic planning activities and the tendency to focus
on a variety of components of the leadership role. In sum, previous research suggests
that cognitively complex individuals process information differently and perform
certain tasks better than less complex individuals. Below, four more recently
conducted studies of cognitive complexity in field or other ill-structured settings are
reviewed.
Chang and McDaniel (1995) studied individuals' use of search strategies in a loosely
structured yet information rich environment where no clear questions were provided
to give direction to the search. Using a HyperCard software program containing
information about the Vietnam War, 32 students were queried by the investigator
while they browsed freely through the program. Among several cognitive variables
included (cognitive complexity, scholastic aptitude, need for cognition and learning
orientation), cognitive complexity was the single most important characteristic
determining the level of investigative direction in search. Cognitively complex
students were more likely to exhibit connectedness between topic choices in the
program and searched less randomly than their less cognitively complex counterparts.
The subjects were also instructed to write a summary of the information in the
program, and the complexity of the summary was significantly positively related to
search strategies and all the cognitive variables, including cognitive complexity. The
authors conclude that "cognitive complexity may translate to an intention to
understand, to avoid premature closure, to consider alternative viewpoints, and to
arrive at reasonable conclusions" (Chang and McDaniel 1995, p. 103).
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Wofford (1994) empirically investigated antecedents and consequences of the
cognitive processes employees use in handling job problems among 74 subjects in
two organizations. Job problems were defined as the issues, decisions, and tasks that
employees handle in their work. He found that cognitively complex employees used a
significantly higher number of script tracks for frequently occurring job problems as
well as rarely occurring problems, indicating that cognitively complex. employees
applied multiple perspectives, tried out more approaches and gathered more
information than employees low in cognitive complexity. Wofford (1994) also found
that the number of script tracks used for rarely occurring job problems was positively
. .
related to the likelihood of being promoted and that job complexity moderated the
relationship of cognitive complexity and promotability. These findings made Wofford
(1994) to conclude that organizations should attempt to hire or promote cognitively
complex employees for complex jobs and for jobs that require the use of a large
number of script tracks.
McGill, Johnson and Bantel (1994) found a strong relationship between cognitive
complexity and four measures of performance among eight bank managers.
Cognitively complex bank managers were rated significantly higher by superiors on
(1) short and (2) long term performance based on short and long term financial
results, (3) over-all performance appraisal and (4) other performance
accomplishments in the'role as bank manager. Additionally; complex bank managers
were also rated as significantly less conform by their superiors. In testing an
interaction model, McGill et al. (1994) found that cognitive complexity had a direct
effect on performance, as well as an indirect effect on performance through a large
negative effect on conformity. Although the performance measures are quite different
from the dimensions of strategic issue diagnosis used in the present study, the effects
are explained through the same mechanisms that might influence strategic issue
diagnosis. In their own words; "The effect is driven by superior information
processing, creativity, abstraction, breadth of focus, and communication skills of
cognitively complex managers" (McGill et al. 1994, p. 1454).
Hitt and Tyler (1991), who studied managers' evaluation of acquisition candidates,
did not find any effects of cognitive complexity. With data from 65 top executives
from several industries, it was found that industry and several personal characteristics
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had significant but small effects on evaluation. The main effects of objective criteria
were by far the strongest, since more than 80 percent of the total explained variance in
evaluation was attributed to objective target firm characteristics. In testing moderating
effects of industry and personal characteristics, Hitt and Tyler (1991) found that
industry, age, type of education, amount of work experience and level of the executive
were all statistically significant moderators of the relationship between objective
criteria and evaluation of acquisition candidates, while level of education, risk
orientation and cognitive complexity were not. Due to these findings, the authors
suggest that managers are fairly rational in decision making. Another possible
explanation is that the target firm cases used in their study were too simple and easy
to understand compared to actual acquisition candidates. Moreover, Hitt and Tyler
(1991) focused exclusively on social cognitive complexity, i.e. how complex
managers were in evaluation of other people.
Therefore, Hitt and Tyler's (1991) findings are too inconclusive to be treated as an
argument to stop looking for cognitive complexity effects on managers' strategic
issue diagnosis or decision making. Based on more than 30 years of research, it seems
that cognitively complex subjects compared to less complex subjects, in general apply
multiple, complementary perspectives to describing and analyzing events, perceive
events more accurately, synthesize diverse perceptions and experience more
completely, and generally behave more effectively in strategic decision making
(Bartunek, Gordon, and Weathersby 1983; Streufert and Swezey 1986). While mainly
demonstrated among students in laboratory settings, these findings suggest that
managers' cognitive complexity will influence strategic issue diagnosis.
Table 3.3: Summary of research on the relationship between cognitive complexity and strategic issue diagnosis
Source Cognitive complexity
Hypothesized Empirical
SID/sensemaking or performance effects support
Investigative search strategies and Pos. ass. +
complexity of summaries
Number of script tracks used for job . Pos. ass. +
roblems
Performance Pos. ass. +
Evaluation of acquisition candidates Association +/-
Chang and McDaniel Cognitive complexity, scholastic
(1995) aptitude, need for cognition,
learning orientation,
and investigative search strategies
Wofford (1994) Cognitive complexity
McGill et al. (1994) Cognitive complexity
Hitt and Tyler (1991) Personal, industry and
objective characteristics
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3.5 The relative importance of cognitive complexity and
organizational context
The primary aim of the present study is to explore whether and how antecedents at
different levels of analysis influence managers' strategic issue diagnosis. So far, the
relative importance of organizational scanning and the information. processing
structure of the top management team on the one side, and managers' cognitive
complexity on the other, have not been discussed. Most behavioral scientists agree
that both personal or individual and situational or contextual characteristics influence
behavior (e.g. Chatman 1989; Pervin 1989). However, the challenge has been not only
to determine if person and situation variables are valid predictors of behavior but also
determine when and to what extent person and situation variables predict behavior
(Chatman 1989; Pervin 1989; Schneider 1987). Along with the interactionist debate in
psychology (see Pervin (1989) for a review of its history), there has been a
controversy within the fields of organization theory and strategy about the role of the
top manager versus the organization or the external environment of the organization
(e.g. Aldrich 1979; Bourgeois 1980; Child 1972; Child 1997; Eisenhardt and Zbaracki
1992; Gupta 1988; Hambrick and Finkelstein 1987; Hambrick and Mason 1984;
Hannan and Freeman 1977; Hitt and Tyler 1991; Hrebiniak and Joyce 1985;
Jackofsky and Slocum 1988; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Porter 1980; Rumelt 1991;
Thomas, Shankster, and Mathieu 1994). It is not the intention here to go deep into this
controversy, and as Pervin (1989) concludes, the person-situation debate cannot be
ultimately resolved.
However, the present investigation can shed further light on the question of to what
extent the cognitive complexity of managers and the organizational and group
contexts respectively predict the particular managerial task of strategic issue
diagnosis. Since cognitive complexity has not yet been studied in relation to strategic
issue diagnosis, and most strategic issue diagnosis research has focused
predominantly on threat-opportunity construction, ·little theory or empirical evidence
exist to guide the development of propositions about the question of relative
importance. Therefore, two competing suggestions are proposed. These will be based
on theory in strategic management and decision making and be rooted in a strategic
choice versus an organizational control perspective. In order to simplify the
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discussion, organizational scanning and top management team information processing
structure will be treated together and be referred to as the organizational information
processing context.
3.5.1 An organizational control perspective
The case for contextual direct effects on strategic issue diagnosis is based on two
closely related mechanisms; the exposure effect and the developmental effect. The
most widely used argument from the organizational information processing literature
is the exposure effect. This effect implies that organizational scanning and the
structure of the top management team, through their filtering and distributive
mechanisms, will in large part determine the exposure of amounts and diversity of
data, stimuli and information in organizations. This in tum will guide the instantiation
of managers cognitive representations. The organization provides cues which trigger
cognitive schemas, and individual managers will use the triggered schemas in
interpreting and selecting incoming data, stimuli and information, and to retrieve
more specific internal .information from memory (e.g. Calder and Schurr 1981;
Svyantek, Jones, and Rozelle 1991) and additional input from the organizational
environment (e.g. O'Reilly 1983). Organizational context, like organizational
scanning and structure, might also provoke a switch in cognitive modes from "habits
of mind" or more automatic processing, to more active modes of thinking (e.g. Louis
and Sutton 1991).
The developmental effect is based on the rather clear principle that people draw
heavily on accumulated experience to aid their understanding (e.g. Fiske, Kinder, and
Larter 1983) and the assumption that organizational context plays an important role in
the development of managers' cognitive representations of the internal and the
external environments (Weick 1979b). More specifically, it is suggested that exposure
of amounts and diversity of data, stimuli and information over time will influence
managers understanding. Accordingly, some organizational contexts should be more
capable of promoting and developing managers' domain specific knowledge and
understanding than other contexts. High levels of organizational scanning might
create such an organizational context, since managers will be exposed to greater
amounts and more diverse stimuli and information (e.g. Goldstein and Zack 1989).
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Moreover, organic top management team structures are supposed to challenge
individual top managers perspectives and understanding (e.g. Dutton 1993a; Dutton
1993b) and thus increase the differentiation of their belief structures (e.g. Dutton
1993a; Dutton and Duncan 1987a). Bartunek and Louis (1988) suggest that high
participation and group involvement, a characteristic of loosely structured top
management teams, foster individual integration of stimuli and information. First
individuals are exposed to different perspectives. Then they are encouraged to let
knowledge of these perspectives lead to a new resolution, which incorporates
elements of each (Bartunek and Louis 1988). Given such developmental effects on
managers' experience, managers in organizational contexts characterized by high
levels of scanning and loosely structured TMT teams might develop more detailed
and meaningful domain-specific schema (e.g. Lurigio and Carroll 1985), make more
use of context-specific knowledge and relate new situations to their personal
experience (Haukedal and Grønhaug 1994), and generally be more effective
information processors within the domain (e.g. Glaser 1982). Early empirical support
for the developmental effect is partly provided by Calori et al. (1994), who found that
top managers in firms with an international geographic scope were more domain
specific cognitively complex than top managers of organizations with a narrower
scope. Similarly, Day and Lord (1992) found that managers in firms with a more
diversified product and service portfolio categorized issues differently from managers
in less diversified firms, implying that managers in more diversified firms had more
domain specific complex knowledge structures. Thus, the exposure as well as the
developmental effect, would suggest that both cognitively complex and less complex
managers in organizations with high scanning profiles and loosely structured top
management teams will diagnose strategic issues differently from managers in
organizations with lower scanning profiles and less rich or organic structured top
management teams.
Since few, if any, organizational information processing theorists argue that managers
.do not matter, an "organizational control perspective" should not be considered purely
situationistic or deterministic. However, its focus on organizational characteristics
influencing organizational outcomes, explicitly or implicitly through organizational
members, emphasize the organizational controlover individual organizational
members. This emphasis should not be seen as an argument for downplaying the
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importance of individual characteristics, but more as a response to lack of research
adopting an organizational view of decision making, strategy and performance (e.g.
O'Reilly 1983). In other words, there exist few theoretical arguments or explanations
supporting a potential organizational or contextual dominance over individual
characteristics. Therefore, arguments must be sought in empirical research that
demonstrates the importance of organizational context.
To that end, there are at least three sources of evidence that support the proposition
that the organizational information processing context is more important in predicting
strategic issue diagnosis than individual cognitive complexity. The first and strongest
refers to the few empirical studies that have investigated the effects of both individual
and organizational (including group) factors on strategic issue diagnosis. Of these
studies, Thomas et al. (1994) found that individual level characteristics did not playa
significant role in strategic issue diagnosis after organizational and group contexts
were accounted for. This finding corresponds to those of Schneider and DeMeyer
(1991) and Thomas et al. (1993).
The second, but more modest source of evidence, refers to studies that have found
strong empirical support of organizational (including group) factors influencing
strategic issue diagnosis or other dimensions of strategic cognition or decision
making, but that do not control for individual characteristics. Several studies have
taken this approach, and empirical support exists for organizational scanning
(Sutcliffe 1994), strategy (Ginsberg and Venkatraman 1992; Meyer 1982; Thomas
and McDaniel 1990), structure (Leifer and Huber 1977; Schmidt and Cummings
1976; Sutcliffe 1994; Thomas and McDaniel 1990) and organizational size (Denison
et al. 1996).
The third and weakest source of evidence refers to findings of strong empirical
support for direct associations between organizational scanning and organizational
outcomes like responsiveness and financial performance (e.g. Dollinger 1984;
Gannon, Smith, and Grimm 1992; Jennings and Lumpkin 1989; Reid 1984; Smith et
al. 1991).
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It is harder to come up with sound explanations for why the organizational
information processing context should be more important than individual complexity,
than to find empirical evidence that supports such a proposition. However, as
indirectly suggested by Thomas et al. (1993), a possible explanation is that that top
managers act and possibly think on behalf of their organizations. Moreover, Hitt and
Tyler (1991), that found no support for the cognitive complexity hypothesis, suggest
that the narrow range of cognitive complexity among top managers (i.e. they are all
generally high in cognitive complexity) in part can explain the lack of cognitive
complexity effects. The final suggestion is that data, stimuli, information and
perspectives provided by the organizational context represent the primary input for
managers in strategic issue diagnosis. This would mean that organizational context,
through its filtering and distributive mechanisms, actually controls and guides
managers individual information processing.
3.5.2 A strategic choice perspective
First, people, not organizations, make decisions, and their decisions depend on prior
processes of human perception and evaluation (Child 1972). Moreover, the experience
that affect their cognitive structures is unique for each individual (Simon and Kaplan
1989). In other words, the assumption that top managers matter rests on two premises:
one, that top managers differ from each other, and two, that the individual top
manager' s decisions and actions have a significant impact on organizational activities
and performance (Gupta 1988). The second assumption will not be empirically
explored in the present investigation, since the focal target of the study is managers'
strategic issue diagnosis. Concerning the first assumption, Gupta (1988) argues that it
must be regarded as essentially indisputable due to the existing substantial scientific
and anecdotal evidence as well as its obvious face validity. In this respect, Hitt and
Tyler's (1991) finding of small differences in cognitive complexity between managers
might be explained with reference to their measurement approach focusing only on
(social) evaluation of persons. Moreover, their report of small differences in cognitive
complexity among managers is not compared to other studies of cognitive complexity.
Other studies have not reported any problems in finding differences in cognitive
complexity, using students from the same class or program (e.g. Hendrick 1979;
Stone, Sivitanides, and Magro 1994; Streufert, Streufert, and Castore 1968) and
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managers from both the same and different organizations (e.g. Calori, Johnson, and
Sarnin 1994; Dollinger 1984; McGill, Johnson, and Bantel 1994; Wofford 1994) as
subjects.
Additionally, research on individual scanning, information behavior and managerial
evaluation have demonstrated that managers often rely on information sources other
than those provided by the organization (e.g. El Sawy 1985; Kotter 1982) and that
networks and relations outside the organization is important in managerial evaluation
(e.g. Galaskiewicz and Burt 1991). Moreover, previous general findings of the
unimportance of top managers suffer from serious methodological weaknesses (see
Hambrick and Mason (1984) for a brief discussion). More interestingly, the cited
empirical studies that have found no effects of individual characteristics on strategic
issue diagnosis have investigated observable managerial demographic characteristics
(Schneider and DeMeyer 1991; Thomas, Clark, and Gioia 1993; Thomas, Shankster,
and Mathieu 1994), not cognitive complexity. After all, the main argument for
including cognitive complexity in the present study is the combination of its potential
to predict strategic issue diagnosis and the lack of evidence from studies that have
investigated other individual characteristics.
Complexity theories have mainly focused on the complexity of the task as the most
important moderating mechanism between cognitive complexity and performance.
These theories suggest that differences in performance between cognitively complex
and less complex individuals become less pronounced as the task becomes easier (e.g.
Schroder, Driver, and Streufert 1967). According to this general proposition, the
effect of cognitive complexity should be strong on strategic issue diagnosis, since it
represents a complex managerial task. Moreover, recent research has investigated the
effects of cognitive complexity under different contextual conditions. Stone et al.
(1994) for instance, found that groups of cognitively complex subjects performed
better than groups of cognitively simple subjects under two different methods of
. formalized dissent (dialectical inquiry and devil's advocacy). Even if the difference
between these two methods might be smaller and of a another kind than differences in
organizational complexity, and Stone et al. (1994) studied group planning and not
individual diagnosis, their study suggests that cognitive complexity is important under
different contextual conditions. Thus, there are several arguments and some empirical
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studies in favor of a strategic choice perspective on the relationship between cognitive
complexity and strategic issue diagnosis.
3.6 Moderating effects of organizational context
Even though .investigations of interactions between 'situational and individual
variables would increase the understanding of the effects of individual characteristics
of top managers on decision processes in organizations (e.g. Hambrick and
Finkelstein 1987; Hambrick and Mason 1984), such investigations are less often
attempted and more difficult to do (Gupta 1988). At this point of development in
strategic issue diagnosis research, it seems more important to refine and extend the
conceptual and empirical treatments of strategic issue diagnosis and to empirically
test untested antecedents, than to go into the question of interactive effects. In the
present investigation, an obstacle to include an appropriate investigation of interaction
effects is the need for a more complex research design. Among other factors, it would
ideally provide different combinations of low versus high cognitive complexity and
organizational information processing levels.
Although interaction effects are largely beyond the scope of this study, the data
needed to investigate the research question might provide some preliminary insight
into how the interaction of organizational context and managers' cognitive complexity
affect strategic issue diagnosis. While neither complexity theory or strategic issue
- diagnosis research provide any directly relevant findings in this respect, they do
indicate the existence of interactive effects (e.g. Dutton 1993a; Schneider and
DeMeyer 1991; Streufert and Swezey 1986; Thomas, Clark, and Gioia 1993; Thomas,
Shankster, and Mathieu 1994).First, it is possible that fit or match between managers'
cognitive complexity and the level of organizational information processing is
important in predicting effects on strategic issue diagnosis. As Streufert and Swezey
(1986) suggest, where the abilities, limitations, and styles of individuals match an
organization's characteristics and needs, the liaison between person and organization
will more likely be happy and productive. This suggestion might imply that high
levels of cognitive complexity is a condition for taking advantage of high levels of
organizational information processing. Such a condition would be consistent with the
information overload hypothesis (O'Reilly 1980). Combinations of low levels of
66
cognitive complexity and high levels of organizational information processing might
produce information overload, potentially followed by poorer diagnosis than
combinations of low levels of cognitive complexity and low levels of organizational
information processing.
Another possibility is that high levels of cognitive complexity might compensate for
low levels of organizational information processing and/or vice versa. To further
complicate the issue, another option is that for some levels of cognitive complexity,
compensating effects might be strongest, while for other levels the effects of fit or
match between individual and organizational information processing might be the
strongest. For example, refined interactive complexity theory has suggested that
cognitively complex individuals are able to adjust their functional level of cognitive
complexity to meet the demands of the complexity of the task (Streufert and Swezey
1986). Following this flexibility argument, and as suggested by Hambrick and
Finkelstein (1987), cognitively complex managers might be less influenced by context
than cognitively simpler managers. Consequently, it might be suggested that
organizational information processing would be less influential on strategic issue
diagnosis if the top managers of the organization are cognitively complex.
Accordingly, if cognitively simple managers are more influenced or dependent on
organizational context, complexity of the organization would be a more influential
antecedent to strategic issue diagnosis if its managers are less cognitively complex.
These and other untested speculations briefly discussed above, make the question of
interactive effects of cognitive complexity and organizational information processing
on strategic issue diagnosis to an important issue for further research. However, as a
first step, the present investigation will explore the very basic question of whether
organizational information processing moderates the relationship between cognitive
complexity and strategic issue diagnosis.
3.7 Conceptual framework
As a summary of the literature review on the main relationships under investigation,
the conceptual framework is presented in Figure 2.1. The present study is based on a
cross-level analysis (Klein, Dansereau, and Hall 1994; Rousseau 1985) of strategic
issue diagnosis. It will explore how multiple contexts, represented by an
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organization's scanning profile, the information processing structure used by its top
management team, and top managers' cognitive complexity relate to strategic issue
diagnosis. Thus, the focal or target unit of the study is the strategic issue diagnosis
performed by individual top managers.
Antecedents Managers' strategic issue diagnosis
• Effect valence• Organizational scanning
• Top management team • Issue sorting
information processing structure
• Causal understanding
• Managers' cognitive complexity
• Data search
Figure 2.1: Conceptualframework
Analytically, the framework suggests that members of the top management team are
influenced by the same organizational and team characteristics, leading to within-
team-organization homogeneity in diagnosis. However, since organizational context
may influence managers' diagnosis differently and individual characteristics are likely
to influence managers' diagnosis, individual top managers within the same top
management team and organization are expected to vary in their diagnosis.
Conceptually, it has been argued that differences in managers' strategic issue
diagnosis can be explained by differences in organizational scanning, the information
processing structure of top management teams, and managers' of cognitive
complexity. Organizational scanning and the information processing structure of top
management teams are assumed to influence the types and amounts of information
managers are exposed to in an organization. Exposure to different amounts and
diversity of data, stimuli and information, are further assumed to guide or control the
instantation of managers' cognitive representations (e.g. Calder and Schurr 1981;
Svyantek, Jones, and Rozelle 1991) and thus what data, stimuli, Information and
perspectives that will be used in strategic issue diagnosis (e.g. Goldstein and Zack
1989; O'Reilly 1983). Additionally, it is suggested that the exposure of amounts and
diversity of data, stimuli, information and perspectives, over time, will influence the
development of managers cognitive representations of the internal or organizational
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and external environments (e.g. Weick 1979b). Finally, it is suggested that the level of
cognitive complexity of managers will influence strategic issue diagnosis (Bartunek,
Gordon, and Weathersby 1983; Streufert and Swezey 1986).
3.8 Summary of the chapter
In this chapter, literature on how organizational scanning, top management team
information processing structure and cognitive complexity might be related to
strategic issues diagnosis were reviewed. These reviews provided a theoretical answer
to the research question implying that all three antecedents might uniquely affect
managers' strategic issued diagnosis. Additionally, the questions of the relative
importance of contextual and individual antecedents,· and possible moderating effects
of the contextual antecedents on the relationship between the individual antecedent
and strategic issue diagnosis were discussed.
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HYPOTHESES AND RESEARCH MODEL
In the previous two chapters it has been argued theoretically for the constructs and the
relations between the constructs in the -conceptual framework. In this chapter, the
relationships in the conceptual framework are translated into sixteen specific
hypotheses and presented in a figure of the research model. Finally, the discussion
about the relative importance of the contextual and individual factors and the
moderating effect of the contextual factors is summarized in three propositions.
4.1 Organizational scanning and strategic issue diagnosis
It has been proposed that the scanning profile of an organization will influence
managers' strategic issue diagnosis. Here, the two organizational scanning
dimensions, information acquisition frequency and information availability and use,
will be related to the four strategic issue diagnosis concepts outlined in the second
chapter.
4.1.1 Organizational scanning and effect valence
Previous research has suggested and empirically studied a range of organizational-
level antecedents of managers' perceptions of threats and opportunities (e.g. Denison
et al. 1996; Dutton 1993a; Dutton, Fahey, and Narayanan 1983; Dutton and
Ottensmeyer 1987; Ginsberg and Venkatraman 1992; Milliken 1990; Thomas, Clark,
and Gioia 1993; Thomas and McDaniel 1990; Thomas, McDaniel, and Anderson
1991). However, no studies have empirically investigated organizational scanning in
relation to effect valence. Moreover, most strategic issue diagnosis research have
dealt with equivocal or neutral events, while the present study makes a distinction
between opportunity consistent and threat consistent developments, trends or events.
Therefore, evidence from previous strategic issue diagnosis research .offers relatively
few guidelines.
However, for positive-gain and controllability interpretations of opportunity
consistent developments, trends or events, the finding that high levels of information
use among managers in organizations is positively related to seeing an issue as
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controllable, positive and as a potential gain (Thomas, Clark, and Gioia 1993),
provides some support for a positive relationship between organizational scanning and
these effect valence dimensions. In line with the exposure and developmental effects
discussed in the previous chapter, managers who have available and use large
amounts of information will have more raw material for constructing their
interpretations (Knight and McDaniel 1979) and be equipped with more knowledge
and data needed to support positive framing (Dutton 1993a; Thomas, Clark, and Gioia
1993; Thomas and McDaniel 1990). Additionally, there are empirical indications that
managers in high scanning organizations have more factual knowledge and a better
understanding of the environment (Goldstein and Zack 1989) and are more accurate in
their perceptions (Sutcliffe 1994). Factual knowledge and better understanding of the
environment along with increased perception accuracy, might imply that managers
will interpret opportunity consistent developments, trends or events in positive-gain
terms and threat consistent developments, trends or events in negative-loss terms.
Moreover, managers that have large amounts of information available, and make use
of this information, might be better able to cope with ambiguity (Eisenhardt and
Bourgeois 1988) and uncertainty (Milliken 1990).
Thus, with a sense of mastery and a feeling that no stone has been left untumed
(Eisenhardt 1989), managers might see both threats and opportunities as controllable.
Another ..argument to support the relationship between organizational scanning and
controllability interpretations, is that managers in high scanning organizations will be
exposed to more information that can be used to exploit opportunities and to
effectively cope with threats (Dutton 1993a). These arguments suggest that there will
be a positive relationship between organizational scanning on one side, and positive-
gain, negative-loss and controllability interpretations for both opportunities and
threats on the other.
While the arguments above support positive relationships between organizational
scanning and positive-gain/negative-loss and controllability interpretations, they do
not provide any evidence of how. organizational .scanning might be related to
extremity in effect valence. However, since stereotyped perceptions like extreme
valence might be the result of lack of knowledge and simplicity in the representation
of knowledge within a domain (e.g. Linville 1982; Lord and Foti 1986), there is a
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possibility that the volume and richness of information due to high levels of scanning
will reduce the likelihood of extreme valence. This possibility might be particularly
relevant for extremity in negative valence. Availability of large amounts of
information might suppress the threat bias suggested by Jackson and Dutton (1988),
and balance managers' interpretation of threat consistent developments, trends or
events. Additionally, recent empirical evidence suggests that managers use
categorization processes to interpret positive events, but more effortful attributional
processes to interpret negative events (Gooding and Kinicki 1995). These arguments
would suggest that organizational scanning will be negatively related to extreme
negative valence.
The finding that managers use less effortful cognitive processes in interpretation of
positive events corresponds with the finding that decision makers receiving positive
performance feedback exhibited characteristics Langer (e.g. Langer 1989) described
as "mindless" information processing and which Dutton (1993b) refer to as automatic
strategic issue diagnosis (Dunegan 1994). This mode of cognitive processing increase
the possibility of cognitive biases (e.g. Louis and Sutton 1991). Moreover, several
cognitive biases or simplifications like overoptimism, overconfidence, influence of
recent performance history, confirmation traps and illusions of control and
invulnerabilityare often associated with positive events (e.g. Bazerman 1994; Dutton
and Duncan 1987a; Lai 1994; Milliken and Lant 1991; Schwenk 1986; Thomas,
Clark, and Gioia 1993; Zajac and Bazerman 1991), and such biases might actually be
reinforced by large amounts of information (e.g. Russo and Schoemaker 1989). Thus,
a possible pitfall of high levels of scanning is that availability of large amounts of
information in situations where managers are faced with positive events increases the
likelihood of extreme positive valence. Seen together, these arguments suggest an
asymmetry in organizational scanning effects on extremity in effect valence. This
leads to the formulation ofthe following hypotheses:
HhVI: The level of an organization's scanning in terms of its (i) information acquisition
frequency and (U) information availability and use will be positively related to the
extent to which managers interpret opportunity consistent developments, trends or
events as (a) positive and potential gains, (b) controllable, and (c) extremely positive.
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HhV2: The levelofan organization's scanning in terms of its (i) information acquisition
frequency and (U) information availability and use will be positively related to the
extent to which managers interpret threat consistent developments, trends or events
as (a) negative and potential losses, and negatively related the extent to which
managers.interpret threat consistent developments, trends or events as-lb}
uncontrollable and (c) extremely negative.
4.1.2 Organizational scanning and issue sorting
Several studies suggest that high levels of information processing will increase
managerial awareness and attention and the probability that change will be noticed,
along with accuracy of managers' perceptions. These relationships are explained by
the exposure of a wider range or larger amounts of information and/or by the
assumption that high levels of information processing provides a context that
facilitates more knowledgeable, richer and complete cognitive representations of the
external and internal environments. Both explanations suggest that high levels of
organizational scanning will provide an organizational context that will enhance
managers' issue sorting, causal understanding and data search.
Equipped with more domain-specific knowledge in terms of richer and more complete
representations of the environment, managers in high scanning organizations will
have the benefit of having multiple past experience against which to compare and
contrast new situations. Accordingly, they might be better equipped to recognize the
strategic and political implications of emerging events, developments or trends.
Moreover, as people become more familiar with a domain of activity, they grow more
sensitive to subtle changes within that domain (Schroder, Driver, and Streufert 1967)
and should therefore be better able to classify signals from noise and to compare
issues against each other. This would suggest the following hypothesis:
H1/5: The level of an organization's scanning in terms of its (i) information acquisition
frequency and (U) information availability and use will be positively related to the
extent to which managers differentiate between developments, trends or events in
terms ofjudgments of(a) importance and (bi feasibility.
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4.1.3 Organizational scanning and causal understanding
Given that managers in high scanning organizations develop richer and more
complete representations of the internal and external environment, they should be
. -better able to ground their interpretations in-detailed factual knowledge and have
higher tolerance for ambiguity and multiple perspectives (e.g. Calori, 'Johnson, and
Samin 1994) and thus be less likely to engage in oversimplistic and impressionistic
interpretations of the environment. Finally, the study by Goldstein & Zack (1989)
suggests that managers in organizations with high exposure of information have more
factual knowledge as well as a better understanding of causality between elements in
the environment. Thus, it is suggested that:
Hhv: The levelofan organization's scanning in terms ofits (i) information acquisition
frequency and (U) information availability and use will be positively related to the
extent to which managers are nuanced in causal understanding of developments,
trends or events.
,//,
/
4.1.4 Organizational scanning and data search
Studies of the relationship between exposure or availability and use of data, stimuli
and information (e.g. Culnan 1983; Culnan 1984; Goldstein and Zack 1989; O'Reilly
1982), strongly suggest that managers in organizations with high levels of
organizational scanning will search for more data in strategic issue diagnosis.
Moreover, if managers in high scanning organizations have more detailed and
meaningful knowledge structures, they might attend to more signals and have better
appreciation for the value of information (Cooper, Folta, and Woo 1995; Karlins and
Lamm 1967) and better understand what they do not know (McGee, Dowling, and
Megginson 1995). These arguments suggest the following hypothesis concerning
organizational scanning and data search;
Hl DS: The level of an organization's scanning in terms of its (i) information acquisition
frequency and (U) information availability and use will be positively related to the'
extent to which managers search for different types of data in order to clarify and
define strategic issues.
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4.2 TMT information processing structure and strategic issue
diagnosis
Past studies do not provide any clear evidence about the relationship between top
management team information processing structures and strategic issue diagnosis.
However, several mechanisms related to different structural configurations. that might
influence strategic issue diagnosis may be identified. Below, these mechanisms are
used to develop five hypotheses about top management team information processing
structure and strategic issue diagnosis.
4.2.1 TMT information processing structure and effect valence
Thomas and McDaniel (1990) found that rich or organic information processing
structures were significantly positively related to positive-gain and controllability
interpretations. Since such structures increase the information processing capacity of
the team due to a greater number and variety of information processors, the team
might be less vulnerable to information overload (Mintzberg 1983) and be better able
to cope with stress and anxiety (Eisenhardt 1989). Moreover, top management teams
with high information processing capacity tend to focus on and process information
that they see as positive and as leading to potential gains, even in times of crisis
(Smart and Vertinsky 1984). On the other hand, information processing structures
characterized by narrow or restricted capacities will tend to lead managers to perceive
low levels of positive stimuli (Fredrickson 1986a), and these structural configurations
are often chosen in order to guard against threats, not to scan for opportunities
(Bourgeois, McAllister, and Mitchell 1978). These arguments suggest that rich
information processing structures should be positively related to positive effect
valence and negatively related to negative effect valence. However, although such
information processing structures might enhance the construction of opportunities
more often or more easily, managers' ability to cope more effectively with uncertainty
and to respond more productively to stress and avoid information overload, suggest a
negative relationship between such structures and extremely positive valence.
Furthermore, if organic structures lead to more differentiated belief structures within
teams (Dutton and Duncan 1987a), greater exchange of ideas and more careful
deliberation of issues (Milliken 1990), managers might be provoked to use more
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active cognitive modes which reduces the possibility of cognitive simplification and
biases (e.g. Louis and Sutton 1991; Schwenk 1984). These argument fit in with the
link between similar structural characteristics and perception accuracy (Shank et al.
1988; Sutcliffe 1994). Thus, the following hypotheses are suggested:
B2EV/: The level of(i)participation, (U) interaction-and (iii)jlexibility within an
organization' s top management team will be positively related to the extent to which
managers interpret opportunity consistent developments, trends or events as (a)
positive and potential gains, and (b) controllable, and negatively related to the extent
to which managers interpret opportunity consistent developments, trends or events as
(c) extremely positive.
B2 EV2: The level of (i) participation, (ii) interaction and (iii) flexibility within an
organization's top management team will be negatively related to the extent to which
managers interpret threat consistent developments, trends or events as (a) negative
and potentiallosses, (b) uncontrollable, and (c) extremely negative.
4.2.2 TMT information processing structure, issue sorting and causal
understanding
With increased information processing capacity, greater exchange of ideas and more
careful deliberation of issues, better ability to cope with stress and to avoid
information overload, use of more effortful modes of cognition and less cognitive
simplification, rich or organic top management team information processing
structures should improve managers' issue sorting, causal understanding and data
search.
Due to the complexity of the task of sorting the wheat from the chaff in the fields of
potential issues facing managers (Dutton, Walton, and Abrahamson 1989), the task
should be more effectively conducted with active modes of cognitive processing
(Dutton 1993b; Louis and Sutton 1991; Reger and Palmer 1996). Active or mindful
processing should also facilitate more nuanced causal understanding, since it reduces
the chances of simplified interpretation. Thus, to the extent that rich or organic
information processing structures provoke managers to use active modes of
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information processing, such structures should enhance managers' issue sorting and
causal understanding. Moreover, as suggested by Shank et al. (1988), communication
density and openness within top management tearns facilitate greater information
sharing and acceptance and analyses of conflicting and diverse information. In a
similar vein, Thomas et al. (1991) argued that participation will increase the number
of variables considered, the number of possible causal relationships considered, and
the number of possible outcomes that potentially will result from strategic issue
diagnosis. Thus, managers in organizations with rich information processing
structures, should, in general be better informed about environmental changes
(Milliken 1990; Sutcliffe 1994) and be equipped with a greater set of cause-and-effect
relationships. This might suggest that they will be more sensitive to subtle changes
and better able to classify signals from noise and be more nuanced in causal
understanding. Finally, to the extent that low participation implies low diversity in
goals and preferences of tearn members, managers may tend to look for and accept
data that conforms to existing or outdated expectations, preferences and believes
(Schwenk 1984). Norms of consistency may facilitate use of narrow and homogenized
perspectives, increase commitment to past actions, and reinforce old ways of seeing
the world (Staw 1981), which might decrease the possibility of nuanced causal
understanding. This leads to the formulation of the following hypotheses:
H2/s: The level of (i) participation, (U) interaction and (iii)jlexibility within an
organization's top management team will be positively related to the extent to which
managers differentiate between developments, trends or events in terms of judgments of
(a) importance and (bi feasibility.
H2ev: The level of (i) participation, (ii) interaction and (iii)jlexibility within an
organization's top management team will be positively related to the extent to which
managers are nuanced in causal understanding of developments, trends or events.
4.2.3 TMT information processing structure and data search
Empirical support for a positive relationship between the richness of top management
tearn structures and data search is provided by Thomas and McDaniel (1990). They
suggested that when top management tearns have high information processing
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capacity, m~agers can attend to more data and consider each piece of data more fully
during interpretation efforts than they can in tearns with low information processing
capacity. Furthermore, given that managers of such tearn are less vulnerable to
information overload (Mintzberg 1983), they should search for more data in strategic
issue diagnosis than managers in less rich or organic structured tearns, since managers
tend to reduce search and simplify decision rules in times of information overload
(Abelson and Levi 1985; Schneider 1988). Finally, if organic structures lead to more
differentiated belief structures within tearns (Dutton and Duncan 1987a) and greater
exchange of ideas and more careful deliberation of issues (Milliken 1990), managers
. .
might be less likely to oversimplify complex situations and limit data search. Thus, it
is suggested that:
H2DS: The level of (i) participation, (ii) interaction and (iiii flexibility within an
organization's top management team will be positively related to the extent to which
managers searchfor different types of data in order to clarify and define strategic
issues.
4.3 Cognitive complexity and strategic issue diagnosis
The final set of hypotheses relates managers' cognitive complexity in terms of
cognitive differentiation and integration strategic issue diagnosis.
4.3.1 Cognitive complexity and effect valence
Previous research within cognitive complexity and strategic issue diagnosis provide
few guidelines for relating cognitive complexity to effect valence. However, the
finding that cognitively complex individuals tend to be more accurate in perceptions
than less complex individuals (Miller 1969),might imply that cognitive complexity is
positively related to positive-gain and negative-loss interpretations. On the other hand,
differences between more and less cognitively complex individuals in terms of
-
accurate perceptions are usually greatest when information contains inconsistencies
(Streufert and Nogami 1989), which is not the case in the present study. However, due
to better integration of information (e.g. Karlins and Larnm 1967), cognitively
complex managers might be more inclined to recognize a wider set of implications of
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issues than their less complex counterparts. Such characteristics might suggest that
cognitively complex managers should interpret opportunity consistent developments,
trends or events in positive-gain terms and threat consistent developments, trends or
events in negative-loss terms to a greater extent than less complex managers.
Turning to controllability, uncontrollability and extremity perceptions, existing
evidence suggest a negative relationship with cognitive complexity. First, a number of
studies suggest that cognitively complex individuals are more balanced and moderate
and less extreme or polarized in perception and attribution than less complex
individuals (Durand and Lambert 1979; Linville 1982; Linville and Jones 1980;
Miller 1969; O'Keefe and Brady 1980). This would suggest that cognitively complex
managers should be less extreme in effect valence than their less complex
counterparts. Moreover, data obtained by a number of researchers suggest that
cognitively complex perceivers take more information into account and form more
well-rounded impressions than less complex perceivers (Streufert and Swezey 1986).
They tend to search for diverse (not only confirmatory) information, are generally
able to integrate inconsistent sets of information, while less complex individuals tend
to focus on either the earlier or the later set (Streufert and Nogami 1989), and have
less tolerance for ambiguity and diversity (Streufert, Streufert, and Castore 1968).
Finally, cognitively complex managers seem to be more likely to redefine problems
rather than accept them exactly as presented (Lepsinger et al. 1989; Merron, Fisher,
and Torbert 1987). These findings might imply that complex managers to a lesser
extent think that they can simply exploit opportunities without effort or behave overly
rigid in threatening situations. Thus, cognitive complexity might be negatively related
to controllability perceptions of opportunity consistent developments, trends or events
and to uncontrollability perceptions of threat consistent developments, trends or
events. Thus, the following two hypotheses are suggested:
B3EV}: The level o/managers' cognitive (i) differentiation and (U) integration will be
positively related to the extent to which managers interpret opportunity consistent
developments, trends or events as (a) positive and potential gains, and negatively
, related to the extent towhich managers interpret opportunity consistent
developments, trends or events as (b) controllable and (c) extremely positive.
79
H3EV2: The level o/managers' cognitive (i) differentiation and (ii) integration will be
positively related to the extent to which managers interpret threat consistent
developments, trends or events as (a) negative and potentiallosses, and negatively
related to the extent to which managers interpret threat consistent developments,
trends or events as (b) uncontrollable and-te) extremely negative
4.3.2 Cognitive complexity and issue sorting
Cognitive complexity theory (Streufert and Swezey 1986) argues that managers differ
in their ability to identify distinct attributes of the information they receive and to
meaningfully interrelate these attributes. For instance, research on interpersonal
perception has shown that cognitively complex individuals are better able to integrate
conflicting information about other persons and less likely to categorize them into
simple "good" versus "bad" groupings or engage in attitude polarization (e.g. O'Keefe
and Brady 1980). Less complex individuals on the other hand, more often tend to
form impressions on the basis of one-sided evidence even where opposing
information is presented (e.g. Mayo and Crockett 1964). Thus, cognitively complex
managers might to a grater extent thaMcGill, Johnson, and Bantel 1994n less complex
managers go beyond surface characteristics of issues and base their interpretations on
more and more diverse information or script tracks (Chang and McDaniel 1995).With
a deeper and more "mindful" elaboration of issues, cognitively complex managers
might be better able to recognize subtle differences between issues. Thus, it is
suggested'that;
H3/s: The level o/managers' cognitive (i) differentiation and (ii) integration will be
positively related to the extent to which managers differentiate between developments,
trends or events in terms ofjudgments ofra) importance and (b)/easibility.
4.3.3 Cognitive complexity and causal understanding
.The same arguments that were used to support a negative relationship between
cognitive 'complexity and extremity and controllability interpretations, suggest a
positive relationship between the level of managers' cognitive complexity and
nuanced causal understanding. Additionally, cognitively complex subjects have been
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shown to be better at abstract reasoning (Neuliep and Hazleton 1986) and use a
greater number of script tracks in handling problems (Wofford 1994). Finally,
cognitive complexity seem to be related to an intention to understand, to avoid
premature closure and to consider alternative viewpoints (Chang and McDaniel
1995). These arguments and findings might suggest that the level of cognitive
complexity will be negatively related to simplified causal understanding. Thus, one
mightexpect:
H3cv: The level o/managers' cognitive (i) differentiation and (ii) integration will be
positively related to the extent to which managers are nuanced in their causal
understanding o/ developments, trends or events.
4.3.4 Cognitive complexity and data search
While earlier theories suggested that cognitively complex individuals should be more
open to all kinds of information, later research has shown that information orientation
interacts with stimulus conditions or tasks (Streufert and Swezey 1986). They seem to
be more actively information orientated and their search activities more a function of
information need than of environmental conditions (Streufert and Nogarni 1989).
While cognitively complex persons generally search for more different kinds of
information (Dollinger 1984; Karlins and Lamm 1967) and seek more novel
information and across a greater number of information categories (Streufert and
Swezey 1986), they do not necessarily search for more information than less complex
subjects. Accordingly, it is generally assumed that cognitively complex persons are
better able to search for near-adequate amounts of relevant information (Streufert and
Nogarni 1989). These arguments suggest that cognitively complex managers not
necessarily will search for more data than less complex managers in terms of core
data, but that they might search for more novel information in terms of additional and
new data. Thus, the final hypothesis suggests that:
H3DS: The level o/managers' cognitive (i) differentiation and (ii) integration will be
positively related to the extent to which managers search/or additional and new data
in order to clarify and define strategic issues.
4.4 Research model
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Translating the relationships in the conceptual framework (Figure 2.1) into testable
hypotheses results in the overall research model in Figure 4.1. Due to number of
underlying dimensions of effect valence and the mix of positive and negative
relationships, -the hypotheses regarding effect valence - is .-presented ·:separately III
Figure 4.2.
Organizational scanning
• Information acqusition frequency
• Information availability and use
Effect valence
• Positive-gain
• Controllability
• Opportunity-extremity
• Negative-loss
• Uncontrollability
• Threat-extremity
TMT-IPS
• Participation
• Interaction
• Flexibility
...,.;:::---------~~...---!3 Issue sorting
<Imponance
I • Unfeasibility
Causal understanding
I
• Nuances
Cognitive complexity
• Differentiation
• Integration
Data search
• Core data
• Additional data
• New data
----tJ. Positive relationship
Figure 4.1: Overall research model
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Figure 4.2: Specification of effect valence
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4.5 Propositions on relative and moderating effects
The theoretical or empirical bases of the relative importance of organizational
information processing versus cognitive complexity in predicting strategic issue
diagnosis are considered too Iimited to .develop specific hypotheses. Cognitive
complexity-has not yet been studied in relation to strategic issue diagnosis and most
strategic issue diagnosis research has focused predominantly on threat-opportunity
construction. Therefore, two propositions based on an organizational control
perspective and a strategic choice perspective respectively, are presented:
Pl: Organizational scanning and top management team information processing structure
will explain a significant amount of variance in managers' strategic issue diagnosis,
above and beyond the variance explained by managers' cognitive complexity.
I
P2: Managers' cognitive complexity will explain a significant amount of variance in
managers' strategic issue diagnosis, above and beyond the variance explained by
organizational scanning and top management team information processing structure.
As a first step in the direction of increased insight into interaction effects between
organizational context and managers' cognitive complexity, the present investigation
will explore the very basic question of whether organizational information processing
do moderate the relationship between cognitive complexity and strategic issue
diagnosis. Thus, whether organizational context compensate for low levels of
cognitive complexity or whether a fit or match between cognitive complexity and the
level of contextual information processing would be most productive, will not be
explored in the present investigation. However, despite the lack of theory and
empirical research on how such interactions might affect strategic issue diagnosis,
contributors within the field suggest the existence of interaction effects (e.g. Dutton
1993a; Schneider and DeMeyer 1991; Streufert and Swezey 1986; Thomas, Clark,
and Gioia 1993; Thomas, Shankster, and Mathieu 1994). Thus, it is proposed that:
P3: Organizational scanning and top management team information processing will
moderate the relationship between managers' cognitive complexity and strategic issue
diagnosis.
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. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
In this chapter, the employed research design is described along with the research
context, sampling and data collection.
5.1 Research design
A cross sectional design was considered appropriate to test the hypotheses and
expforeiIie propOsttiC;n~··inthe previous chapter. This design allows for comparison in
terms of determining whether values of one variable l covary with values of other
variables, which makes it suitable to test and explore the covariation hypotheses and
propositions in the present investigation. The cross sectional design does not permit
formal test of causality since causes and effects are not separated in time and because
other factors can not be ruled out as rival explanations of observed associations
between independent and dependent variables. The time order component would be
difficult no matter the choice of design, so the strongest proof of time order would
have to be based on previous theory and empirical research that posit an association
between conceptually similar variables (e.g. Hitt and Tyler 1991; Thomas, Clark, and
Gioia 1993; Thomas and McDaniel 1990; Thomas, Shankster, and Mathieu 1994).
There are, however, clear limitations in terms of controlling for the possibility that all
relevant third variables may affect relations between independent and dependent
variables. Although one can test whether the observed relations are nonspurious by
including control variables, the single control variable included in this study do not
rule out the effects of known and unknown third variables that might be related to the
relations under investigation.
5.2 A single-industry field simulation method
Studying strategic issue diagnosis requires identification or instrumentally creation of
stimulus objects to be diagnosed by the managers. These stimulus objects must be ill-
structured and ambiguous enough to meet the requirements of what constitute the raw
lIn the previous chapters, the terms concept or construct have been used. In this chapter, "variables"
will be used to denote the central terms, since the discussion relates to the empirical part of the study.
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material of strategic issues (e.g. Dutton, Fahey, and Narayanan 1983). Additionally,
there should not be strong a priori reasons to assume that their impact on
organizations is strongly affected by variables not included in the study. At the same
time, the stimulus objects should be as equally relevant as possible across individual
managers and their organizations.
Based on the above considerations, stimulus objects were created and presented to
managers in the form of case-scenarios, instead of relying on real world
developments, trends or events. Case-scenarios are short stories (often about five to
ten sentences long) that describe a development, trend or an event. This approach
offers expert input in the form of real managers as well as theoretically driven control
over the stimulus material (Fredrickson 1986b; Nichols and Dukerich 1991; Snow and
Thomas 1994). By providing a common reference point across informants, scenarios
enable the assessment of variance in diagnosis that likely exists between managers
facing the same development, trend or event. Moreover, using managers from
organizations in the same industry make it easier to construct case scenarios that are
realistic, interesting and detailed enough to stimulate cooperation and commitment
from respondents and that at the same time are relevant for managers across
organizations (Fredrickson 1986b).
In other words, choosing a single industry does not only eliminate the impact of
industry characteristics on strategic issue diagnosis (e.g. Milliken, Dutton, and Beyer
1990; Sutcliffe 1994; Thomas, Clark, and Gioia 1993; Thomas and McDaniel 1990;
Yasai-Ardekani 1986). It also provides a context where the case scenario construction
is made easier. The case-scenario methodology described here is referred to as the
field simulation method (Fredrickson 1986b). In short, this is a two-phase research
method using interviews and expert input to first develop case scenarios that represent
stimulus objects, followed by written case scenarios to which managers respond by
answering a questionnaire .
. 5.3 Research context
After having considered several candidate industries, the newspaper industry in
Norway was selected. First, there are enough newspaper firms in Norway to constitute
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a satisfactory numbers from which to draw. a sample of managers. Although the
Norwegian Newspaper Publishers' Association (NAL) counts no more than 154
newspapers, which account for about 98 percent of the total circulation of newspapers
in Norway, most newspaper firms have the necessary characteristics to be included in
this study; they have some form of a top management team and they are confronted
with strategic issues. In general, small and large newspaper firms are similar in terms
of their organization structure and main functions, and they face very much the same
strategic threats and opportunities (Fink 1988). Finally, the NAL showed a
willingness to assist the empirical part of this study, which was considered important
in terms of recruiting a panel of experts and to increase the response rate.
Newspaper firms are, like most firms, businesses that must be managed efficiently
and profitably. Besides, the newspaper industry in Norway is quite turbulent and
changing, which makes it suitable for an investigation of strategic issues. For
instance, very much like newspapers in other countries, newspaper firms face an
increasing number of vigorous competitors fighting for reader time and advertiser
money, the source of any newspaper's strength. In addition, the Norwegian newspaper
industry is currently undergoing structural changes through a series of mergers and
acquisitions. Moreover, there is considerable uncertainty related to public regulation
of the industry in terms of for example governmental incentives to obtain a
differentiated press and arrangements to secure the protection of privacy. Thus, even
small newspaper firms are confronted with and influenced by environmental changes
and should be expected to conductstrategic analysis and planning (Wilberg 1994a;
Wilberg 1994b). Finally, the newspaper industry is an intriguing industry (e.g. Fink
1988; Grønhaug and Falkenberg 1990; Thompson 1989). Newspaper managers work
under severe time limits and are continuously confronted with strategic dilemmas
(e.g. Fink 1988), which make strategic issue diagnosis a particularly important
managerial function. For instance, the product has to be renewed every day. Secondly,
most newspapers represent a "double" product since they produce and market news as
well as advertisement space. Thirdly, most newspapers have higher ideals than just
making money.
It might be argued that these distinct characteristics might be considered as a threat
against the generalizability of the results of the present study. However, the aim is to
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create a research context with as little "noise" as possible in order to identify
mechanisms of general applicability. This is done by eliminating industry effects and
selecting an industry that suits the purpose of the research.
5.4 The measurement development process
The measurement development process included three main phases. In the first phase,
constructs were first conceptually defined by using subconstructs or dimensions (e.g.
organizational scanning was defined in terms of acquisition and availability and use).
Furthermore, the domains of the constructs were specified by delineating what was
included in the definition and what was excluded (e.g. structured and deliberated
efforts and environmental data, stimuli and information). Then, the subconstructs and
the specifications guided the development of a pool of items (and case scenarios) for
each construct. This first phase was guided by both "general" and industry specific
theory and empirical research, as well as input from industry experts in an expert
panel (the following section about the dependent variables gives a fuller description of
the role of the expert panel and the development of case scenarios). A major concern
in the latest step of this phase was to "translate" questions and items into the
newspaper industry context.
The second phase was concerned with a preliminary exploration of a first draft of the
questionnaire. Particular attention was paid to the user-friendliness and clarity of
every section of the instrument, including general and specific instructions. Three
fellow colleagues acquainted with surveys read through the questionnaire and gave
feedback on the wording and format. After having cleared design, inconsistencies and
bad wording, the members of the expert panel completed the questionnaire while
making verbal comments that were recorded during the sessions. This process resulted
in several minor changes, but also deletion of some items that did not seem relevant
for the newspaper context.
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-------_.,--..--------~--- ----------The third phase was a small scale pilot test2 f the instrument within a limited sample
of nine newspaper managers from. newspaper firms. Five managers responded by
-, ~".-., ',-_. o,, •• __ •• c __ ._ •.• _._._._ --'-
mail, i.e. the administrative procedure that was followed in the actual study, and four
completed the questionnaire with me present. Verbal and written comments from the
managers resulted in minor changes of the wording of some of the items.
Additionally, some items were deleted because there were almost no variation in the
responses from the nine managers. A potential problem with this pilot test was that
the managers were recruited from two large newspaper firms. However, attention was
paid to the potential problem of size during the first two phases of the measurement
development process and one of the reasons to select the newspaper industry was that
small and large newspaper firms are similar in terms of their organization structure
and main functions (Fink 1988).
5.4.1 Development of case scenarios
As a basis for constructing the case scenarios to measure three of the dependent
constructs (effect valence, issue sorting and data search), a list of-possible topics was
compiled by tapping several sources; informal interviews with newspaper managers,
consultants and researchers, publications and reports by NAL and strategic newspaper
management related research and literature (e.g. Brumback 1992; Fink 1988;
Grønhaug and Falkenberg 1990; Noon 1994; Thompson 1989; Ulvenes, Svardal, and
Gammelsæter 1986; Vogel 1993; Wilberg 1994a; Wilberg 1994b; Zack and
McKenney 1995).
Then a panel of experts was formed, consisting of three persons with newspaper
management experience. The main purpose of this panel was to propose topics and
evaluate scenarios according to some pre-established criteria. Before the first meeting,
the members of the expert panel received a short description of the planned study.
This report included the criteria for the case scenarios, as well as some examples of
general (Le. not industry-specific) case scenarios used in related research. The first
criterion was that case scenarios should not affect different organizations differently,
2 Strictly speaking, this was more like pretesting since not all of the managers completed the
questionnaire using the administrative procedure that was used in the actual study and because they
were told to give comments (e.g. Bourque and Fielder 1995).
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where particular attention were paid to size, ownership, competitive posture, and
whether the newspaper published a local, regional or national newspaper. If strong
arguments were found that a particular development, trend or event would affect a
special kind of newspaper organization very differently from others, it was ruled out.
The second criterion was that the case scenarios should be considered realistic and
detailed enough to be interesting. The third and last criterion was that case scenarios
should be ill-structured and ambiguous enough to meet the requirements of what
constitute the raw material of strategic issues (e.g. Dutton, Fahey, and Narayanan
1983). This was ensured by explaining to the members of the panel that the case
. .
scenarios should allow for different interpretations by different managers along
dimensions such as cause(s), magnitude, effect(s) and so on. In addition to these
general criteria, the report to the expert panel included specific requirements for each
of the five case scenarios to be used to measure three of the dependent constructs.
These specific requirements will be discussed under the heading of each construct in
the next chapter
At the first meeting in the expert panel, different suggestions to topics for case
scenarios were discussed and tested against the general and specific criteria. After
deciding on five scenario topics, drafts were made and later checked and refined by
the panel members.
5.5 Sampling and data collection
In order to increase the number of respondents and to check the organizational and
group measures for within-group-organization agreement, it was decided to try to get
more than one respondent from each newspaper firm. Thus, the population constitutes
members of top management teams in Norwegian newspaper firms that are members
of NAL. Members of the top management team is operationally defined as the
newspaper' s president, editor or "single manager" (i.e. managers that have editorial as
well as managerial responsibility), and executives who report directlyto the president,
editor or single manager and at the same time are involved in strategic analysis and
decision making.
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Since it would be extremely difficult to get a list of sampling units (Le. all top
management team members in the 154 newspapers), the initial selection was based on
firm level data provided by a list of all 154 newspaper members of NAL (NAL 1997).
According to managers at NAL and other industry experts, very small newspapers
often do not operate with top management teams. Therefore, managers in newspapers
with a circulation of less than 5000 were excluded from the population. This a priori
based restriction resulted in a final population of top management team members of
106 newspaper firms. Since this is a relatively small number of firms and because
surveying top managers typically produces low rate of responses (e.g. Snow and
" "
Thomas 1994), managers from all the firms in the population (given that they
operated with top management teams) were invited to participate in the investigation.
Furthermore, once developed and tested in cooperation with industry expertise, the
survey instrument cannot be applied in another industry. Not only the content of the
case scenarios, but also the language and jargon is industry specific. Hence, to get the
most out of the invested resources, it was decided to try to collect data from managers
from a large number of organizations compared to the total number of organizations
in the industry.
A request letter from NAL together with a one-page description of the study were
mailed to the president, editor or single manager of all 106 newspaper firms. The
description contained general information about the study including participant
requirements, i.e. that three to five respondents from each firm were desired and that
the president, editor or single manager preferably should be .represented amongthese.
As an incentive to participate, firms that completed and returned at least three
questionnaires were promised a report comparing their responses to the rest of the
sample. In order not to exclude too many firms, single respondents from firms were
also accepted. Firms that completed one or two questionnaires were pledged a general
report from the study; The" managers were informed that if their firm decided to
participate in the study, they should" prepare names and positions of top management
team members.
After less than a week each firm was contacted by telephone to determine
participation and obtain the names and positions of top management team members.
In addition, checks were made to establish whether firms in fact operated with top
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management teams in strategic analysis and decision making. Thirty-one firms agreed
to participate with more than one manager and provided names and positions of top
management team members. All of these managers were then mailed questionnaires
individually. Thirty firms agreed to participate with at least one respondent and
perhaps more than one. The president, editor or sing1e manager of these firms was
mailed between two and five questionnaires to be distributed within their top
management teams. Seventeen firms agreed to participate with the president, editor or
single manager only, and fifteen firms were rather doubtful but agreed to receive one
or two questionnaires to have a closer look. Finally, eleven firms did not want to
participate and two firms were excluded because they did not operate with top
management teams. In sum, a total of 231 questionnaires were distributed to 93
newspaper firms.
Two mail prompts and a telephone follow-up, generated 162 usable questionnaires
representing 73 newspaper firms, a response rate of approximately 70 percent. The
number of respondents per firm ranged from 1 to 5 with an average of 2.22. In 46 of
the 73 firms, two or more managers completed and returned the questionnaire, leaving
27 single informant responses. About half the respondents held top positions in their
firms (36 presidents, 21 editors and 23 single managers), while the remaining 82
respondents held lower managerial positions. The respondents' average age was 44
years and 87 percent were males.
Non-response bias was analyzed with regard to competitive 'posture and circulation
size, based on available data from NAL3 (NAL 1997). As far as circulation size is
concerned, non-responding firms are generally smaller than responding firms, with
group means of 13,834 and 29,276 respectively. However, excluding the three largest
newspapers in the response sample gives a group mean of 18,438, while excluding the
six largest newspapers produce a group mean of 15,392. Thus, with regard to
circulation size, one can conclude that the majority of respondents are employed in
firms not very different from the non-responding firms.
3Data were missing for two of the non-responding firms.
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Table 5.1: Competitive posture of the response and non-response samples
Response sample Non-response sample
Competitive posture Frequency Percent Frequency .Percent
Number one newspaper 15 20.50 2 6.50
Number two newspaper 9 12.30 5 16.10
Nolocal competitors 43 58.90 21 67.70
Niche newspapers 4 5.50 3 9.70
Non-subscribe newsl2BE!:rs 2 2.70 O 0.00
Total 73 100.00 31 100.00
Table 5.1 displays competitive posture of the response and non-response samples. The
main difference between the two samples is that the percentage of number one
newspapers" is about three times larger for the response sample than for the non-
response sample. Besides this factor, the distribution of competitive posture in the two
samples does not differ very much. Thus, the sample of 162 top management team
members from 73 newspaper firms appears to be representative of the population.
4A number one newspaper is the one with the largest circulation of two newspapers competing in the
same geographical market.
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MEASUREMENT
This chapter empirically explores the reliability and validity of each measure, starting
'with the dependent variables. Since all variables are' treated at an interval level of
measurement and considered reflective as' opposed,.to formative, 'ceeffi~ient alpha
(Cronbach 1951) is used to estimate the reliabilityofjhe measures. Moreover, factor
"-.:,,-_., ·c,,,,-:,...,-~'"-- .
analyses of the multidimensional constructs are conducted as a proximation to
convergent and discriminant validity (e.g. Carmines and Zeller 1979; Dess and Beard
1984;Nunnally and Bernstein 1994). At the end of the chapter; the procedures applied
te construct variables based en the questions asked in the questionnaire and
descriptive statistics for all variables are reported.
6.1 Dependent variables
All dependent variables are individual level perceptual variables since they are
developed to' empirically establish individual managers' .strategic issue diagnosis. To
strengthen conformity between the conceptual and empirical level, all questions used
to' measure dependent variables directed respondents attention to' their individual
perceptions of the case scenarios (e.g. Klein, Dansereau, and Hall 1994).
6.1.1 Effect valence
Most studies that have measured threat and opportunityhave treatedthem as two ends
- -"--~-"""~~'~-"'"
of a single dimension (e.g. Fombrun and Zajac 1987; Ginsberg and Venkatraman
1992; Thomas, Clark, and Gioia 1993; Thomas and McDaniel 1990). Jackson and
Dutton (1988) and Denison et al. (1996), in contrast, suggest that threat and
opportunity represent distinct dimensions relevant to' issue interpretation, In order to'
address ,this concern, respondents were presented with .two case. scenarios and 9
questions to each scenario based on the questionnaire used by Jackson and Dutton
(1988). The two case scenarios were designed to' signal an environmental threat and
an environmental opportunity. The threat scenario contained threat-consistent and
opportunity-discrepant information, while the opportunity scenario contained
opportunity-consistent and threat-discrepant information. Interviews with panel
members were conducted to' refine and cross-check the text as well as to check the
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manipulation of the case scenarios. This procedure was followed for all case-
scenarios.
Jackson and Dutton (1988) demonstrated that opportunity and threat labels were
differentiated by three strategic interpretation dimensions: (1) whether decision
makers evaluate an issue in positive or negative terms, (2) whether they see it as
representing potential gain or loss for their organization, and (3) whether they see it as
controllable or uncontrollable, often referred to as capability perception. Thomas and
McDaniel (1990) and others (e.g. Thomas, Clark, and Gioia 1993) have later verified
the relevance of these labels for describing strategic issues but also noted that the
positive-negative and gain-loss dimensions are operationally indistinguishable and
highly correlated, and therefore should be collapsed into a single positive-gain and a
negative-loss dimension. Thus, ten items (five for each scenario) were posed to assess
the extent to which managers would see the scenarios in positive-gain/negative-loss
terms. For example, after the respondents had read the opportunity and threat
scenarios, they were asked: «To what extent would you see the situation as having
positive implications for the future of your company?» and for the threat case
scenario: "To what extent would you see the situation as having negative implications
for the future of your company?».
To assess the controllability and uncontrollability dimensions, respondents were
promted two items for each of the scenarios. For the opportunity scenario, they were
asked: "To what extent do you feel that your company has the necessary resources to
effectively capitalize on the situation?" and "To what extent do you feel that your
company can effectively capitalize on the situation without much effort?" For the
threat scenario, they were asked: "To what extent do you feel that your company lack
the necessary resources to satisfactorily manage the situation?" and "To what extent
do you feel that your company can only satisfactorily manage the situation with much
effort?"
To assess extremity in effect valence, two items for each of the scenarios contained
questions about the magnitude of the situations compared to other firms. For the
opportunity scenario, managers were asked: "To what extent do you feel that that the
situation will have more positive implications for your company than for other
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newspaper companies?" and "To what extent do you see the situation as a strategic
opportunity that is particularly important for your company?" For the threat scenario,
they were asked: "To what extent do you feel that the situation will have more
negative implications for your company than for other newspaper companies?" and
"To what extent do you see the situation as a strategic opportunity that is particularly
important for your company?". Managers responded on a 7-point Likert. scale with
anchors ranging from "very little extent" to "very great extent".
If positive-gain/negative loss, controllability-uncontrollability and extremity
represents are three distinct dimensions of opportunity and threat interpretations, the
scales for each dimensions should demonstrate internal consistency. In other words,
items positivelyassociated with the same dimension should be positively correlated
with one another.
Furthermore, items associated with one dimension should in factor analytical terms
load on that dimension or factor only. In order to empirically explore these
-_. __ •.._-------_._.~._.-.
assumptions, a principal component analysis (PCA) with three factors for each case
scenario was conducted. PCA was applied since the interest was to determine the
minimum number of factors needed to account for maximum portion of the variance
represented in the data (Hair et al. 1992). Furthermore, an oblique rotation was used
since the dimensions were assumed to be correlated with each other (Hair et al. 1992).
This procedures were followed for all variables. Tables 6.1 and 6.2 present the results
of the factor analyses for effect valence.
VI The results reveal that perceptions of positive-gain/negative-loss, controllability-
I uncontrollability and extremity should be viewed as distinct dimensions. The fact that
II items load significantly on one factor only is taken as an indication of convergent and
\ discriminant validity. The relatively low coefficient alpha for uncontrollability (fO~.
\ the threat situation) must be seen in relation to the small number of items used to
.\ ._-.- •••• _. • •••••••••• - _ •••• - __ o • __ ._ _ •• __ •• ' • __ ._ .. __ ••••••• • •• •••
'i\aSSeSsthe dimension. The inter-item correlation between the two items is .37,
suggesting that a small increase in the number of items would have resulted in a
$ubstantial increase in coefficient alpha (Carmines and Zeller 1979; Van de Ven and
Ferry 1980). Furthermore, given that limited reliability is not the major reason
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limiting test validity (Nunnally and Bernstein 1994) and that the two items can be said
to be conceptually related to each other, the scale was kept for further analysis.
Table 6.1: Effect valence opportunity, PCA with oblimin rotations
Factors
Items 1 2 3
Positive-gain
2. Future significantly easier .90 -.20 .01
4. Very positive .82 .02 .12
I. Provide benefits .78 .26 -.10
3. Potential gain .74 .22 .05
7. Very high probability of large gains .50 .10 .46
Controllability
9. Easy to capitalize .03 .89 -.01
8. Capability to capitalize .01 .87· .08
Extremity
5. More positive implications -.06 .07 .88
6. More significant strateg!c o~rtuni!! .07 -.05 .87
Eigenvalue 5.00 1.15 .89
Pet, of variance 55.60 12.80 9.90
Coefficient a1(!ha .90 .81 .73
Table 6.2: Effect valence threat, PCA with oblimin rotation
Factors
Items 1 2 3
Negative-loss
I.Provide disadvantage .90 -.15 -.01
3. Potentialloss .86 -.08 .06
2. Future significantly more difficult .81 .12 .08
4. Very negative .75 .16 .04
7. Very high probability oflarge loss .67 .32 .00
Extremity
5. More negative implications -.12 .90 .14
6. More significant strategic threat .29 .75 -.11
Uncontrollability
8. Lack the capability to manage -.07 .04 .93
9. Difficult to manage .29 -.02 .59
Eigenvalue 4.63 1.10 .93
Pet, of variance 51.40 12.30 10.30
Coefficient a1(!ha .90 .70 .54
6.1.2 Issue sorting
To measure issue sorting, two case scenarios containing descriptions of two different
organizational problems were presented to the respondents. The scenarios varied with
respect to problem structure. The first scenario (denoted scenario S). described a
structured organizational problem with a single explicitly mentioned cause and where
the solution was relatively straight forward compared to the problem in the second
scenario. The latter (scenario U) described an unstructured problem with uncertain.
5The formulation of items is shortened due to limited space. For the exact wording of items see
appendix A.
96
and multiple potential causes, effects and solutions. To balance the two scenarios,
additional identical facts about the "case-organization" were included in both case
scenarios.
Nine items based on previous research (Dutton, Stumpf, and Wagner 1990; Jackson
and Dutton 1988) were used to identify the extent to which the two situations were
considered important for the organization (six items) and to what extent they were
seen as unfeasible or difficult to understand and manage (three items). Managers
responded on a 7-point Likert scale with anchors ranging from "very little extent" to
---_ .-----~-------_._-
"very great extent". Since these two types of perception should form positively related
but distinct dimensions (Dutton, Stumpf, and Wagner 1990; Jackson and Dutton
1988), they were treated as separate dependent variables.
Table 6.3: Issue sorting, peA with oblimin rotation
Factors
Items 1 2 3 4
Importance scenario U
3. An urgent issue .87 .13 .01 -.15
4. Placed high on the issue agenda .87 JY7 -.07 -.14
I.An important issue .83 -.09 -.04 .02
2. Future will be changed .78 .07 .06 .05
5. A routine issue" .55 -.09 -.14 .07
9. Invest further resources in exploration .39 -.12 .11 .42
Unfeasibility scenario S
7. Sufficient knowledge to understand" .08 .93 .01 -.03
8. Sufficient resources to manage" -.06 .84 -.09 .09
6. Easy to understand cause-effect relationships" .01 .72 -.13 -.03
Importance scenario S
4. Placed high on the issue agenda .08 .00 .. ~.:78 -J9·
3. An urgent issue .02 .07 -.77 -.20
2. Future will be changed -.05 .08 -.72 .15
1. An important issue .08 -.14 -.70 -.01
5. A routine issue" -.03 .05 -.56 .01
9. Invest further resources in exploration .07 .11 -.49 .19
Unfeasibility Scenario U
6. Easy to understand cause-effect relationships' -.06 -.20 -.17 .76
7. Sufficient knowledge to understand" .03 .35 .19 .69
8. Sufficient resources to manage" -.06 .36 .09 .69
Eigenvalue 4.06 2.88 2.51 1.34
Pet. of variance 22.50 16.00 14.00 7.40
Coefficient a1I!ha .86 .82 .77 .70
"Reversed
If importance and unfeasibility are two distinct dimensions of issue perception, the
scales for each dimensions should demonstrate internal consistency and the items
should load on one dimension only. In order to empirically explore these assumptions,
a principal component analysis (peA) with four factors was conducted (since
respondents rated importance and unfeasibility of two different case scenarios).
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The results reveal that perceptions of importance and unfeasibility of the two case
descriptions in fact form four dimensions. The only exception is item 9 for case
scenario U, since it loads on both importance and unfeasibility. Thus, item 9 was
deleted from further analysis for both case scenarios.
In general, the PCA indicate that the respondents saw the two problems as different in
terms of the two different perceptual dimensions of importance and unfeasibility. To
assess issue sorting, Le. which of the issues that were perceived as most important and
most unfeasible, a new scale was made simply by dividing the respondents score on
each of the U-items on the S-items. This scale gives a score of the relative weight of
problem U as compared to problem S, where scorings greater than one indicates that
the unstructured problem is perceived as more important or more unfeasible than the
structured problem. To provide some evidence of discriminant and convergent
validity of this new scale, a PCA with two factors and oblique rotation was
performed. However, due to low factor loadings for item 2 and 5, and because three
factors had eigenvalues greater than one, the analysis indicated that three factors
might give a better representation of the data when it comes to comparing the
importance and unfeasibility of the two problems. As can be seen from table 6.4 the
three factor solution makes a distinction between what can be interpreted as
"operational" versus "strategic" importance of problem U relative to problem S. The
term "operational" is applied since the perception of the issue is based on the short
term importance assessed by the urgency and agenda setting items. "Strategic"
importance on the other hand is related to the long term effect of the issues and the
inverse of being routine issues. Since all three unfeasibility items load significantly on
the third factor only, the unfeasibility dimension behave as hypothesized.
The low coefficient alpha of strategic importance of U relative to S must be seen in
relation to the small number of items used to assess the dimension. Besides, the two
items seem to be conceptually related to each other as well as to strategic importance.
In general, since all items load significantly? on one factor only in a conceptually
6Using .40 as a rough rule of thumb for a significant loading of an item on a factor (e.g. Hair et al.
1992; Van de Ven and Ferry 1980).
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reasonable pattern, this is interpreted as some evidence of convergent and
discriminant validity of the three measures.
Table 6.4: Issue sorting, peA with oblimin rotation
Factors
Items 1 2 3
Operational importance (of U relative to S)
3. An urgent issue .92 .01 -.05
4. Placed high on the issue agenda .85 .07 .00
I.An important issue .72 -.02 .11
Unfeasibility (of U relative to S)
7. Sufficient knowledge to understand" -.02 .89 .05
8. Sufficient resources to manage" -.12 .88 .08
6. Easy to understand cause-effect relationships" .21 .66 -.08
Strategic importance of (U relative to S)
5. A routine issue" -.13 .13 .87
2. Future will be changed .27 -.Il .76
Eigenvalue 2.86 1.74 1.10
Pet. of variance 35.80 21.80 13.80
Coefficient all!ha .79 .72 .57
"Reversed
/ 6.1.3 Nuances in causal understanding
To measure nuances in causal understanding, respondents were presented with 23
cause-effect statements that varied in how nuanced they were. All the information
used to develop the statements were taken from industry relevant sources like
newspapers and industry magazines and they were typically in the form of quotations.
Eighteen of the statements were extremely unnuanced, for instance "The fact that a
newspaper is free, is equivalent with lower degrees of editorial independence". Five
statements were designed to be nuanced, e.g. "It is difficult to point to unambiguous
and universal causes to positive and negative changes in the circulation size".
Managers indicated the degree of truth of the statements on a three point scale ranging
from "true", "can be both true and false" and "false". The extremely unnuanced
statements were scored so that "true" was given a score of 1, "can be both true and
false" was given a score of 2, and "false" was given a score of 3. For the nuanced
statements the scoring was reversed.
The content of the statements was related to four different domains, free papers,
governmental regulations, market and competition and attribution of newspaper
success. Thus, the scale was expected to be four dimensional. However, factor
analyses revealed that only statements related to free papers "behaved" as one
dimension and that it was impossible to give meaningful interpretation and names to
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more than two dimensions. Additionally, the second dimension included statements
related to both the market and competition and attribution of success domains and was
given the rather long name "issues related to market, competition and attribution of
success". The result of the peA with two factors and oblique rotation is shown in
table 6.5.
Table 6.5: Causal understanding, PCA with oblimin rotation
Items
Factors
l 2
.70 .11
.68 .05
.62 -.10
.59 .06
.57 .04
.43 -.20
-.01 .66
-.03 .60
.22 .51
.12 .50
-.07 .48
.04 .47
-.09 .43
-.25 .40
2.44 2.07
17.44 14.75
.66 .58
Freepapers
2 ..Several reasons to believe that increased distribution of FP will have both positive and negative ...
3. FP exclusively a threat to the industry"
I. Increased distribution of FP and a less differentiated press structure'
5. FP and lower degrees of editorial independence"
6. Several reasons to believe that increased distribution will have both ...
4. Increased distribution of FP and lower consumption of traditional newspapers"
Issues related to market, competition and attribution of success
22. Increased industry concentration exclusively negative"
8. Internet can be written off as serious competitor"
14. The main reason to reduction in circulation size will always be ... •
20. DM written off as a competitor to newspaper adds'
13. The main reason to growth in circulation size will always be ... a
23. Several reasons to believe that increased industry concentration will have both ...
7. Unambiguous positive relationship between editorial quality and profit"
17. Credibility as a necessary condition for survival'
Eigenvalue
Pet. of variance
Coefficient alpha
"Reversed
As can be seen from the table, coefficient alphas are relatively low and the second
factor contains statements across different domains. Except from the fact that the
items related to free papers loaded on the same factor, it is difficult to provide any
support for validity for these measures. However, due to the explorative nature of this
study, and this construct in particular, both scales were kept for further analysis.
6.1.4 Data search
To measure data search, yet another short case scenario was presented to the
respondents. The scenario described a problem where two major advertisers had
signaled a significant decrease in the purchase of advertisement from the newspaper.
There were no clear cut information telling why this was happening, but several
possible reasons were mentioned. However, the case contained information that both
advertisers recently had become customers of an advertising agency known for their
efforts in direct marketing and radio advertisement.
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After reading the case scenario, managers were asked to indicate the extent to which
he or she would use each of fourteen different pieces of data to clarify and define the
strategic situation presented in the case scenario. These pieces of data were
constructed as items that varied in how closely they were related to the presented
problem and how effortful the gathering of the information would be. Five items
assessed core data that were strongly related to the problem in that they dealt directly
with the two advertisers and the advertising agency. Three items contained questions
about additional data on the advertising market not as closely related to the problem,
and six items were related to search and gathering of new data. To make the task more
. .
realistic, subjects were reminded that data gathering in real situations is costly in
terms of time and effort (Dukerich and Nichols 1991). Managers responded on a 7-J
point Likert scale with anchors ranging from "very little extent" to "very great
extent".
Table 6.6: Data search, PCA with oblimin rotation
Items
Factors
1 2 3
.82 -.01 -.02
.78 .02 .01
.68 -.10 -.19
.67 -.11 -.30
.64 .15 .12
-.16 .70 -.36
.36 .69 .31
.-.08 .65 -.01
.36 .44 -.17
.19 .44 -.32
-.01 .19 -.74
.11 .03 -.72
.33 -.06 -.61
4.87 1.40 1.18
37.48 10.79 9.07
.81 .71 .70
New data
13. Methods and costs of doing advertising effect measurement
14. Future strategies of advertisers
12. New segments of possible advertisers
Il. Future development of the advertising market
9. Other existing customers relationships with Beta
Coredata
3. Existing information about the two advertisers
2. The strategy and services offered by Beta
l. Meeting with the two advertisers
4. Last statistical report on advertising in different media
5. Existing report comparing effects of different advertising media
Additional
6. Historical internal information on advertiser satisfaction
8. Historical internal information on new and quitting customers
10. Historical information about possible structural market changes
Eigenvalue
Pet. of variance
Coefficient alpha
To test the three-dimensionality of the data search, a peA with three factors and
oblique rotation was conducted. Except from one item (item 7) that was deleted from
further analysis, the result of the factor analysis supports this idea. The scales
demonstrate acceptable reliability .and all remaining items have significant factor
loadings, providing some evidence on convergent validity. However, some of the core
data items have fairly high loadings on the additional data dimension, suggesting at
least some lack of support for discriminant validity.
101
6.2 Independent variables
Two of the independent variables are conceptually treated as objective phenomena at
the group and organizational levels .of analysis. The data used to measure these
variables are however collected from individual managers. Members of the top
management team are assumed to be the most knowledgeable persons regarding an
organization's information processing, and the individuals most responsible for taking
actions intended to align the organization's strategy, structure, processes, and
environment (Thomas, Clark, and Gioia 1993). Thus, top managers will be the best
informants for gathering data oh the independent as well as the dependent variables.
To strengthen the conformity between the conceptual and empirical level, questions
directed respondents' attention to the group and organizationallevel respectively.
6.2.1 Organizational scanning
Organizational scanning has been defined as a two-dimensional construct consisting
of information acquisition frequency (IAF) and information availability and use
(IAV). Even though these dimensions can be expected to be interrelated, the
frequency of information acquisition on one side, and how and whether information is
available and used in strategic analysis, planning and forecasting on the other, were
treated as two distinct organizational processes. This distinction is supported by
empirical studies that indicate that organizations are usually not successful in having
their informational input integrated into the strategic management process (e.g.
Diffenbach 1983; Jain 1984; Lenz and Engledow 1986a; Stubbart 1982).
The 18-item IAF scale was designed to measure how frequently organizations collect
information from different environmental sectors. The classification of sectors was
influenced by previous organizational scanning research, but refined and "translated"
into a newspaper industry context. This classification -resulted in the following
environmental sectors; customers (readers and advertisers), direct competition (other
-newspapers), indirect competition (other media than newspapers), sub suppliers,
regulatory (governmental policy and court rulings) and economic sectors. Since
several studies indicate that scanning frequency or intensity and scope are related (e.g.
Jain 1984; Jennings and Lumpkin 1989; Lenz and Engledow 1986a; Reid 1984), IAF
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was treated as an unidimensional "dimension" of scanning, meaning that frequency of
information acquisition can be measured across environmental sectors. IAF was
measured using frequency questions similar to those used by Hambrick (1982),
Culnan (1983) and Daft et al. (1988), where managers responded to the questions by
indicating how often the organization systematically collect different kind of
information on a six point frequency scale with anchors ranging from "very rare or
never" to "more than weekly".
The 20-item information availability and use (IAU) scale consisted of eight questions
about the use of information in strategic analysis, planning and forecasting, and
twelve questions about how easily available different kinds of information are for
managers in the newspaper. These items were related to the same sectors as the !AF
items and the IAU dimension was also assumed to be unidimensional. This implies
that availability and use of information is hypothesized to be positively related, a
notion that is empirically supported both at the managerial (Culnan 1983; O'Reilly
1982) and organizational (Goldstein and Zack 1989) level. It also implies that
different levels of availability and use is fairly consistent across different sources of
information and different kinds of use of information, which is indirectly supported
by the above cited studies that indicate a positive relationship between frequency and
scope of scanning. Managers responded to the IAU-items on a 7-point Likert scale
with anchors ranging from "very little extent" to ''very great extent".
In order to empirically explore these assumptions, a principal component analysis
with two factors was conducted. The results reveal that no !AF items loaded
significantly on the IAU factor, thus providing some support for the distinction
between the two dimensions. However, five of the eight IAU items that are related to
use of information had higher loadings on the !AF factor than on the IAU factor.
Therefore, a factor analysis with three factors was performed to determine whether
the information use items would load on a single factor.
.As table 6.7 shows, this is not the case. All information use items (except item lu)
load on the first factor together with the !AF items related to market information on
readers and advertising market information, the two most important customer
segments for any newspaper (Fink 1988). Hence, the first factor might be
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meaningfully named "customer information acquisition frequency and use". Since this
factor includes the use of information in strategic analysis, planning and forecasting, it
can conceptually be differentiated from the two other factors as a measure of more
developed or sophisticated organizational scanning (e.g. Jain 1984; Lenz and
Engledow 1986a).
Table 6.7: Organizational scanning, PCA with oblimin rotation
Factors
Items l 2 3
Customer information acquisition frequency and use
2af. Characteristics of existing readers such as attitudes and buying habits .77 -.06 .01
7u. Demographic characteristics of readers in communication with advertisers .74 .07 .01
13u. Attitudes and buying behavior of readers in communication with advertisers .70 .19 .02
19u. Readers to develop scenarios and marketing plans .68 .15 -.11
4af. Reading habits of the population .67 -.14 .26
6u. Advertising market to meet the need of existing and potential advertisers .67 .35 -.09
l2af. Demographic characteristics of existing readers .66 -.21 .34
14af. Existing readers attitudes against the newspaper .66 -.11 .21
8af. Potential readers' attitudes against the newspaper .58 -.18 .24
16u. Media market to detect future threats and opportunities .54 .35 .03
17u. Advertisers to develop plans about how to serve the advertising market .49 .37 .07
Il u. Advertising market to detect future threats and opportunities .48 .34 .06
laf. How other newspapers cover the advertising market .46 -.08 .31
Information availability
3a. Materials and operation-techniques -.13 .77 .03
2a. Updated key figures of the national economic development .00 .70 -.05
12a. Management magazines .21 .66 -.05
9a. Scientific and popular journals -.16 .66 .17
lOa. Sub suppliers -.12 .63 .24
Sa. Advertising market .42 .62 -.26
14a. Reports from researchers and consultants .14 .59 .17
18a. Public and governmental reports and newsletters -.02 .57 .28
4a. Attitudes of readers .48 .50 -.22
20a. Reports and magazines from the trade union .06 .46 .18
8a. Competitors .32 .45 -.02
General information acquisition frequency
17af. Governmental policy and plans concerning the media market .01 .09 .74
6af. Changes in other newspapers image or profile .08 -.06 .64
9af. Tactics and strategies of other media than newspapers .28 -.03 .58
3af. Court rulings related to newspaper production .05 .11 .56
l3af. Alternative sub suppliers .04 .12 .56
5af. Development of new materials and operation-techniques -.16 .12 .55
llaf. Tactics and strategies of competing or comparable newspapers .25 .07 .54
lOaf. How other media than newspapers cover the advertising market .41 .01 .50
15af. Key figures of the national economic development .05 .32 .49
7af. The consumption of other media than newspapers in the population .31 .06 .47
18af. Reader erofiles of other newseaI!!:rs .35 -.06 .43
Eigenvalue 11.88 3.36 2.21
Pet. of variance 33.95 9.60 6.31
Coefficient alpha .91 .88 .87
Etasquared .55 .26 .40
Eta sguared or~anizational eosition .01 .01 .00
"af" denotes information acquisition frequency items, "a" information availability items and "u" information use items.
The second factor consists of all availability items (except one) and was simply
named information availability. Item ISa, which did not load significantly on anyof
the factors, was excluded from further analysis. This item was related to what extent
managers have their own access to the Internet, which seems to be relatively
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independen~of the three organizational scanning dimensions extracted by the factor
analysis.
The rest of the IAF items loaded on the third factor. These items are related to
information segments other than the customer sector, i.e. the competition, sub
supplier, regulatory, and economic sectors. Accordingly, the factor was named
general information acquisition frequency. One item (I6af) about attitudes and
satisfaction of advertisers and one information use item (Iu) were deleted because
they conceptually fitted the first factor rather than the third.
A few items do have fairly high loadings on more than one factor. This suggests that
the measures of the three dimensions of organizational scanning lack support for
~~_Il~t __.YJ1jl~ity.However, they demonstrate high internal consistency with
coefficient alphas ranging from .87 to .91 and average inter-item correlations ranging
from .39 to 046. Moreover, using 040 as a rough rule of thumb for a significant loading
of an item on a factor (e.g. Hair et al. 1992;Van de Ven and Ferry 1980), all included
items can be considered significant. Combined with a conceptually reasonable pattern
of factor loadings, this can be interpreted as some evidence of convergent validity of
the measures.
Since .the organizational scanning variables are measures of organizational
phenomena, members of the same organizations should demonstrate high levels of
agreement in rating these variables. To test this assumption, the extent of agreement
(or reliability) among managers from the same organization were assessed by
contrasting within- and between organization variance (e.g. Klein, Dansereau, and
Hall 1994). One-way analysis of variance of 31 organizations with three to five
respondents in each (n = 105), showed that for customer information acquisition
frequency and use (F = 2.98, P = ..00) and general information acquisition frequency
(F = 1.63, P = .05), the variance between organizations were significantly greater than
within organizations. However, for information availability (F = .88,-P = .64), there
were no significant differences between organizations. In general, such disagreement
in ratings may typically arise because managers hold different organizational
positions and thus different perspectives on the same organizational phenomena
(Kumar, Stem, and Anderson 1993). If organizational position explains more variance
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in the organizational scanning variables than organizational membership, it would
imply serious reliability and validity problems. However, a one-way anova analysis
for organizational position showed no significant differences in the scanning variables
between the 80 top managers and 82 middle managers. Moreover, comparing the eta
squared values in table 6.7, indicate that organizational membership is a much better
explanation of variance in all three organizational scanning variables than
organizational position. Consequently, it is concluded that interrater reliability of
these variables was acceptable.
6.2.2 Top management team information processing structure
The information processing structure of the top management tearn is a concept rooted
in earlier work (e.g. Daft and Lengel 1986; Duncan 1973; Duncan 1974; Thomas and
McDaniel 1990; Thomas, McDaniel, and Anderson 1991; Thomas, Shankster, and
Mathieu 1994). The concept was measured on a 9-item mechanistic-organic scale,
where "organicness" or "looseness" is defined by Cl) the degree to which the tearn's
members participate in strategic decision making, (2) the inverse degree to which
strategic decision making is formalized, and (3) the degree of interaction arnong the
tearn's members. Managers responded to the items on a 7-point Likert scale with
anchors ranging from "very little extent" to "very great extent".
In previous research, the top management tearn information processing structure is, at
least implicitly, treated as a unidimensional construct, and reported coefficient alphas
usually vary between .70 to .90. However, in the present study the coefficient alpha is
moderate (.61), which might indicate multidimensionality. Thus, to emPiriCallyl
e~Plore the dimenSionalit~ of the t~ee mechanistic-organicness dimensions, a PCA \
with three factors and oblique rotation was conducted. As can be seen from the table ..
6.8, three items load on the second factor, and all of these are flexibility items (i.e. the
inverse of formality). One interaction item (4) and one participation item (8) load on
the third factor and the remaining items load on the first factor. In other words, except
from the flexibility dimension, the data do not support the theory.
As it was difficult to give a conceptually meaningful narne to the third factor based on
item 4 and 8, and because items 6 and 7 could be interpreted in terms of participation,
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a second PCA with only two factors was conducted. From table 6.9 we can see that
item 4 does not load significantly on any of the two factors and this item was thus
omitted. This operation resulted in a 5-item participation scale and 3-item flexibility
scale. However, due to relatively low corrected item-total correlation of item 2 in the
flexibility scale (.28 as compared to .45 arid .51 for items 5 and 9), this item was
eliminated. Even though item selection based only upon the correlations between
items and the total score can lead one to discard an item spuriously (Nunnally and
Bernstein 1994), the increase in coefficient alpha from .60 to .68, and in average inter-
item correlation from .33 to .51 was considered large enough to justify the deletion of
the item. The alpha for this scale can still be considered somewhat low, but given the
low number of remaining items the score of .68 should be acceptable (e.g. Carmines
and Zeller 1979; Van de Ven and Ferry 1980).
Table 6.8: TMT information processing structure, peA with oblimin rotation
Factors
Items 1 2 3
Participation
1. All members participate in SP&DM on a regular basis .78 -.18 .07
3. SP&DM characterized as a group activity .84 -.15 -.10
8. One or two people dominate the handling of strategic issues" .53 .17 -.67
Flexibility
2. Group deviates from standardized procedures and agendas .14 .54 .26
5. SP&DM characterized as rule-oriented" -.26 .78 -.14
9. A single set of written rules and procedures followed" -.01 .85 -.04
Interaction
4. Informal interaction outside group settings .25 .14 .75
6. Free and open exchange of ideas .77 .00 .17
7. Possibilit~ of mutual influence .76 .17 -.05
Eigenvalue 2.93 1.74 1.J3
Pet. of variance 32.50 19.30 12.60
"Reversed
Acceptable reliability coefficients and a pattern of factor loadings where items load
significantly on one factor only, are taken as an indication of both convergent and
discriminant validity. Tests of within-team agreement with one-way analysis of
variance of the 31 organizations with three to five respondents in each (n = 105),
showed that the variance between top management teams were significantly greater
than within teams for participation (F = 2.07, P = .01), but not for flexibility (F = 1.03,
.P = .45). However, one-way anova analysis for organizational position showed no
significant differences in neither participation nor flexibility between top managers
and middle managers. Finally, comparing the eta squared values in table 6.9, indicate
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that top management team membership yields a much better explanation of variance
in both participation and flexibility than organizational position.
Table 6.9: TMT information processing structure, PCA with oblimin rotation
Factors
Items l 2
Participation
3. SP&DM characterized as a group activity
7. Possibility of mutual influence
6. Free and open exchange of ideas
I. All members participate in SP&DM on a regular basis
8. One or two people dominate the handling of strategic issues"
Flexibility
9. A single set of written rules and procedures followed"
5. SP&DM characterized as rule-oriented'
.82 -.20
.78 .13
.77 -.05
.76 -.24
.57 .26
.10 .86
-.16 .83
Eigenvalue
Pet, of variance
Coefficient alpha
Etasquared
Eta squared organizational position
2.87 1.54
40.95 22.05
.79 .68
.47 .30
.01 .00
'Reversed
6.2.3 Cognitive styles; cognitive complexity and assimilation-
J exploration
Cognitive complexity has been defined as the extent to which individuals differentiate
and integrate data and stimuli in perception and evaluation. Differentiation refers to
the ability to perceive several dimensions in a stimulus array, and integration refers to
the development of connections among the differentiated characteristics. Cognitive
complexity is defined and measured in several ways and the problem of measurement
has been raised many times in the literature (e.g. O'Keefe, Shepherd, and Streeter
1982; O'Keefe and Sypher 1981; Schneier 1979; Scott, Osgood, and Peterson 1979;
Streufert and Driver 1967; Streufert and Streufert 1978; Vannoy 1965). A striking
phenomenon is the fact that various measures seem to be more or less unrelated to
each other, while at the same time producing similar results when more versus less
cognitive complex individuals are compared on a variety of dependent variables (e.g.
Streufert 1986; Streufert and Nogami 1989). One interpretation of such a finding is
that most or all of the measures do not measure differentiation and integration
characteristics correctly. However, the fact that many predictions based on these tests
have produced significant results, do not support such an interpretation (e.g. Streufert
and Driver 1967). Another interpretation is that different measures capture different
aspects of cognitive complexity.
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The most widely used instrument to measure cognitive complexity in research settings
with little controlover respondents has been different versions of the Role Concept
Repertoire Test, that was originally developed by Kelly (Kelly 1955). While the REP
test has demonstrated good reliability and validity (Schneier 1979), it has two
important limitations. First, there appears to be little support for occasional.claims that
the test is able to measure integration (Streufert and Nogarni 1989). The criticism is
that most people are able to differentiate, i.e. to apply different and independent views
of a person, object, idea, or a situation, but higher levels of cognitive complexity
requires an ability to integrate different dimensions as well (e.g. Streufert and Swezey
1986).While this criticism might seem fundamental, the problem of measuring levels
of integration seems to be quite general across all tests that can be used in situations
with little controlover respondents and with simple administration as in a mailed
survey.
The second limitation of the REP test is that it is limited to the social domain.
Although cognitive complexity theory is rooted in social and interpersonal
perceptions (e.g. Asch 1946; Bieri 1966; Kelly 1955) and despite the assumption that
cognitive complexity within the social domain should be important for managers, a
purely domain specific measure might not capture essential cognitive characteristics
possibly related to strategic' issue diagnosis. Against this .argument, cognitive
complexity focuses on structural rather than content dimensions of human information
processing. The emphasis is on how information is processed, not on the specific
information content. What a person thinks likely differs greatly from one individual to
another. However, how a person thinks can be compared to how another person
thinks, irrelevant of the content of these thought (Streufert and Streufert 1978). Thus,
cognitive complexity should be minimally affected by shifts in informational or task
content over time (Streufert and Swezey 1986). However, although information
processing is the focus of cognitive complexity, people processes. information in .
relation to some information content, meaning that the measurement of processing
will never be totally content free. As argued by Fiske (Fiske, Kinder, and Larter
1983), the distinction between content and process is of course imperfect. Cognitive
theories are fundamentally process-representation pairs. However, although one
cannot logically distinguish the effects of processing from the effects of content, one
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can still attempt to formulate theories that emphasize the one or the other and that are
useful empirically, in accounting for existing data and formulating new predictions
(Fiske et al. 1983:383).
The question of domain-specific versus general cognitive complexity is usually
treated as a methodological issue in the literature (e.g. Calori, Johnson, .and Sarnin
1994; Planchon and James 1991; Wofford 1994). However, since information
processing is most likely dependent on information content, the choice of domain free
versus domain specific conceptualization of cognitive complexity should have
important theoretical implications. Most researchers agree that levels of cognitive
complexity within a person may be quite specific to particular domains (e.g. Scott,
Osgood, and Peterson 1979; Streufert and Swezey 1986; Zinkhan and Martin 1983),
and that complexity within any domain is likely to develop only where experience or
communication has generated multidimensional differentiative or integrative thought
processes (Streufert and Swezey 1986). On the other hand, and despite the lack of
knowledge about the sources and development of cognitive complexity, there are
reasons to believe that complexity might be transferred from one domain to another.
Streufert and Swezey (1986) gives an example of a person who has achieved the
ability to differentiate and integrate information about the political views of various
political candidates and suggest that such a person is more likely to understand (or be
trained to understand): potentially differentiated and integrated- views of executives.
Moreover, studies of personality development in children and adults suggests that
people are often more or less high versus low complex not only within, but also across
domains (see Bartunek et al. (1983) and Streufert and Streufert (1978) for reviews).
To further complicate the debate over the existence or degrees of domain specific
versus general cognitive complexity, the question of what should constitute a domain
and how many domains that should be included in a particular study is far from self
evident. Cognitive complexity theorists have usually made a distinction between
social and non-social domains (e.g. Scott, Osgood, and Peterson 1979), while others
have chosen more purely domain-specific approaches, for example in studying the
perceived structure and dynamics of a particular industrial environment (e.g. Calori,
Johnson, and Sarnin 1994).
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Due to the uncertainty about the question of domain specific versus general cognitive
complexity, the present study includes more than one domain and focuses on general
managerial cognitive complexity. This conceptualization is partly domain specific in
that it focuses on a broad domain or classes of subdomains that are likely to be more
relevant for managers than other people. However, it is general in that it does not
focus exclusively on a single industry or a single domain (or subdomain) like for
example financial, technological, social or political domains. Such a conceptualization
recognizes that experience and knowledge acquisition within particular domains are
important for competent managerial performance (e.g. Day and Lord 1992), and that
the same manager might demonstrate higher complexity within some domains and
less within others (e.g. Linville 1982; Streufert and Swezey 1986). Furthermore, the
interest in top managers and strategic issue diagnosis makes a partly general approach
to cognitive complexity more appropriate than a purely domain-specific one. Top
managers have survived the long process of weeding out those who are less
competent, they are generally expert at dealing with their job, and they have relatively
high levels of domain-specific knowledge as a result of years of experience (Streufert
and Swezey 1986). In other words, top managers are general managers that must deal
with an incredible array of issues across different domains (e.g. Hitt and Tyler 1991)
ranging from social and political to financial and technological issues (e.g. Daft,
Sormunen, and Parks 1988; Milliken, Dutton, and Beyer 1990). Then, an alternative
approach studying managers' experience or knowledge content across potentially
important "managerial domains" could be more appropriate than focusing on their
cognitive complexity. The answer to that question is rooted in the assumption that
high levels of knowledge content are not sufficient to be effective in strategic issue
diagnosis and other ill-structured, complex and non-repetitive managerial tasks. As
Streufert and Swezey (1986) suggest, most cases of mismanagement are not due to
insufficient knowledge and experience, but to lack of differentiated and integrated use
of knowledge.
The literature does not offer any ready-made measures that are appropriate for the
present study. One instrument, the Driver-Streufert Complexity Index (DSCI) (Driver,
Brousseau, and Hunsaker 1990;McGill 1989;McGill, Johnson, and Bante11994) was
a promising candidate since it contains items across domains and since its simple
format makes it suitable for a mailed survey. The DSCI consists of sixty self-
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description items describing various points of view and ways of behaving in social
and problemsolving situations. It has been used in studies of managers and decision
makers to evaluate their comfort with complexity, differentiation and openness
(McGill 1989; McGill, Johnson, and Bantel 1994) and their decision-making rolestyle
(Driver, Brousseau, and Hunsaker 1990; Driver and Rowe 1979; Driver et al. 1996;
McGill 1989). However, the DSCI is very extensive, and scoring instructions were
not freely available due to copy right arrangements. Therefore, a pilot study was
conducted in order to reduce the number of items and to develop a scoring key.
Since the majority of the DSCI-items are related to the social domain, the pilot study
also included a cognitive style instrument (The Assimilator-Explorer Inventory (AEI))
on general preferences for task-oriented problem solving strategies (Kaufmann 1989;
Martinsen and Kaufmann 1991). The cognitive style dimension is made between
assimilator and explorer strategies in problem solving where preferences for novelty
is central in discriminating between the strategies. Explorers are typically more open,
flexible and novelty seeking, while assimilators are more conformist, rule bound, rigid
and less open (Martinsen 1995). Since novelty and complexity are treated as
conceptually independent aspects of the task environment in cognitive problem
solving research (Kaufmann 1988), assimilation-exploration and cognitive complexity
might constitute cognitive dimensions that supplement each other. The AEI version
used in the pilot study consists of thirty self-description items (plus four lie indicator
items) that relate to concepts like "pattern", "rule", "method", "instructions" etc.,
where respondents are invited to assess their own relationship to such concepts in a
problem solving context. The DSCI and the AEI have similar instructions and both
employ five-point Likert scales.
The pilot study
The DSCIwas translated into Norwegian from the original American version and an
official Swedish version. The translated version was then controlled by a senior .
professor in organizational psychology with expertise in cognitive psychology and
psychometric theory. The AEI has been developed in Norway and thus existed in a
Norwegian version.
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The two indexes were mailed to about 210 employees at the Norwegian School of
Management. 123 employees (59%) responded after one follow-up mailing. The
average respondent age was 44,66% oftherespondents were males and 34% females,
and 66% were faculty employees and 34% held administrative positions. Although
the small ratio of subjects (n = 123) to items (n = 90) may cause instability of the
factor loadings due to sampling error, the sample was assumed to be more
representative for managers than a larger sample of students at the school.
The purpose of the pilot study was to identify a structure among the items of the
original scales and to reduce the number of items from ninety to about twenty-five to
thirty-five to be included in a new scale. An exploratory factor analysis was
considered an appropriate statistical method to serve this purpose.
First, a principal component analysis without rotation was conducted to identify the
appropriate number of factors to serve as a basis for the selection of items. PCA was
used since the purpose was to determine the minimum number of factors needed to
account for the maximum portion of the variance. Moreover, both indexes have been
extensively tested and refined in the past suggesting that specific and error variance
represent a relatively small proportion of the total variance. The factor analysis
resulted in twenty-eight factors with eigenvalues greater than one accounting for
about 80% the variance. Since this was a far too large number of factors to be
assessed with twenty-five to thirty-five items, yet another PCA was performed. Using
the a priori criterion (Hair et al. 1992), four factors were extracted to potentially
identify the assimilation-exploration dimension of the ABI and comfort with
complexity, differentiation and openness from the DSCI in the data. Again, an oblique
rotation was used since it was assumed that the four dimensions were correlated.
The first factor contained twenty-seven of the thirty ABl-items, of which twenty-four
had factor loadings greater than .4, along with some DSCI-items :with acceptable
loadings. Almost all items loading on the second factor were related to the social
domain and was interpretedas social cognitive complexity.(e.g. "In making friends, I
prefer those who are quite dissimilar from me in values and opinions"). Most of the
items that loaded on the third factor were items related to differentiation (e.g. "In
considering problems and situations, I greatly enjoy to, and seek out problems that
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require many points of view). While the first three factors could be interpreted in
accordance with theory and the original indexes, it was difficult to interpret and name
the fourth factor. Therefore, only three factors were kept for further investigation.
To reduce the number of items to account for these three factors a PCA with three
factors and oblique rotation was conducted. As a first criteria for keeping items, the
rather rigorous rule of thumb of keeping items with factor loadings greater than .4 was
applied (Hair et al. 1992). This analysis resulted in forty-nine items, where twenty-
seven loaded on the assimilation-exploration dimension, thirteen on the social
complexity dimension and nine on the differentiation dimension. To further reduce
the number of items, a second PCA with three factors and oblique rotation for the
remaining forty-nine items was performed.
This analysis resulted in fifteen assimilation-exploration items. Four AE-items (AE3,
AE22, AE29 and AE31) were omitted because their content and wording were judged
as very similar with items with higher factor loadings, and two DS-items (DS6 and
DS7) because they were difficult to interpret in terms of assimilation-exploration.
Eleven social complexity items were kept, three deleted (DS 15, DS22 and DS23) due
to low factor loadings and one (DS56) because it was hard to relate to social
complexity. Finally, to measure differentiation eight items were included and five
omitted (DS4, DS 14, DS36, DS39 and DS40) because they did not seem to relate to
differentiation. The final result was a 34 item three dimensional measure of cognitive
styles, including two cognitive complexity dimensions (social complexity and
differentiation) and the assimilation-exploration dimension. Coefficient alphas for the
three scales ranged from .75 to .89.
Due to the inclusion of the assimilation-exploration dimension and since different
cognitive complexity dimensions are often classified as cognitive styles (e.g. Streufert
and Nogami 1989), the general concept used to refer to all three cognitive dimensions
included in the present investigation will be cognitive style. Thus, cognitive
complexity, represented by social complexity and differentiation, will constitute one
subgroup of cognitive style, while assimilation-exploration will constitute another.
Cognitive style can be viewed as characteristic consistencies of information
processing that are applied across a wide range of situations and tasks and that are not
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subject to easy modification (Messick 1984). Moreover, like cognitive complexity,
cognitive styles usually refer to the way individuals think, not what they think (e.g.
Blaylock and Rees 1984). On the other hand, while cognitive style research is not
occupied with how well people think, but their preferences, cognitive complexity
researchers more often refer to different levels of complexity and individuals' ability
in thinking.
Evaluation of the cognitive style measures
To provide some evidence of convergent and discriminant validity of the three
cognitive style dimensions, a peA with three factors and oblique rotation was
conducted with the data from the newspaper managers.
Table 6.10: Cognitive styles, PCA with oblimin rotation
Factors
1 2 3
.71 -.18 -.03
.70 .05 .04
.68 -.04 -.02
.68 .05 .18
.65 .08 .30
.60 -.09 -.05
.55 .16 .15
.54 .10 .12
.44 .15 -.16
.41 -.14 -.Il
.08 .71 .02
-.02 .70 -.13
-,lO· - .«i -.12
.13 .65 .04
.14 .64 -.14
.08 .63 -.02
-.11 .48 .23
-.08 .42 .14
-.27 .42 .31
.10 -.02 .65
.09 .19 .62
.21 -.02 .57
-.02 .02 .53
-.05 -.17 .52
-.04 .02 .46
4.35 3.45 1.94
17.41 13.79 7.75
.81 .78 .61
Items
Exploration
l. Prefer detailed work that requires neatness and precision"
12. Prefer to have clear guidelines to stick to in work"
9. Best suited for work which requires precision and a systematic approach"
7. Prefer situations in which you have to work according to specific rules'
6. Work best in situations which are clear and straightforward"
4. Prefer working without any clear guidelines
13. I work best in complex situations
5. Like situations in which it is necessary to break with conventional wisdom
10. Prefer to improvise in what I do
2. Like best to work without a prearranged plan
Social complexity
19. Prefer those who are similar to me in values and opinions'
22. Similarity in values and opinions not being of great consequences for me
26. Similarity in personality not being of great consequences to me
24. Enjoy being with individuals quite dissimilar in personality
23. Enjoy being with individuals somewhat like myself in personality"
20. Prefer those who are quite dissimilar from me in values and opinions
21. Prefer a mix ofsome similar and some dissimilar in values and opinions
18. Mixing individuals ofvastly different make-ups
25. Enjoy being with some similar, some quite dissimilar
Differentiation
28. Moderately attracted to problems that involve many points of view
29. Greatly enjoy problems that require many points of view
15. Prefer a single problem with one possible solution"
27. Hesitate to solve problems that involve many points. of view'
34. People should more often keep their views for themselves'
31. Avoid discussing the situation with persons who have different points .. a
Eigenvalue
Pct. of variance
Coefficient. alpha
"Reversed
As table 6.10 shows, the overall pattern of factor loadings do support the three
dimensionality of the cognitive style instrument. However, several exploration items
(3, 8, 11 and 14) were related to both exploration and differentiation and were
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removed from the scale. Furthermore, one exploration item (15) related only to
differentiation and was "transferred" from the exploration scale to the differentiation
scale since it was originallya DSCI-item and because it makes good sense as a
differentiation item". Thus, the modified exploration scale consists of ten items and
has a coefficient alpha of .81 and an average inter-item correlation of .30.
The social complexity items functioned as expected. However, two items (16 and 17)
were removed from the scale due to low factor loadings. The modified scale thus
consists of 9 items and has a coefficient alpha of .78 and an average inter-item
correlation of .29.
Three items (30, 31 and 32) were omitted from the differentiation scale due to low
factor loadings. Including item 15 as a differentiation item gives a 6 item modified
differentiation scale with a moderate coefficient alpha of .61 and an average inter-
item correlation of .21. Although the coefficient alpha is only moderate when
compared to the alpha values for the exploration and the social complexity scales, it
might be considered acceptable given the theoretical and exploratory nature of this
study (Nunnally and Bernstein 1994).
While the differentiation scale failed to demonstrate good reliability, the three
modified scales consist of items that have high loadings on one factor only, providing
some evidence of convergent and discriminant validity.
6.3 Descriptive statistics
In the last section of this chapter, the construction of variables is described and
descriptive statistics for all variables are reported.
6.3.1 Dependent variables
Individual scores for the fourteen measures of the four strategic issue diagnosis
constructs were computed by averaging the ratings across the items comprising a
7The items are scored so that high values represent an explorative cognitive style.
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measure. Table 6.11 below shows means, standard deviation, maximum and minimum
values along with skewness and kurtosis indicators for all these variables. The number
of items and coefficient alphas for all measures are also reported.
Table 6.11: Descriptive statistics for dependent variables
Constructs and variables 'Mean S.D. Skewness Kurtosis -Min ; Max -4Htems --C.alpha
Effect valence
Positive-gain 4.50 1.25 -.45 .14 1.00 7.00 5 .90
Controllability 4.72 1.31 -.63 .15 1.00 7.00 2 .81
Extremity (opportunity) 3.18 1.38 .31 -.66 1.00 6.50 2 .73
Negative-loss 4.26 1.24 -.45 -.02 1.00 7.00 5 .90
Uncontrollability 3.77 1.17 -.17 -.07 1.00 7.00 2 .70
Extremity (threat) 3.07 1.36 .19 -.75 1.00 6.50 2 .54
Issue sorting
Operational importance (inversed) .50 .08 .07 3.03 .24 .84 3 .79
Strategic importance (inversed) .47 .10 -.66 1.65 .13 .77 2 .57
Unfeasibility (inversed) .39 .10 -.09 -.72 .16 .65 3 .72
Causal understanding
Free papers 1.91 .45 -.25 -.74 1.00 2.83 6 .66
Market, competition and attribution of success 2.21 .33 -.18 -.23 1.29 2.88 8 .58
Data search
Core data (reflected and square root transf.) 1.52 .28 .31 .76 1.00 2.65 5 .71
Additional data 4.66 1.18 -.40 .03 1.00 7.00 3 .70
New data 4.91 1.11 -.37 .41 1.00 7.00 5 .81
From the maximum and minimum values, along with the standard deviation
estimates, it seems that the variables capture differences between managers' strategic
issue diagnosis. However, using skewness and kurtosis values less than +/- 1 as a
rough indication of normality, four variables seemed to depart from normality
assumptions. All issue sorting variables had high positive values of skewness and
kurtosis, meaning that the distributions of the variables were skewed to the left and
are too peaked. One data search variable, core data, was skewed to the right and was
too peaked as indicated by negative skewness and positive kurtosis. Since
- - -
transformation of nonnormally distributed variables are recommended unless there is
some reason not do it (Tabachnick and FidelI 1996), these variables were transformed
as a remedy for failures of normality. The issue sorting variables were inversed and
core data were first reflected (since it was negatively skewed) and then square root
transformed. As table 6.11 shows, the issue sorting variables operational importance
and strategic importance have rather high values of kurtosis even after transformation.
However, due to more loss of variance when dichotomizing 'variables (e.g.
.Tabachnick and FidelI 1996), they were kept for further analysis in transformed
versions.
SThe exact wording is as follows: "I prefer situations where there is a single problem with one possible
solution".
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6.3.2 Independent variables and organizational size
Since the customer information acquisition frequency and use measure is based on
different types of items (IAF- and IAV-items), the items were transformed to z-scores
before the individual scores were computed by averaging the ratings across the items
comprising the measure. For all other measures of dependent variables, individual
scores were computed by averaging the raw ratings across the items comprising the
measures. As table 6.12 shows, skewness and kurtosis values are below one for all
independent variables, indicating that the sampling distribution of the variables are
close to normal distributions. Maximum and minimum values and standard deviation
estimates indicate that the variables capture differences in managers' cognitive styles
and their perceptions of top management team information processing structure and
organizational scanning.
Table 6.12: Descriptive statistics for independent variables and size
Constructs and variables Mean S.D. Skewness Kurtosis Min Max # items C.alpha
Organizational scanning
Customer information acquisition frequency & use 0.00 LOO -34 .29 -2.89 2.39 13 .91
Information availability 4.70 LOO -.64 37 L55 6.64 11 .88
General information acquisition frequency 3.11 .80 30 .01 L45 5.50 11 .87
TMT infonnation processing structure
Participation 5.04 L02 -.54 33 L80 6.80 5 .79
Flexibility 4.17 L37 .09 -.63 LOO 7.00 2 .68
Cognitive style
Exploration 2.93 .52 .15 -.45 L80 4.30 10 .81
Social complexity 3.34 .48 -.06 .12 2.00 4.78 9 .78
Differentiation 3.89 .44 -.27 .41 2.67 5.00 6 .61
Organizational size
Circulation size (log_arithmic trandPrmation) 4.97 .53 .46 .60 3.76 6.40
Organizational size, which will be used as a control variable, was measured as the
average weekly circulation size of newspapers in 1996 by multiplying the number of
issues per week with the average daily circulation size. The distribution of the
measure was skewed to the left and was very peaked, as indicated by high positive
skewness and kurtosis values. Therefore, a logarithmic transformation was applied.
118
DATAANAL YSIS AND RESULTS
In this chapter, the results of the data analyses are presented. First, the hypothesis
testing are reported. Fourteen sets of regression models are presented, where each
dependentvariable is regressed onto the full set-of independent variables: Next, the
propositions about relative effects of contextual and cognitive variables respectively,
and whether the effects of the cognitive variables are contingent on the level of the
contextual variables, are explored.
7.1 Statistical methods
The present study includes covariation hypotheses with a number of continuous
dependent and independent variables. Thus, canonical correlation or structural
equation modeling could be appropriate statistical methods used in order to test the
hypotheses. However, since the objective is not to analyze the dependent variables
simultaneously, canonical correlation analysis was ruled out. Moreover, because of
the large number of variables and number of items comprising each variable
compared to the number of observations, structural equation modeling was not
considered appropriate. Therefore, being guided by the principle of choosing the
simplest possible method providing the possibility of a valid testing procedure,
multiple regression analysis is used to test the hypotheses and propositions in the
-
present investigation. This method requires that each dependent variable comprising a
multidimensional construct be analyzed individually. Thus, the hypotheses were
tested with a multiple regression procedure in which each dependent variable was
regressed onto the full set of independent variables.
To explore the propositions about relative effects of contextual and cognitive
variables respectively, hierarchical and regression was used. Finally, to explore
whether the effects of the cognitive variables are contingent on the level of the
contextual variables moderated regression analysis and subgroup analyses were used
in tandem.
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7.1.2 Controlling for organizational size
In order to reduce the risk of attributing explanatory power to independent variables
that in fact are not the cause of the variation in the dependent variables, organizational
size was included as a control variable. Although particular attention was paid to size
in the construction of case scenarios and small and large newspaper firms are assumed
to be quite similar in many ways (Fink 1988), organizational size might still influence
the relationship between the independent and dependent variables.
Within the strategic issue diagnosis literature, Denison et al. (1996) found that larger
firms were more likely to perceive the issue of local foreign investment as a threat,
while smaller firms were more likely to perceive it as an opportunity. This finding is
explained with reference to the assumption that increased size leads to internal
complexity, which in tum leads managers to perceive change as threatening (e.g.
Lant, Milliken, and Batra 1992). Moreover, large firms may generally pay less
attention to environmental developments, trends or events due to complacency,
inertia, insularity and resistance to adaptation (Aldrich and Auster 1986; Chen and
Hambrick 1995; Hannan and Freeman 1984; March 1981). For small firms on the
other hand, their structural simplicity can allow them to respond more quickly to
changes in the environment (e.g. Ketchen, Thomas, and McDaniel 1996).
Another possibility is that managers in large organizations may in general be more
sensitive to strategic issues due greater diversity (Thomas, Shankster, and Mathieu
1994) in terms of for instance more complex and voluminous activities. Furthermore,
advantages usually associated with large size; economies of scale, experience, brand
name recognition, market power and organizational slack (e.g. Bourgeois 1981; Chen
and Hambrick 1995; Hambrick, MacMillan, and Day 1982; Woo and Cooper 1981)
might influence strategic issue diagnosis. Nevertheless, although there are possible
effects of size, existing evidence is not clear as to whether and how it influence the
specific relationships between the independent and dependent variables included in
the present investigation. Organizational size is an ambiguous organizational
characteristic for several reasons. For instance, a variety of operational definitions has
been used and conceptual discussions of the potential roles of different aspects of size
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have been lacking (Kimberly 1976). Therefore, it will be controlled for organizational
size, although it has not been formulated specific hypotheses about its potential
effects.
To statistically control for organizational size, hierarchical regression analyses were
used. Specifically, the regression models were analyzed with and without size
followed by F-tests of changes in R2 between the two models. Since preliminary
analyses showed several instances were the direction of the relationship between
dependent and independent variables were positive for larger firms and negative for
smaller firms (and vice versa), the sample was split into large and small firms through
a median split (e.g. Ketchen, Thomas, and McDaniel 1996; Miller, Kets de Vries, and
Toulouse 1982). The heavily positively skewed and peaked distribution of
organizational size would ideally suggest an exploration of alternative splitting
procedures. However, the large number of independent variables (eight) and the given
sample size of 162 managers (from 73 firms), ruled out alternative cut-off-points and
use of more than two subsamples. As an indicator of improved estimation with a
sample split over the total sample, average improvement in R2 is reported for every
regression model (e.g. Hambrick and Lei 1985).
Prior to analyses, the distribution for each variable in the two subsamples was
checked for nonnormality. An inverse transformation was conducted for
organizational size among large firms, while the distribution of size among small
firms was close to a normal distribution. Except from organizational size, the
distributional characteristics of the subsamples did not deviate much from the
distributions in the total sample (see table 1 in appendix B). However, this implies
that the variables that had too high skewness or kurtosis values when analyzing the
total sample still seem to depart from normality assumptions. Appendix B reports the
results of one-way analysis of variance of differences between the two samples,
bivariate correlations among the dependent and independent variables for the total
sample and the two subsamples, and full correlation matrixes between all included
variables.
To assess pairwise and multiple variable collinearity, collinearity diagnostics in SPSS
were run. prior to analyses. The lowest tolerance value was .32 (for customer
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information acquisition frequency and use in the total sample including size), that is
considerably above the common cutoffthreshold value of .10 (Hair et al. 1992).
7.2 Hypothesis testing
In the following; fourteen sets of, regression models -are presented, where each
dependent variable is regressed onto the full set of independent variables, starting
with the effect valence variables. Since significance levels suffer under limited
number of observations (Mohr 1990), and analyses of the subsamples approximately
halve the ratio of number of observations relative to the number of independent
variables, results with significance levels lower than 15% are indicated in the tables.
In similar studies, significant results are usually interpreted as those lower than 5% or
10%.
7.2.1 Effect valence
Tables 7.1 to 7.3 report the results of the regression analyses used to test hypotheses
HIEV1 to H3EV1 about opportunity interpretation. Starting with positive-gain
interpretation, hypotheses HlaEVl to H3aEVl posited a positive relationship with all
independent variables. Table 7.1 shows that two variables, customer information
acquisition frequency and use (bSF,IS= .43, P < .05)9 and differentiation (bSF,IS= .30, P
< .05), are positively related to positive-gain interpretation in the small firm
subsample. Thus, the hypotheses HlaEVl and H3aEVl are partly supported while
H2aEVl is not supported.
The hypotheses HlbEV1 to H3bEV1 suggested that the organizational scanning and
information processing structure variables would be positively related, and that the
cognitive style variables would be negatively related to controllability interpretation.
Regressing the total sample, table 7.2 shows that information availability is the only
variable that is significantly related to controllability when size is "included in the
model (bAP,IS= .23, P < .05). This finding is also significant for small firms (bsF,IS=
.28, p < :10) and marginally significant for large firms (bLF,IS= .22, P < .15). In the
9The subscripts "SF', "LF" and "AF" denote small firms, large firms and all firms respectively, and
"IS" including size.
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large firm sample, participation is significantly related to controllability in the
hypothesized direction (bLF,IS= .23, P < .10). Thus, hypotheses HlbEvl and H2bEVI
are partly supported since information availability is positively related to
controllability and since participation IS positively related to controllability
interpretation for large firms. H3bEVI is not supported. Social complexity is
marginally, but significantly positively related to controllability in the .small firm
sample (bSF,IS= .18, P < .15), while the cognitive style variables were expected to be
negatively related to controllability. Finally, in the total sample and the small firm
sample, size adds significantly to the level of explained variance (6R,2AF,IS= .04, P <. .
.01, L\R2sF,IS= .07, P < .05), while this is not the case for large firms (L\R2LF,IS= .02, P
> .15).
Table 7.1: Positive-gain interpretation by organizational scanning, TMT-IPS, and cognitive style
Positive-gain
Total sample (n = 158) Small firms (n = 77) Large firms (n = 81)
Independent variables l" 2b l" 2b l" 2b
Organizational scanning
Customer information acquisition frequency/use .27** .16 .48*** .43** .05 .00
Information availability .08 .10 -.01 .04 .Il .Il
General information acquisition frequency -.03 -.01 -.06 -.08 .07 .10
TMT information processing structure
Participation -.10 -.08 -.12 -.15 .02 .01
Flexibility -.06 -.06 .06 .07 -.17 -.15
Cognitive style
Exploration .00 -.01 .07 .08 -.05 -.06
Social complexity -.01 -.01 .05 .04 -.13 -.12
Differentiation .12t .10 30** 30** -.07 -.06
Circulation size (logJnot transformed/inv.) .16* .16 -.14
Overall model
F 2.46** 2.54** 2.90*** .2.84*** .68 .75
R2 .117 .134 .254 .276 .070 .086
Adjusted R2 .069 .081 .166 .179 -.033 -.029
l\F 2.95* 2.01 1.30
IOAverage improvementin R2 with sample spilt ,05
t: <.15; *: p<.10; **: p<.05; ***: p<.OI
"Original model; bincluding size
The hypotheses HlcEVl to H3cEVl suggested that the organizational scanning
variables would be positively related and that the information processing structure and
cognitive style variables would be negatively related to extremity. As can be seen
from table 7.3, customer information acquisition frequency and use is significantly
and positively related to extremity in the total sample (bAF,IS= .27, P < .05) and the
small firm sample (bsF= .47, P < .01), providing some support for HlcEvl. The only
additional significant relationship is for differentiation in the small firm sample, but
lOUsing regression models including size, e.g. ([(.276-.134) + (.086-.134)]) /2.
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this relationship is positive as opposed to what was hypothesized (bsr = .30, P < .05).
Thus, H2cEVI and H3cEVI are not supported. Again, organizational size adds
significantly to the level of explained variance for the total sample (~R2 AF,IS = .02, P <
2 .
.05), and among large firms (~R LF,IS = .07, P < .05).
Table 7.2: Controllability interpretation by organizational scanning, TMT-IPS, and cognitive style
Controllability
Total sample (n = 158) Small firms (n = 77) Large firms (n = 81)
Inde~ndent variables la 2b la 2b la 2b
Organizational scanning
Customer information acquisition frequency/use .20* .04 .23 .14 .10 .04
Information availability .20* .23** .20 .28* .22t .22t
General information acquisition frequency -.05 -.02 -.02 -.05 .00 .02
TMT information processing structure
Participation .12 .13t .09 .03 .25** .23*
Flexibility .02 .03 .15 .17 -.14 -.12
Cognitive style
Exploration .02 .00 .09 .10 -.05 -.06
Social complexity .09 .09 .18t .18t -.05 -.04
Differentiation .02 -.01 .02 .02 -.01 .00
Circulation size (log.lnot transformed/inv.) .24*** .29** -.15
Overall model
F 3.78*** 4.28*** 2.09** 2.67** 2.16** 2.13 **
R2 .169 .206 .197 .264 .193 .212
Adjusted R2 .124 .158 .103 .165 .104 .112
i1F 7.06*** 6.09** 1.72
Average imErovement in R2 with samEie SEilt .03
t: <.IS; *: p<.10; **: p<.05; ***: p<.01
"Original model; "including size
Table 7.3: Opportunity-extremity interpretation by organizational scanning, TMT -IPS, and cognitive style
Independent variables
Opportunity-extremity
Total sample (n = 158) Small firms (n = 71) Large firms (n = 81)
la 2b la 2b la 2b
.39*** .27** .47*** .48 *** .25 .14
.07 .10 -.04 -.05 .14 .14
-.08 -.06 -.11 -.Il -.01 .04
-.07 -.05 -.17 -.16 .06 .03
-.06 -.06 -.01 -.01 -.12 -.08
.05 .04 .01 .01 .03 .02
-.04 -.03 -.12 -.12 -.02 -.01
.10 .08 .30** .30** -.06 -.03
.18** -.03 -.28**
4.10*** 4.15*** 2.32** 2.04** 1.59t 2.16**
.180 .202 .214 .215 .149 .215
.136 .153 .12 .11 .055 .116
3.99** .07 5.98**
.01
Organizational scanning
Customer information acquisition frequency/use
Information availability
General information acquisition frequency
TMT information processing structure
Participation
Flexibility
Cognitive style
Exploration
Social complexity
Differentiation
Circulation size (log.lnot transformed/inv.)
Overall model
F
R2
Adjusted R2
M
Average imErovement in R2 with samEIe SEilt
+: <.15; *: p<.10; **: p<.05; ***: p<.01
"Original model; "including size
Tables 7.4 to 7.6 report the results of the regression analyses used to test hypotheses
HIEv2 to H3EV2 about threat interpretation. As hypothesized in HlaEv2, customer
information acquisition frequency and use is significantly and positively related to
negative-loss interpretation, at least in the total sample (bAF = .25, P < .05) and
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strongly for small firms (bsr = .56, P < .01), providing some support for HlaEv2.
However, as shown in table 7.4, the relationship between general information
acquisition frequency and negative-loss interpretation is significant and negative in
the small firm sample (bsF = -.24, P < .10). H2aEV2 suggested a negative relationship
between information processing structure variables and negative-loss interpretation.
In the total (bAF= -.14, P < .15) and the small firm sample (bsF = -.24, P < .10),
flexibility behave as expected, but the relationship is not significant in the large firm
sample (bLF= -.12, P > .15). Besides, the regression model of the large firm sample is
not significant (FLF= 1.36, P > .15). However, the findings provide some support for
H2aEV2. Finally, H3aEV2 gains some support from the finding that exploration is
positively related to negative-loss interpretation among small firms (bSF= .27, p <
.05). However, social complexity is negatively related to negative-loss interpretation
in the large firm sample (bLF= -.33, P < .05), while positively but not significantly in
the small firm sample (bsF = .10, P > .15). Organizational size does not add
significantly to any of the models.
Table 7.4: Negative-loss interpretation by organizational scanning, TMT-IPS, and cognitive style
Negative-loss
Total sample (n = 158) Small firms (n = 77) Large firms (n = 81)
Indel!!::ndent variables la 2b la 2b la 2b
Organizational scanning
Customer information acquisition frequency/use .25** .28** .56*** .54*** .06 .03
Information availability .01 .00 -.16 -.14 .16 .16
General information acquisition frequency ·.11 -.12 -.24* -.25* .02 .04
TMT infonnation processing structure
Participation .08 .08 .08 .07 .07 .06
Flexibility -.14t -.14* -.24* -.24* -.12 -.11
Cognitive style
Exploration .02 .03 .27** .27** -.07 -.07
Social complexity -.10 -.11 .10 .10 -.33 ** -.32**
Differentiation .01 .02 -.03 -.03 .06 .07
Circulation size (Iog./not transformed/inv.) -.05 .06 -.06
Overall model
F 1.90* 1.71* 3.15*** 2.79*** 1.36 1.22
R2 .093 .094 .270 .273 .131 .134
Adjusted R2 .044 .039 .184 .175 .034 .025
AF .23 .23 .28
Average imErovement in R2 with samEIe SEilt .11
t: <.15; *: p<.10; **: p<.05; ***: pc.Ol
"Original model; "including size
Hypothesis HlbEv2 to H3bEV2 suggested a negative relationship between all
independent variables and uncontrollability interpretation. As can be seen from table
7.5, H2bEV2 is the hypothesis that is closest to be supported as flexibility is
significantly and negatively related in all three samples (bAF = -.25, < .01, bSF,IS= -
.28, < .05, bLF= -.23, < .10). However, the regression model of the large firm sample
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is only marginally significant (FLF= 1.76, P < .15). As for negative-loss interpretation
and contrary to what was expected, customer information acquisition frequency and
use is significantly and positively related to uncontrollability for small firms (bSF,IS=
.46, < .01). Thus, although general information acquisition behave as hypothesized, at
least for small firms (bSF,IS= -.30, < .05), HlbEv2 is not supported. Finally, H3bEV2is
not supported since both exploration (bsF,IS= .21, < .10) and social complexity (bSF,IS
= .19, < .15) are positively related to uncontrollability in the small firm sample. In the
large firm sample however, social complexity is significantly and negatively related to
uncontrollability (bLF = -.21, < .10). Again, organizational size does not add
significantly to any of the models.
Table 7.5: Uncontrollability interpretation by organizational scanning, TMf.IPS, and cognitive style
Uncontrollability
Total sample (n = 158) Small firms (n = 77) Large firms (n = 81)
Independent variables la 2b la 2b la 2b
Organizational scanning
Customer information acquisition frequency/use .13 .18 .51 *** .46*** -.Il -.09
Information availability -.17t -.18* -.21 -.16 -.18 -.18
General information acquisition frequency -.14 -.15 -.28* -.30** .00 -.01
TMf information processing structure
Participation .01 .01 -.02 -.06 .05 .05
Flexibility -.25 *** -.25*** -:29** -.28** -.23* -.23*
Cognitive style
Exploration .Il .12 .20t .21 * .15 .IS
Social complexity -.02 -.03 .I9t .19t -.21 * -.21 *
Differentiation -.05 -.04 -.01 -.02 -.10 -.11
Circulation size (log.lnot transformed/inv.) -.08 .16 .05
Overall model
F 1.78* l.64t 2.22** 2.19** 1.73t 1.54
R2 .087 .091 .207 .227 .161 .163
Adjusted Rf .038 .036 .114 .123 .068 .057
~F .61 1.74 .15
Average improvement in R2 with sample spilt .10
t: <.15; *: p<.IO; **: p<.05; ***: p<.OI
'Original model; bincluding size
As for uncontrollability interpretation, it was hypothesized in HlcEv2 to H3cEV2that
all independent variables would be negatively related to extremity. From table 7.6, we
see that the pattern is very much the same as for uncontrollability interpretation.
Again, flexibility behave as expected, although not significantly for small firms (bAF=
-.17, < .05, bSF= -.13, > .15, bLF= -.24, < .05), providing some support for H2cEV2.
As for the two other threat interpretation variables, and contrary to what was
expected, customer information acquisition frequency and use is significantly and
positively related to extremity for the total sample and for small firms (bAF,IS= .26, <
.10, bSF,IS= .59, < .01). Thus, HlcEv2 is not supported, althoughgeneral information
acquisition frequency is negatively, and for the total sample and among small firms,
126
significantly related to extremity (bAF= -.20, < .10, bSF= -.29, < .10). Finally, some
support for H3cEV2 is provided by the negative relationship between social
complexity and extremity (bAF= -.14, < .15, bLF,Is= -.24, < .10), although the
regression model for large firms is not significant (FLF,IS= 1.32, P > .15). However,
contrary to what was expected, exploration is positivelyand significantly related to
extremity for small firms (bsF,Is= .21, < .10). Organizational size does not add
significantly to the level of explained variance for any of the models.
Table 7.6: Threat-extremity interpretation by organizational scanning, TMT -IPS, and cognitive style
Threat-extremity
Total sample (n = 158) Small firms (n = 17) Large firms (n = 81)
lndeE!:ndent variables la 2b la 2b la 2b
Organizational scanning
Customer information acquisition frequency/use .32*** .26* .55*** .59*** -.01 -.07
Information availability .06 .07 .00 ·.03 .17 .17
General information acquisition frequency -.20* -.19* -.29* -.27* -.07 -.04
TMT information processing structure
Participation -.07 -.06 -.06 ·.04 .01 -.01
Flexibility -.17 ** -.17 ** -.13 -.14 -.26** -.24**
Cognitive style
Exploration .07 .06 .21 * .21 * .02 .01
Social complexity -.I4t -.I4t .00 .00 -.25* -.24*
Differentiation .02 .01 -.09 -.09 .10 .Il
Circulation size (1011I.lnotransformed/inv.) .08 -.12 -.15
Overall model
F 2.76*** 2.52** 2.38** 2.22** 1.27 1.32
R2 .129 .133 .218 .229 .124 .143
Adjusted R2 .082 .080 .127 .126 .026 .035
6F .71 .95 1.63
Averase im(!rovement in R2 with sam(!le s(!iIt .05
t: <.15; *: p<.I0; **: p<.05; ***: p<.OI
"Original model; "including size
Brief comments on effect valence
Overall, the regression models suggest that organizational scanning seems to
influence both opportunity and threat interpretations. Concerning opportunity
interpretations, customer information acquisition frequency and use strongly enhances
both positive-gain and extremity interpretations while information availability tends
to increase controllability interpretation. However, when turning to threat
interpretations, customer information acquisition frequency and use shows a generally
strong positive influence with respect to both negative-loss, uncontrollability and
extremity interpretations. Thus, at least this particular variable, does not seem to
suppress the threat effect as expected and suggested in strategic issue diagnosis
research (e.g. Dutton 1993a). Rather, it tends to increase both opportunity and threat
interpretations. Finally, another organizational scanning variable, general information
acquisition frequency, seems to reduce the magnitude of threat interpretations while it
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is not significantly related to opportunity interpretations. The effects of organizational
scanning variables on opportunity and threat interpretations are however strongly
dependent on organizational size. The general pattern is that the two predictive
scanning variables, customer information acquisition and use and general information
acquisition frequency, are significant predictors of effect valence only among
managers in small firms. For positive-gain, opportunity-extremity, and negative-loss
interpretations, large and significant beta coefficients obtained in the small firm
sample drop to small and insignificant in the large firm sample. For uncontrollability
and threat-extremity, positive and significant beta coefficients for small firms change
to negative but insignificant beta coefficients for large firms. Thus, organizational size
seems to be an important moderator for the influence of organizational scanning on
effect valence.
Turning to the effects of the top management team information processing structure
on effect valence, the only significant effect of participation is on controllability
interpretations among managers in large firms. As expected, participation increases
controllability interpretation, which replicates the finding of Thomas and McDaniel
(1990). Flexibility is not significantly related to any of the opportunity interpretation
variables, but shows several significant and negative relationships with threat
interpretation among managers in both small and large firms. Thus, although
flexibility does not enhance opportunity frames, it seems to consistently reduce threat
interpretations.
The effects of the cognitive style variables are strongly dependent on size and
different for opportunity and threat interpretations. Starting with exploration, it has no
effect among managers in large firms. However, among managers in small firms, it is
positivelyand significantly related to all threat interpretation variables, while not
related to any of the opportunity interpretation variables. Thus, exploration tends to
increase the perception of threat, but only among managers in small firms.
Differentiation seems to increase positive-gain and opportunity-extremity
interpretations among managers in small firms, while it is not related to threat
interpretations and has no effect among managers in large firms. While exploration
and differentiation seem to be unimportant predictors among managers in large firms,
social complexity is negativelyand significantly related to all threat interpretations
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among managers in large firms, while it is positivelyand marginally significantly
related to both controllability and uncontrollability among managers in small firms.
Thus, among managers in large firms, social complexity has no effects on opportunity
interpretation, while it seems to strongly reduce the interpretation of threat.
In addition to the moderating effects of organizational size discussed above, size has
direct and positive effects on opportunity interpretations, but not on threat
interpretations. Thus, organizational size seems to increase opportunity interpretation,
which contradicts the findings of Denison et al. (1996). When analyzing the
subsamples, size increases controllability perception and this effect is stronger in the
small firm sample than in the large firm sample. On the other hand, it is only among
managers in large firms that size increases opportunity-extremity perception.
7.2.2 Issue sorting
The hypotheses HIlS to H31s suggested that all independent variables would be
positively related to the 'extent to which managers differentiate between
developments, trends or events in terms of judgments of importance and feasibility.
Tables 7.7 to 7.9 report the results of the regression analyses to test these hypotheses.
Recall from the previous chapter that issue sorting in terms of importance were
divided into operational and strategic importance. Table 7.7 shows that the only
significant relationship using the full sample, is between differentiation and
operational importance. However, this relationship is negative (bAF= 17, P < .05), as
opposed to what was suggested in H3als. On the other hand, exploration behave as
expected (bLF= -23, P < .10), but only in the large firm sample. Thus H3als gains
some support. Among small firms, the only predictive variable is size (bSF,IS= 30, P <
.05). Thus, HIaIS and H2als are not supported for operational importance. Besides, all
three regression models are insignificant.
Table 7.8 reveals that exploration is positivelyand significantly related to
differentiation of strategic importance in all three samples (bAF,IS= -21, P < .05, bs'F=
-23, P < .10, bLF,IS= -25, p < .05), providing some support for H3als. Additionally,
among small firms, customer information acquisition frequency and use is positively
and significantly (bsF = -29, P < .10), and information availability positivelyand
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marginally significantly (bsF = -25, p < .15) related to strategic importance. These
findings support HIaIS. However, among large firms, customer information
acquisition frequency and use is negativelyand significantly (bLP,IS= 34, P < .10),
while general information acquisition frequency is positivelyand significantly (bLF,IS
= -33, p < .05) related to strategic importance. Thus, HlaIS is partly supported for
small firms, but not supported for large firms. H2aIS is not supported since the only
significant relationship, between flexibility and strategic importance is negative (bLP,IS
= 24, P < .05). Finally, organizational size is negativelyand marginally (bLP,IS= -17, P
< .15) related to strategic importance for large firms.
Table 7.7: Operational importance by organizational scanning, TMT-IPS, and cognitive style
Operational importanee"
Total sample (n = 156) Small firms (n = 76) Large firms (n = 80)
Ia 2b la 2b 1a i'
.11 .10 -.16 -.07 .29t .29t
-.09 -.09 .07 -.02 -.17 -.17
-.10 -.10 -.07 -.04 -.17 -.17
.07 .07 .14 .21 t .05 .05
.Il .Il .02 .00 .13 .13
-.I3t -.I3t .04 .02 -.23* -.23*
-.08 -.08 .02 .03 -.12 -.12
.17** .17* .03 .03 .16 .16
.02 -.30** .00
1.10 .97 .35 .93 1.38 1.21
.056 .057 .040 .113 .134 .134
.005 -.002 -.074 -.008 .037 .023
.03 5.39** .00
.07
Independent variables
Organizational scanning
Customer information acquisition frequency/use
Information availability
General information acquisition frequency
TMT information processing structure
Participation
Aexibility
Cognitive style
Exploration
Social complexity
Differentiation
Circulation size (log.lnot transformedlinv.)
Overall model
F
R2
Adjusted R'
~
Average improvement in R2 with sample spilt
+: <.15; *: p<.lO; **: p<.05; ***: p<.OI
"Original model; "including size; 'reversed
Table 7.8: Strategic importance by organizational scanning, TMT-IPS, and cognitive style
Strategic impertanee"
Total sample (n = 156) Small firms (n = 76) Large firms (n = 80)
Inde~ndent variables 1a 2b la 2b l" 2b
Organizational scanning
Customer information acquisition frequency/use .05 -.06 -.29* -.30* .41 ** .34*
Information availability -.I6t -.14 -.25t -.24t -.16 -.16
General information acquisition frequency -.09 -.07 .15 .15 -.37** -.33 **
TMT information processing structure
Participation .10 .11 .l9t .18 -.04 -.05
Flexibility .07 .08 -.04 -.03 _22* .24**
Cognitive style
Exploration -.20** -.21 ** -.23* -.23* -.24** -.25**
Social complexity -.09 -.08 -.18 -.18 .03 .03
Differentiation -.01 -.03 .05 .05 -.09 -.08
'Circulation size (log.lnot transformedlinv.) .16t .05 -.I7t
Overall model
F 1.90* 2.00** 1.91* 1.69t 1.90* 1.96*
R2 .094 .110 .185 .187 .176 .201
Adjusted R2 .044 .055 .088 .077 .084 .099
~F 2.64t .16 2.19t
Average improvement in R2 with sample spilt .08
t: <.15; *: p<.10; **: p<.05; ***: p<.OI
"Original model; "including size; 'reversed
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HlbIS to H3bIS hypothesized that all independent variables would be positively
related to issue sorting in terms offeasibility. Table 7.9 shows that the only significant
relationships are found in the regression modelon the small firm sample (including
size) and that the other two regression models are insignificant. Specifically,
information availability (bSF,ls= -42, P < .05) and flexibility (bSF,IS= -24, P < .10)
behave as expected, providing some support to HlbIS and H2bIS. H3bIS is not
supported since none of the cognitive style variables shows significant relationships.
Finally, organizational size adds significantly to explained variance in the small firm
. .
sample (AR2sF,IS= .08, P < .10) in the positive direction (bSF,IS= -30, P < .10).
Table 7.9: Unfeasibility by organizational scanning, TMT.IPS, and cognitive style
Overall model
F
R2
AdjustedR?
~F
Average improvement in R2 with sample spilt
Unfeasibility'
Total sample (n - 156) Small firms (n - 76) Large firms (n = 80)
la 2b la 2b la 2b
.07 .08 -.12 -.02 .21 .19
-.15 -.16 -.32 ** -.42 ** .01 .01
-.01 -.02 .15 .18 -.18 -.17
.00 .00 .06 .13 -.08 -.09
-.I3t -.13t -.22t -.24* -.06 -.05
-.02 -.02 .01 .00 -.10 -.11
-.01 -.01 -.04 -.04 .06 .06
-.03 -.03 -.07 -.06 .01 .01
-.02 -.30** -.06
.64 .57 1.31 1.96* .37 .35
.034 .034 .135 .211 .040 .043
-.019 -.025 .032 .104 -.068 -.080
.06 6.38** .20
.09
Independent variables
Organizational scanning
Customer information acquisition frequency/use
Information availability
General information acquisition frequency
TMT information processing structure
Participation
Flexibility
Cognitive style
Exploration
Social complexity
Differentiation
Circulation size (IogJnot transformed/inv.)
t: <.15; *: p<.I0; **: p<.05; ***: p<.01
"Original model; bincluding size; 'reversed
Brief comments on issue sorting
Overall, the independent variables are not good predictors of issue sorting as defined
and measured in this study. However, exploration has a positive effect on
differentiation in terms of strategic importance across all three samples, and on
operational importance among managers in large firms.
Two of the organizational scanning variables, customer information acquisition
frequency and use and information availability, seem to increase the ability to
differentiate between issues in terms of strategic importance and feasibility, but only
for managers in small firms. For managers in large firms, customer information
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acquisition frequency and use actually decreases this ability when it comes to
judgments of operational and strategic importance.
The only significant finding for the two information processing structure variables, is
that flexibility seems to increase differentiation in terms of unfeasibility among
managers in small firms, while it decreases the ability to differentiate in terms of
strategic importance among managers in large firms.
Finally, organizational size increases differentiation in terms of both operational
importance and unfeasibility for managers in small firms. Size is a much less
important predictor in the large firm sample, but it seems to decrease differentiation in
terms of strategic importance.
7.2.3 Causal understanding
HIeu to H3eu hypothesized that all independent variables would be positively related
to the extent to which managers are nuanced in causal understanding of development,
trends or events. The results of causal understanding of free papers are reported in
table 7.10 below. Regressing the total sample, general information acquisition
frequency (bAF= 22, P < .05) and differentiation (bAF= 23, P < .01) are positivelyand
significantly related to causal understanding. When analyzing the subsamples, general
information acquisition frequency is only significant in the large firm sample (bLF =
44, P -c ..01), providing some support for HIeu for large firms only. However, in this
sample and in contradiction to HIeu, customer information acquisition frequency and
use is negativelyand significantly related to causal understanding (bLF = -42, P < .01).
Differentiation is a significant predictor in the large firm sample (bLF= 22, P < .05),
but becomes insignificant in the small firm sample (bsF = 17, P = .21). Thus, H3eu is
partly supported. Finally, participation is positively related to causal understanding in
the small firm sample (bsF = 27, P < .05). However, since this regression model is not
significant (FsF = 1.08, P = .39), this should not be taken as strong support for H2eu.
The results of the second causal understanding variable, market, competition and
attribution of success, is reported in table 7.11. Regressing the full sample, flexibility
(bAF.1S= 14, P < .10) and exploration (bAF,IS= 30, P < .01) are positivelyand
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significantly related to causal understanding. Moreover, organizational size is a
positive and significant predictor of causal understanding across all samples, although
only marginally so among large firms (bAF,IS= 18, P < .10, bSF,IS= 23, P < .10, bLF,IS=
-18, P < .15). But again, the regression model of the small firm sample is not
significant (FSF,IS= 1.29, P > .15). Among large firms, exploration is positivelyand
significantly related to causal understanding (bLF= 35, P < .01).
Table 7.10: Causal understanding (j) by organizational scanning, TMT-IPS, and cognitive style
Freepapers
Total sample (n = 158) Small firms (n = 77) Large firms (n = 81)
'lnde~ndent variables la 2b . la 2b la 2b
Organizational scanning
Customer information acquisition frequency/use -.10 -.13 .06 .01 -.42** -.41 **
Information availability -.07 -.06 -.12 -.15 .07 .07
General information acquisition frequency .22** .23** .02 .03 .44*** .44***
TMT information processing structure
Participation .I3t .13t .27** .30** .04 .04
Flexibility -.01 -.01 -.05 -.06 .01 .01
Cognitive style
Exploration -.10 -.09 .02 .01 -.10 -.09
Social complexity -.09 -.09 .00 .00 -.14 -.14
Differentiation .23*** .22** .17 .17 .22** .22**
Circulation size (log./not transformedlinv.2 .05 -.12 .03
Overall model
F 1.83* 1.65t 1.08 1.07 1.99* 1.76*
R2 .090 .091 .113 .125 .181 .182
Adjusted R2 .041 .036 .009 .008 .090 .078
åFchange .24 .93 .06
Average imQrovement in R2 with samQle sQilt .06
t: <.15; *: p<.IO; **: p<.05; ***: p<.01
'Original model; bincluding size
Table 7.11: Causal understanding (ji) by organizational scanning, TMT -IPS, and cognitive style
Independent variables
Market, competition and attribution of success
Total sample (n = 158) Small firms (n = 77) Large firms (n = 81)
la 2b la 2b la 2b
.I7t .05 .04 -.03 .12 .05
.06 .09 .17 .24t .02 .ot
-.Il -.08 -.16 -.18 -.03 .00
.05 .06 -.05 -.10 .15 .13
.14* .14* .16 .17 .09 .12
.31 *** .30*** .16 .18 .36*** .35 ***
-.05 -.05 -.12 -.12 -.02 -.01
.08 .05 .08 .07 .05 .06
.18* .23* -.I8t
4.51 *** 4.52*** .99 1.29 3.09*** 3.12***
.195 .216 .104 .148 .256 .283
.152 .168 -.001 .033 .173 .192
3.90* 3.39* 2.73t
.00 ...
Organizational scanning
Customer information acquisition frequency/use
Information availability
General information acquisition frequency
TMT information processing structure
Participation
Flexibility
Cognitive style
Exploration
Social complexity
Differentiation
Circulation size (log./not transformed/inv.)
Overall model
F
R2
Adjusted R2
åF
Average imQrovement in R2 with sample sQilt
t: <.15; *: p<.I0; **: p<.05; ***: p<.01
"Original model; "mcluding size
Seeing the two causal understanding variables together, H3cu is partly supported
since differentiation and exploration are relatively strong and significant predictors of
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each of the variables. H2cu is marginally supported, due to the relationships between
participation and the first causal understanding variable for small firms, and between
flexibility and the second causal understanding variable in the full sample. Finally, the
empirical evidence regarding Hlcu is mixed. However, the strong positive relation
between general information acquisition frequency and causal understanding of free
papers provides some support in the large firm sample.
Brief comments on causal understanding
Two of the .cognitive style variables increase nuances of managers' causal
understanding. Exploration seems to improve causal understanding of the market,
competition and attribution of success, while differentiation enhances causal
understanding of free papers. These findings are consistent across samples, but
stronger and significant only among managers in large firms.
The effect of organizational scanning is mixed. None of the three variables seem to
influence causal understanding of the market, competition and of success. On the
other hand, two of the organizational scanning variables strongly influence managers'
causal understanding of free papers, but only among managers in large firms. General
information acquisition frequency strongly enhances nuances in causal understanding
of free papers, while customer information acquisition frequency has an almost as
strong effect but in the opposite direction.
The information processing structure variables do not seem to have strong effects on
casual understanding. However, flexibility has some positive effects on managers'
causal understanding of the market, competition and attribution of success, among
small firms, while participation seems to positively influence managers' causal
understanding of free papers, but only in small firms.
Finally, while organizational size does not have any direct effects on causal
understanding of free papers, it seems to have a positive influence on nuances in
,managers' causal understan~ing ofthe market, competition and attribution of success.
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7.2.4 Data search
The final set of hypotheses, HIDs to H3DSsuggested that organizational scanning and
information processing structure variables would be positively related to all three
categories of data search and that the cognitive -style variables -wøuld be positively
related to search for additional and new data. Starting with core data, table 7.12 shows
that customer information acquisition frequency and use is positivelyand significantly
related to core data for the full sample (bAF = -24, P < .10). However, although still
positive, the relationship becomes insignificant in both subsamples (bsF= -23, P > .15,
bLF,IS= -17, P > .15). On the other hand, general information acquisition frequency is
negatively related to core data in the total sample (bAF = 23, P < .05), but the analyses
of the subsamples show that this relationship is strong and significant only managers
in small firms (bsF = 37, P < .05, bLF,IS= 08, P > .15). Differentiation is positivelyand
significantly related to core data in the small firm sample (bsF = -22, P < .10), while
social complexity is positivelyand marginally significant to core data in the large firm
sample (bLF= -19, P < .15). The regression models of the two subsamples are only
marginally significant (FSF= 1.65, P < .15, FLF,IS= 1.59, P < .15).
Table 7.12: Core data by organizational scanning, TMr.IPS, and cognitive style
Core data"
Total sample (n = 157) Small firms (n = 77) Large firms (n = 80)
Independent variables I" 2b lB 2b la 2b
Organizational scanning
Customer information acquisition frequency/use -.24* -.24* -.24 -.24 -.11 -.17
Information availability -.11 -.11 -.09 -.09 -.17 -.17
General information acquisition frequency .23** .23** .37** .37** .05 .08
TMr information processing structure
Participation -.08 -.08 -.10 -.10 -.08 -.10
Flexibility .05 .05 .04 .04 .Q7 .09
Cognitive style
Exploration .02 .02 .02 .02 .04 .03
Social complexity -.11 -.11 -.01 -.01 -.20t -.19t
Differentiation -.15* -.15* -.22* -.22* -.07 -.05
Circulation size (Iog./not transformedlinv.) .01 -.01 -.17
Overall model
F 2.75*** 2.43** 1.65t 1.45 1.53 1.59t
R2 .129 .129 .163 .163 .147 .170
Adjusted R2 .082 .076 .064 .050 .051 .063
~ .01 .00 1.94
Average improvement in R2 with sample spilt .04
+: <.15; *: p<.10; **: p<.05; ***: p<.01
. "Original model; "including size; <reversed
Table 7.13 reveals that the only significant .relationship of the regression for
additional data, is that between differentiation and data search (bAF,IS= 19, P < .10,
bLF= 26, P < .10). However, the regression model for small firms is not significant
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(FsF = .84, P < .15), while only marginally significant for large firms (FLF = 1.70, P <
.15).
Table 7.13: Additional data by organizational scanning, TMT-IPS, and cognitive style
Additional data
Total sample (n = 157) Small firms (n = 77) Large firms (n = 80)
Inde~ndent variables la 2b la 2b ja 2b
Organizational scanning
Customer information acquisition frequency/use .06 .16 .14 .18 .01 .03
Information availability .04 .02 .05 .03 .06 .06
General information acquisition frequency .08 .06 -.04 -.03 .16 .16
TMT infonnation processing structure
Participation -.03 -.04 -.03 -.01 -.08 -.07
Flexibility -.10 -.10 -.05 -.06 -.13 -.14
Cognitive style
Exploration -.12 -.Il -.16 -.16 -.06 -.06
Social complexity .02 .02 -.07 -.07 .08 .08
Differentiation .17** .19** .17 .17 .26** .26**
Circulation size (log./not transformed/inv.) -.I4t -.10 .05
Overall model
F 1.79* 1.85* .84 .81 1.70t 1.51
R2 .088 .102 .090 .098 .161 .162
Adjusted R' .039 .047 -.017 -.023 .066 .055
~ 2.19t .60 .15
Average im(!TOvement in R2 with sam(!le s(!ilt .03
t: <.15; *: p<.I0; **: p<.05; ***: p<.OI
"Original model; "including size
Table 7.14: New data by organizational scanning, TMT-IPS, and cognitive style
New data
Total sample (n = 157) Small firms (n = 77) Large firms (n = 80)
Inde~ndent variables la 2b la 2b l a 2b
Organizational scanning
Customer information acquisition frequency/use .13 .22* .31 * .36** -.11 -.02
Information availability -.01 -.03 -.07 -.11 .09 .09
General information acquisition frequency -.01 -.03 -.22t -.20 .19 .16
TMT infonnation processing structure
Participation .02 .01 .Il .14 -.11 -.09
Flexibility -.28*** -.28*** -.35*** -.35*** -.22* -.25**
Cognitive style
Exploration -.04 -.03 .05 .04 -.03 -.01
Social complexity .10 .10 .12 .12 .10 .08
Differentiation .19** .21 ** .ISt .18t .21 * .19*
Circulation size (log./not transformed/inv.) -.13 -.16 .24**
Overall model
F 4.03*** 3.83*** 3.29*** 3.19*** 1.75t 2.10**
R2 .179 .190 .278 .300 .165 .213
Adjusted R2 .134 .140 .194 .206 .070 .111
~F 2.02 2.03 4.27**
Average im(!rovement in R2 with sam(!le S(!i1t .07
t: <.15; *: p<.I0; **: p<.05; ***: p<.OI
"Original model; "including size
Finally, table 7.14 reports the results for the regression of search for new data. The
table shows that customer information acquisition and use is positivelyand
significantly related to new data for small firms (bsF,IS = 36, P < .05). The relationship
between flexibility and new data is negative and significant across all samples (bAF,IS
= -28, P < .01, bSF,IS = -35, P < .01, bLF,IS = -25, P < .05). Finally, differentiation is
positivelyand significantly related to new data in the full sample and among
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managers in large firms (bAF,IS= 21, P < .05, bLF,IS= 19, P < .10), while marginally
significant among small firms (bsF,IS= 18, P < .15). In the large firm sample,
organizational size is negativelyand significantly related to search for new data (bLF,IS
= 24, P < .05),
In conclusion, BIns is marginally supported for small firms, due to the relationships
between customer information acquisition frequency and use and search for core data
and particularly new data. B2ns is clearly not supported, since the only significant
relationship between information processing structure and data search variables is
negative. Although B3ns hypothesized a positive relationship between cognitive style
and only two of the data search variables (additional and new data), and
differentiation is positively related to all three data search variables, it is concluded
that the hypothesis is partly supported. However, the support is generally stronger for
large firms than for small firms.
Brief comments on data search
Customer information acquisition frequency and use seems to increase data search
among managers in small firms, although not significantly so in terms of core data
and additional data. On the other hand, general information acquisition frequency has
the opposite effect for these managers, especially in terms of core data and new data.
For large firms, organizational scanning variables do generally not seem to influence
managers' search for data.
The top management team information processing structure variables are generally
not important in predicting managers' search for data. However, flexibility seems to
strongly and consistently reduce data search, This effect tends to be slightly stronger
among managers in small firms than among those in large firms.
Turning to cognitive style, differentiation seems to enhance managers' search for all
data search categories. For additional and new data, this effect is stronger for
managers in large firms, while the positive effect of differentiation on core data is
found only among managers in small firms,
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Organizational size does not seem to directly influence managers' search for core and
additional data, while it tends to decrease the search for new data among managers in
large firms.
7.3 Relative effects of contextual and cognitive variables
Hierarchical regression was used to explore proposition PI and P2 about relative
effects of contextual and cognitive variables respectively (see paragraph 4.5). To
analyze proposition PI, all cognitive style variables were entered into the model
followed by the inclusion of all contextual variables including size. Differences in
explained variance were tested using F-tests of changes in R2 between the model
including only the cognitive variables and the model including all independent
variables. As shown in table 7.15, the contextual variables add significantly to
explained variance of opportunity and threat interpretation, issue sorting in terms of
unfeasibility and search for new data, for managers in small firms. For managers in
large firms, the addition of contextual variables added significantly to explained
variance for controllability and opportunity-extremity interpretations, issue sorting in
terms of strategic importance and search for new data. Thus, proposition PI that
organizational context would explain a significant amount of variance in managers'
strategic issue diagnosis, above and beyond the variance explained by managers'
cognitive style, is partly supported by the data. The strongest support is found for
effect valence among managers in small firms and for managers' search for new data.
Table 7.15: Hierarchical regression models for exploring the organizational control proposition (PI)
Small firms Large f"1I'JIlS
Cognitive Cognitive
style Contextual variables" style Contextual variables"
Dependent variables R2 R2 L\R2 L\F R2 R2 L\R2 L\F
Positive-gain .100 .276 .176 2.71 ** .008 .086 .078 1.01
Controllability .046 .264 .218 3.31 *** .009 .212 .203 3.05**
Extremity-opportunity .087 .215 .128 1.82t .016 .215 .199 3.01 **
Negative-loss .019 .273 .254 3.89*** .068 .134 .066 .91
Uncontrollability .018 .227 .209 3.02 ** .062 .163 .101 1.43
Extremity-threat .027 .229 .202 2.94** .041 .143 .102 1.41
Operational importance .006 .113 .107 1.32 .079 .134 .055 .74
Strategic importance .063 .187 .124 1.69t .053 .201 .148 2.17*
Unfeasibility .013 .211 .198 2.77 ** .009 .043 .034 .42
Causal understanding I .033 .125 .092 1.18 .063 .182 .119 l.72t
Causal understanding II .054 .148 .094 1.23 .204 .283 .079 1.31
Core data .063 .163 .100 1.33 .080 .170 .090 1.26
Additional data .063 .098 .035 .43 .107 .162 .055 .77
New data .089 .300 .211 3.37*** .084 .213 .129 1.91*
+: <.15; *: p<.10; **: p<.05; ***: p<.OI
"Including size
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Table 7.16: Hierarchical regression models for exploring the strategic choice proposition (P3)
Small firms Largfirms
Contextual Contextual
variables' Cognitive style variables' Cog_nitive s!YJe
Dependent variables R2 R2 t1R2 t1F R2 R2 M2 t1F
Positive-gain .175 .276 .101 3.12 ** .066 .086 .020 .53
Controllability .222 .264 .042 1.28 .207 .212 .005 .15
Extremity-opportunity .143 .215 .072 2.05t .214 .215 .001 .04
Negative-loss .205 .273 .<>68 2.07t .040 .134 .094 2.57*
Uncontrollability .159 .227 .068 1.96t .102 .163 .061 1.73
Extremity-threat .195 .229 .034 .98 .090 .143 .053 1.48
Operational importance .110 .113 .003 .07 .053 .134 .081 2.19*
Strategic importance .120 .187 .067 1.82 .144 .201 .057 1.69
Unfeasibilitv .205 .211 .006 .16 .032 .043 .Oll .27
Causal understanding I .100 .125 .025 .65 .115 .182 .067 1.93t
Causal understandinz II .106 .148 .042 1.10 .177 .283 .106 3.50**
Coredata .121 .163 .042 1.12 .137 .170 .033 .91
Additional data .064 .098 .034 .85 .091 .162 .071 1.98t
New data .242 .300 .058 1.87t .171 .213 .042 1.23
t: <.15; *: p<.10; **: p<.05; ***: p<.Ol
"Including size
The same procedure was used to analyze proposition P2. "The strategic choice
proposition" stated that managers' cognitive style would explain a significant amount
of variance in managers' strategic issue diagnosis, above and beyond the variance
explained by organizational context. Table 7.16 shows that for managers in small
firms, the only significant (p<.10) increase in explained variance .was found for
positive-gain interpretation. For managers in large firms, the addition of the cognitive
variables added significantly to explained variance for negative-loss interpretation,
issue sorting in terms operational importance and causal understanding of the market,
competition and attribution of success. Thus, for some of the dependent variables, the
addition of cognitive style variables increase the variance explained, but not to the
same extent that contextual variables added to the cognitive variables.
7.4 Exploration of interaction effects
To explore proposition P3, that suggested the effects of the cognitive variables will be
contingent on the level of the contextual variables (see paragraph 4.5), moderated
regression analysis (e.g. Sharma, Durand, and Gurarie 1981) and subgroup analyses
(e.g. Hunt, Osborn, and Larson 1975) were used in tandem.
First, the cross-productterms of the contextual variables and the cognitive variables
were added to the full original regression models. Due to the importance of
organizational size in the hypothesis testing, both in terms of direct effects and as a
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moderator, it was included as a contextual independent variable and as a moderating
variable. To identify significant interaction effects, F-tests of changes in R2 between
the original and the moderated model including the cross-product terms were
performed (see tables 3 to 10 in appendix B).
Because the cross-product term is entered into the regression after the original model,
this type of analysis yields a conservative estimate of the moderating effects of one
variable on the relationship between two or more other variables (Darrow and Kahl
1983). Moreover, the relative low number of subjects due to the sample split and the
addition of the cross-product term onto the full original regression models, increase
the threshold for detecting significant interactions. To avoid the risk of
multicollinearity problems due to the use of cross-product terms, all independent
variables were centered by subtracting their means before computing the cross-
product terms. Finally, using a subgroup analysis where significant moderator
variables were split based on the median (e.g. Hunt, Osborn, and Larson 1975), the
significant interaction effects were analyzed further In order to identify possible
patterns in terms of the form of interactions. Given the explorative nature of this
analysis, only two cognitive variables were investigated; exploration and
differentiation.
Table 7.17: Subgroup analysis for exploration
Small firms Large ftrms
Before split After split Before split After split
Dependent Mode- Eplor- Mode- Eplor-
variables Moderators tlF rator ation Low High tlf rator ation Low High
Positive-gain Information avail. 2.93* .04 .08 .24 -.04
Flexibility 11.77 *** -.15 -.06 .09 -.25
Opportunity-extr. GeneralIAF 2.87* -.Il .01 -.39** .31 t 3.61 * .04 .02 -.01 -.11
Participation 3.20* .03 .02 .22 -.25
Flexibility 2.59t -.08 .02 .06 -.08
Size" 2.73t -.28** .02 .09 -.06
Negative-loss Information avail. 2.91 * -.14 .27** .41 ** .24
Participation 2.16t .07 .27** .36** .28t
Flexibility 10.35*** -.11 -.07 .12 -.34*
Threat-extremity Information avail. 3.27* .17 .01 .10 -.14
Participation 6.39** -.01 .01 .24 -.25
Flexibility 2.19t -.14 .21 * .21 .04 2.40t -.24** .01 .02 -.19
Operational imp," General IAF 3.48* -.04 .02 .14 -.19 4.08** -.17 -.23* -.44** .02
Strategic imp. a Customer IAF&V 5.62** -.30* -.23* -.20 -.25
GeneralIAF 5.29** -.33** -.25** -.44** .02
CV free papers Information avail. 7.36*** -.15 .01 .38* -.37*
Size 2.42t -.12 .01 -.22 .15
Core data" Information avail. 3.19* -.09 .02 .02 -.04
Additional data Information avail. 2.I5t .m -.16 -.18 -.06
Size" 2.64t .05 -.06 .05 -.14
New data Participation 2.26t -.09 -.01 .13 -.25
t: <.15; *: p<.lO; **: p<.05; ***: p<.OI
"Reversed
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Table 7.17 and 7.18 show the results of the subgroup analysis with exploration and
differentiation as the independent variables. The tables present F change statistics,
standardized beta coefficients for the cognitive variables before the sample split and
for high versus low values of moderators, and standardized beta coefficients for the
moderators before the sample split.
Table 7.18: Subgroup analysis for differentiation
Smallfirms Large firms
Before split After split Before split After split
Dependent Moder- Differ- Moder- Differ-
variables Moderators LW ator entiation Low High LW ator entiation Low High
Positive-gain Size' 2.42t . -.14 -.06 .01 -.08
Opportuoity-extr. Customer IAF&V 2.57t .48 *** .30** -.15 .48 ***
Size' 5.45** -.28** -.03 .08 -.03
Negative-loss flexibility 2.22t -.24* -.03 .06 -.16
Vncontrollability Participation 3.72* .05 -.Il .24 -.24t
Threat-extremity Size" 3.52* -.15 .Il .24t -.19
Operational imp." Size 3.50* -.30** .03 -.13 .31 t
Strategic imp." Size" 2.54t -.I7t -.08 -.18 -.06
Unfeasibilitv" Size 11.39 *** -.30** -.06 -.63 *** .42**
CV free papers Customer IAF&V 6.28 ** .01 .17 .38t -.05
GenerailAF 5.38** .03 .17 .48** -.17
Participation 2.86* .30** .17 .47** -.16
flexibility 2.81 * -.06 .17 -.21 .37*
Size" 2.38t .03 .22** .10 .34*
CV market, comp .. Customer IAF&V 6.35** -.03 .07 .01 .24t
Information avail. 3.23* .24t .07 -.31 .25
General IAF 4.57** -.18 .07 -.10 .30
Participation 4.97** -.10 .07 -.28 .33*
flexibility 4.87** .17 .07 .20 -.13
Size 4.88** .23* .07 .40* -.24
Core data" Participation 4.73** -.10 -.05 -.34* .23
Size" 2.33t -.17 -.05 -.16 .26t
Additional data flexibility 9.91 *** -.14 .26** -.07 .72***
New data Participation 2.65t .14 .18t .23 .11
flexibility 2.23t -.25** .19* -.05 .42 ***
t: <.15; *: p<.IO; **: p<.05; ***: p<.OI
'Reversed
The tables reveal that eleven (small firms) and thirteen (large firms) significant
interactions were found with exploration as the independent variable, while fifteen
(small firms) and ten (large firms) significant interactions were found for
differentiation. For each independent variable and subsample, the total possible
number of significant interactions is of eighty-four (six contextual variables
multiplied with fourteen dependent variables). Thus, only about 12 to 18 percent of
the regression models produced significant interaction effects. On the other hand,
given the method applied in order to detect moderating effects, those· that have been
found must, by implication, be very strong. Darrow and Kahl (1983) state that studies
finding a moderating effect using this method can be concluded to contain strong
evidence that the moderating effect does exist. Besides, for the large firm sample, a
relatively clear pattern emerges. The relationships between exploration and the
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dependent variables shifts from weak and positive to negative (four effect valence
variables and search for additional and new data) or from strong and positive to
weakly positive (operational and strategic importance) for low versus high values of
organizational information processing and organizational size. A similar pattern is
found for the relationships between differentiation and effect valence, strategic
importance search for core data.
In sum, for twenty out of twenty-three significant moderating effects found in the
large firm sample, exploration and differentiation are negatively related (or not related
at all) to the dependent variables for high levels of organizational information
processing and size, while positively (although mostly not significantly) related to the
dependent variables for low levels of organizational information processing and size.
Thus, it seems that high levels of organizational information processing produces an
effect of the cognitive variables in a negative direction. This pattern, along with the
rest of the results, will be more thoroughly discussed in the next and final chapter.
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DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
In this chapter the results from the data analysis are discussed and their implications
highlighted. First, the results of the hypotheses testing are commented. Second, some
speculations about the relative effects of contextual and cognitive variables and the
moderating effects of the contextual variables are made. Then, implications for theory
and practice and the validity of the findings are considered. Finally, suggestions and
opportunities for further research are discussed.
8.1 Organizational scanning and strategic issue diagnosis
Table 8.1 presents an overview of the significant findings for the relationship between
organizational scanning and strategic issue diagnosis.
Table 8.1: Overview of significant findings for organizational scanning
Customer infonnation
acquisition frequency and use
Infonnation availability General infonnation acquisition
frequency
All Small Large All Small Large All Small Large
Effect valence
Positive-gain
Controllability
Opportunity-extremity
Negative-loss
Uncontrollability + + +
Threat-extremity .+ + + + + +
Issue sorting
Operational importance (-)
Strategic importance
Unfeasibility
Causal understanding
Free papers
Market, competition, ..
Datasearch
Core data
Additional data
New data lliili!ili:N~~i_ll~tJ (-)
(+/-): p < .15; +/-: p < .10; ++/--: p < .05; +++/---: p < .01
Shaded area: Significant findings in the hypothesized direction
The table reveals that there have been found a number of significant relationships
between customer information acquisition frequency and use and managers' strategic
issue diagnosis. In particular, customer information acquisition frequency and use is
significantly related to several effect valence variables. Customer information
acquisition frequency and use is strongly positively related to two of the three
opportunity variables. However, these relationships are only found for managers in
small firms, since there are no significant relationships between customer information
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acquisition frequency and use and effect valence for managers in large firms. Thus, at
least for small firms, the findings indicate that managers in organizations that
frequently gather environmental information and use this information in strategic
planning and analyses, are more likely to see opportunities as more positive and more
as potential gains, as well as more positive for their own organizations compared to
other organizations (opportunity-extremity).
While it was hypothesized that the organizational scanning variables would be
negatively related to uncontrollability and threat-extremity, customer information
acquisition frequency and use is strongly positively related to all three threat
variables. Thus, contrary to what was expected, customer information acquisition
frequency and use does not seem to suppress the threat effect as implicitly suggested
in strategic issue diagnosis research. While previous research indicates that managers
more exposed to information are better equipped with knowledge and data needed to
support positive framing (Dutton 1993a; Thomas, Clark, and Gioia 1993; Thomas and
McDaniel 1990), the data in the present study suggests that this particular kind of
scanning tends to increase the strength of both opportunity and threat interpretations.
A potential explanation is that customer information acquisition frequency and use
increases managers' attention and awareness of all environmental changes and their
potential consequences, as suggested by several of the articles reviewed in relation to
organizational scanning (e.g. Ansoff 1980; Daft and Weick 1984; Dutton and
Ottensmeyer 1987; Hedberg 1981; Meyer 1982; Milliken, Dutton, and Beyer 1990).
Moreover, the positive relationships between customer information acquisition
frequency and use and managers search for core data (although not significantly when
the sample is split) and new data among managers in small firms, support the
interpretation that customer information acquisition frequency and use increases
managers' attention and awareness.
Due to findings that suggest that managers use less effortful cognitive processes in
interpretation of positive events (Gooding and Kinicki 1995), and that less effortful
processing increases the possibility of cognitive biases (Louis and Sutton 1991),
combined with a link between information load and overly optimistic or positive
evaluation, it was hypothesized that organizational scanning would increase the
likelihood of positivity biases and thus opportunity-extremity interpretation. While
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customer information acquisition frequency and use in fact is positively related to
opportunity-extremity interpretation for managers in small firms, it is unlikely that
this relationship can be attributed to a positivity bias. The fact that this scanning
variable does not significantly increase managers' perception of their organizations
capability to easily capitalize on opportunities (controllability), indicates that such
scanning behavior does not seem to produce overly positive interpretations, at least
not to an extent that managers assume that they can simply exploit opportunities
without conducting extended analysis. On the other hand, the strong positive
relationships between customer information acquisition frequency and use and all
. .
threat interpretation variables indicate that this scanning variable might produce threat
biases for managers in small firms. If managers view a threat consistent event as
having more negative and threatening implications for their organization than for
other organizations (threat-extremity), and report that their organization lack the
capability to deal with the event (uncontrollability), they might show a tendency to
deal with the event in an overly rigid manner (e.g. Dutton 1986a; Lai 1994; Starbuck,
Greve, and Hedberg 1978; Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton 1981; Turner 1976). A
potential explanation for these results is that managers are found to be more sensitive
to threats than opportunities (Jackson and Dutton 1988) and that customer information
acquisition frequency and use actually might strengthen such a tendency. This in tum
would imply that active opportunity construction as suggested by Dutton (1993a)
might be necessary to avoid threat biases in times of-threat consistent development,
trends or events.
Support for some of the relationships between information availability and strategic
issue diagnosis were also found. Particularly, information availability is strongly
positively related to controllability and negatively (but weaker) related to
uncontrollability interpretation. Consequently, the data suggests that simply having
information available increases managers perception of -their.organizations. capability
to capitalize on opportunities and to manage threats. These findings support the idea
. that managers in organizations that have a wide range of information available, and
use this information, feel less uncertain and more confident in their organization' s
ability to deal with strategic issues (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois 1988; Milliken 1990).
However, the availability of information does not seem to influence any other
dimensions of managers' positive or negative evaluations of developments, trends or
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events. Moreover, no support was found for a positive relationship between
information availability and data search. Hence, the findings do not support previous
findings of a strong relationship between availability and use of data (Culnan 1983;
Culnan 1984; O'Reilly 1982).
General information acquisition frequency was not related to any of the opportunity
variables, but is consistently negatively related to threat interpretations among
managers in small firms. Moreover,· the negative relationship between general
information acquisition frequency and information search for core and new data
among managers in small firms, suggests that this scanning variable not only seems to
suppress threats, but also reduce information search. On the basis of these findings, it
appears that general information acquisition frequency creates a sense of mastery and
control among managers (Eisenhardt 1989; Thomas and McDaniel 1990). Such an
interpretation fit in with findings indicating that information overload creates
increased confidence and satisfaction (e.g. O'Reilly 1980).
Turning to issue sorting and causal understanding, little support was found for the
hypothesized positive links with customer information acquisition frequency and use.
However, for small firms, customer information acquisition frequency and use is
positively related to managers' ability to differentiate between developments, trends
or events in terms of strategic importance. On the other hand, for large firms,
customer information acquisition frequency and use is negatively related to both
operational and strategic importance, as well as nuances in causal understanding of
free papers. Consequently, the findings are mixed and do not constitute any clear
pattern. The generally poor prediction of issue sorting in terms of operational
importance and unfeasibility (as indicated by very low and insignificant R2 values),
might indicate that the two case scenarios were seen as roughly equally operationally
important and unfeasible. However, for small firms, support was found for positive
relationships between information availability and issue sorting in terms of strategic
importance and unfeasibility and nuances of managers' causal understanding of the
market, competition and attribution of newspaper success. Thus, for small firms, all
significant findings are in the hypothesized direction. Finally, some support was
found for positive relationships between general information acquisition frequency
and both issue sorting and causal understanding. For large firms, general information
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acquisition frequency is positively related to both operational importance and causal
understanding of free papers. Table 8.2 provides an overview of all hypotheses
between organizational scanning and strategic issue diagnosis ..
Table 8.2: Hypotheses and results·for organizational scanning and strategic issue diagnosis
Hypotheses Organizational scanning Strategic issue diagnosis H .R :Sample and significance level
HlllEvJ Customer Information AF&U Positive-gain + + Small firms***
Information availability + O
General information AF + O
HlhEvJ Customer Information AF&U Controllability + O
Information availability + + Small* and larget firms
General information AF + O
HlcEVJ Customer Information AF&U Opportunity-extremity + + Smallfirms***
Information availability + O
General information AF + O
HlllEv2 Customer Information AF&U Negative-loss + + Small firms***
Information availability + O
General information AF + Small firms*
HlhEv2 Customer Information AF&U Uncontrollability + Small firms***
Information availability Total sample only+
General information AF Small firms*
HlcEV2 Customer Information AF&U Threat-extremity + Small firms***
Information availability O
General information AF Small firms*
HlaJs Customer Information AF&U Operational importance + Large firms t
Information availability + O
General information AF + O
Hlb1s Customer Information AF&U Strategic importance + +/- Small* (+), large* (-)
Information availability + + Small firms*
General information AF + + Large firms**
Hlcls Customer Information AF&U Unfeasibility + O
Information availability + + Small firms**
General information AF + O
Hlacu Customer Information AF&U Free papers + Large firms**
Information availability + O
General information AF + + Large firms ***
Hlbcu Customer Information AF&U Market, comptetion, ... + O
Information availability + + Small firms+
General information AF + O
Hlaos Customer Information AF&U Coredata + + Total sample only*
Information availability + O
General information AF + Small firms**
Hlbos Customer Information AF&U Additional data + O
Information availability + O
General information AF + O
Hlcos Customer Information AF&U New data + + Small firms*
Information availability + O
General information AF + Small firms+
+: <.15; *: p<.IO; **: p<.05; ***: p<.OI
H: Hypothesized relationship, R: Results
Different forms of scanning and strategic issue diagnosis
The three organizational scanning variables seem to have rather different effects on
managers' strategic issue diagnosis. Hence, a discussion about the main differences
between the three types of scanning might provide further insight into the relationship
between organizational scanning and strategic issue diagnosis. Although all three
variables are seen as belonging more to a viewing or monitoring mode of scanning
rather than a searching mode (e.g. Aguilar 1967; Auster and Choo 1994; Huber and
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Daft 1987), information availability is closer to be categorized as belonging to a
monitoring mode. Information availability covers scanning behavior without a
specific need in mind other than having a broad set of different kinds of information
available to managers. Customer information acquisition frequency and use on the
other hand, is exclusively directed toward the reader and advertising markets and is
also related to the use of scanned information in detecting future threats and
opportunities and to develop scenarios and plans. Hence, this type of scanning comes
closer to the searching mode of scanning, where the organization has a more specific
purpose in mind. Finally, general information acquisition frequency covers
information about a broader set of environmental sectors and is less oriented toward
using the scanned information in strategic planning and analyses. Since it relates to
the frequency of information gathering and not simply availability, it might be
classified in between information availability and customer information acquisition
frequency and use when applying the distinction between searching and monitoring.
Applying this categorization suggests that monitoring or viewing modes of scanning,
as represented by information availability and general information acquisition
frequency, increases managers' perception ofcontrollability and reduces their threat
interpretations and data search. Hence, while the main purpose of this kind of
scanning might be to keep managers informed about the environment and it is not
always clear when or if-the information will be needed or useful (e.g. Huber and Daft
1987; O'Reilly 1980), it seems to fulfill the frequently mentioned purpose of
organizational scanning, namely to reduce managers' uncertainty (e.g. Daft,
Sormunen, and Parks 1988; Huber and Daft 1987). In the literature, the relationship
between uncertainty reduction and information has been treated rather differently. On
the one hand, the classic information theory approach has been to define uncertainty
as the difference between the amount of information required to perform a task and
the information already possessed by the organization (e.g, Galbraith J977; Gifford,
Bobbit, and Slocum 1979; Schmidt and Cummings 1976). Then, low. environmental
_uncertainty would imply that organizational members have sufficient knowledge and
understanding of the environment. On the other hand, managers might feel or perceive
low environmental uncertainty because they lack the information required to
acknowledge environmental complexity or "real uncertainty" (e.g. Leifer and Huber
1977). In addition to these two approaches, a third one rarely discussed in the
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scanning literature is possible. Managers' environmental uncertainty might be reduced
by simply knowing that information is available or that information acquisition is
being taken care of and institutionalized. Given that information availability and
general information acquisition frequency are not positively related to managers'
search for data, it is possible that these kinds of scanning reduce uncertainty even if
managers do not use the information. Thus, this mode of scanning might reduce
managers' uncertainty without upgrading their understanding of the environment.
Hence, a potential consequence will be that managers become overconfident in terms
of their and their organizations' environmental knowledge and capability to capitalize
. .
on opportunities and to deal with threats. In tum, such confidence might maintain or
reinforce managerial information processing referred to as limited capacity models
(Lord and Maher 1990), including satisficing (Simon 1955) and adaptively or
boundedly rational information processing (Cyert and March 1963;March and Simon
1993). These speculations are important in terms of different forms and functions of
organizational scanning. However, they represent an adequate explanation only for
the relationship between scanning on one side, and effect valence and data search on
the other, since both information availability and general information acquisition
frequency are positively related to issue sorting and causal understanding.
The variable closer to a searching mode of scanning, customer information acquisition
frequency and use on the·other hand, increases managers effect valence and data
search. Hence, this kind of scanning seems to increase managers' attention and
awareness and can be seen as a way to overcome some of the limitations in
managerial information processing, which is an important assumption in an
organizational information processing perspective (e.g. March and Simon 1993;
O'Reilly 1983; Shank et al. 1988) and another important purpose of organizational
scanning (e.g. Daft and Weick 1984; Stoffels 1994). Consequently, the findings
suggest that to fulfill the purposes of reducing uncertainty and rationalizing and
upgrading managerial thinking require different forms or modes of organizational
scanning.
As can be seen from table 8.1, it is harder to recognize a pattern for the relationships
between organizational scanning on one side and issue sorting and causal
understanding on the other. However, while customer information acquisition
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frequency and use produces mixed results, all significant relationships between the
two other organizational scanning variables and both issue sorting and causal
understanding variables are in the hypothesized positive direction. Information
availability seems to be more important for small firms, while general information
acquisition frequency appears to facilitate issue sorting and causal understanding in
large firms. The logic behind the hypothesized positive relationship was that high
levels of organizational scanning might provide an organizational context that
facilitates the development of managers' domain-specific knowledge in terms of
richer and more complete representations of the environment and multiple past
experience against which to compare and contrast situations.
8.2 TMT-information processing structure and strategic issue
diagnosis
Table 8.3 presents an overview of the significant findings for the relationship between
top management team information processing structure and strategic issue diagnosis.
Starting with effect valence, support for a positive link between participation and
controllability was found, but only for managers in large firms. Other than that,
participation was not significantly related to any of the effect valence variables or the
data search variables. Consequently, on the basis of these findings, it appears that the
level of participation in strategic decision making does not influence managers'
opportunity-threat interpretation or data search, except that it appears to increase
managers' perceptions of their organizations' capability to capitalize on opportunities.
The negative relationship between flexibility and the threat interpretation variables
was supported, but flexibility was not significantly related to any of the opportunity
variables. Moreover, flexibility was significantly negatively related to search for new
data. Thus, the pattern is very much the same as for general information acquisition
frequency, which supports the interpretation of an uncertainty reducing effect that
might decrease managers' awareness of and attention to the environment.
To some extent, the findings that participation is positively related to controllability
and flexibility is negatively related threat interpretation, echo the findings of Thomas
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and McDapiel (1990;1991). Using neutral stimulus material, a single threat-
opportunity scale and an aggregated measure of information processing structure, they
found that rich information processing structures (Le. high participation, flexibility
and interaction) were positively related to opportunity interpretation. Thus, as
suggested by Thomas and McDaniel (1990;1991), the explanation might be that rich
information processing structures enhance team information capacities "and hence
reduce uncertainty (Duncan 1974) and information overload (Mintzberg 1983) and
increase the ability to cope with stress and anxiety (Eisenhardt 1989). Additionally,
participation in decision making has been found to be rather strongly related to team
or group members' satisfaction (Black and Gregersen 1997;Miller and Monge 1986).
Hence, an alternative explanation is that positive attitudes and emotions due to high
levels of participation increase controllability.
Table 8.3: Overview of significant findings for TMT information processing structure
Participation Flexibility
All Small Large All Small Large
Effect valence
Positive-gain
Controllability
Opportunity-extremity
Negative-loss
Uncontrollability
Threat-extremity
Issue sorting
Operational importance (-)
Strategic importance (-)
Unfeasibility
Causal understanding
Free papers
Market, competition, ..
Datasearch
Coredata
Additional data
New data
(+/-): p < .15; +/-: p < .10; ++1--: p < .05; +++1---: p < .01
Shaded area: Significant findings in the hypothesized direction
While Thomas and McDaniel (1991) found rich information processing structures to
be positively related to managers' data search, the data in the present study shows a
negative relationship between flexibility and search for new data. Thus, even if rich
information processing structures enhance team information capacities and that
managers then can attend to more variables and consider each variable more fully
during interpretation (Thomas and McDaniel 1990), they don't necessarily search for
more information. On the contrary, high levels of flexibility might reduce managers'
uncertainty to an extent that creates a sense of mastery and control and a feeling that
they have processed the needed information. This might explain why flexibility as
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well as general information acquisition frequency reduces both threat interpretations
and data search, Finally, it is not possible to rule out an information overload
explanation where rich information processing structures together with large flows of
information may lead to increased confidence and satisfaction among managers (e.g.
O'Reilly 1980).
Table 8.4: Hypotheses and results for TMT information processing structure and strategic issue diagnosis
Hypotheses TMTIPS Strategic issue diagnosis H R Sample and significance level
H2aEVI Participation Positive-gain + O
Flexibility + O
H2hEVi Participation Controllability + + Large firms*
Flexibility +' O
H2CEVI Participation Opportunity-extremity O
Flexibility O
H2aEV2 Participation Negative-loss O
Flexibility Small firms*
H2bEV2 Participation Uncontrollability O
Flexibility Small** and large* firms
H2cEV2 Participation Threat-extremity O
Flexibility Small firms*
H2a,s Participation Operational importance + Small firms+
Flexibility + O
H2b,s Participation Strategic importance + Small firms+
Flexibility + Large firms**
H2c,s Participation Unfeasibility + O
Flexibility + + Small firms*
H2acu Participation Free papers + + Small firms**
Flexibility + O
H2bcu Participation Market, comptetion, ... + O
F1exibility + + Total sample only*
H2aos Participation Core data + O
Flexibility + O
H2bos Participation Additional data + O
Flexibility + O
H2cos Participation + O
Flexibility New data + Small*** and large** firms
t: <.15; *: p<.I0; **: p<.05; ***: p<.OI
H: Hypothesized relationship, R: Results
No support was found for a positive relationship between neither participation nor
flexibility and issue sorting terms of operational and strategic importance. Contrary to
what was expected, participation was negatively related to issue sorting in terms of
operational and strategic importance among managers in small firms, and flexibility is
negatively related to strategic importance among managers in large firms. The only
significant positive finding with regard to TMT information processing structure
variables and issue sorting, is that between flexibility and unfeasibility among
managers in large firms. With regard to causal understanding, support was found for a
positive relationship between participation and causal understanding of free papers for
small firms and between flexibility and causal understanding of the market,
competition and attribution of newspaper success for the total sample. It is difficult to
find a pattern in the relationships between information processing structure on one
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side, and issue sorting and causal understanding on the other. However, while the
results are mixed for issue sorting, the information processing structure variables
appear to have positive effects on causal understanding, potentially because they
equip managers with environmental knowledge and a wide set of cause-and-effect
relationships. Table 8.4 sums up the testing of the hypotheses between top
management team information processing structure and strategic issue diagnosis.
8.3 Cognitive style and strategic issue diagnosis
As can be seen from table 8.5, the three cognitive style variables produced several
significant findings, although not exclusively in the hypothesized direction.
Table 8.5: Overview of significant findings for cognitive style
Exploration Social complexity Differentiation
All Small Large All Small Large All Small Large
Effect valence
Positive-gain
Controllability
Opportunity-extremity
Negative-loss
Uncontrollability (+)
Threat-extremity +
Issue sorting
Operational importance
Strategic importance
Unfeasibility
Causal understanding
Free papers
Market, competition, ..
Datasearch
Core data
Additional data
New data
(+)
++
(+)
(+) ..
p < +/-: p < p < p <
Shaded area: Significant findings in the hypothesized direction
With regard to effect valence, it was expected that the cognitive style variables would
be positively related to positive-gain and negative-loss interpretations, and negatively
related to the rest of the effect valence variables. Exploration is significantly
positively related to all the threat interpretation variables in the small firm sample,
while differentiation is significantly positively related io positive-gain and
opportunity-extremity interpretations in the same subsample. These finding might
suggest that explorers and "differentiators" are more inclined to recognize a wider set
of implications of issues than managers low on exploration and differentiation.
However, while explorers demonstrate such issue sensitiveness for threats,
differentiators are more sensitive to opportunities. The finding that these cognitive
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style variables seem to be more important predictors of effect valence in small firms
than in large firms, is in line with research that suggest that inertial forces like size
reduce managerial discretion since managers in large firms operate under more severe
constraints (e.g. Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996). However, for social complexity and
for the remaining strategic issue diagnosis variables, this is not the case. While
exploration and differentiation are significantly related to effect valence in the small
firm sample, social complexity is negativelyand significantly related to all threat
interpretation variables in the large firm sample. Thus, the three cognitive style
variables have rather different impact on effect valence.
Turning to issue sorting and causal understanding, support for a positive relationship
between exploration and issue sorting in terms of operational importance (in the large
firm sample) and strategic importance (in both subsamples) were found. Moreover, in
the large firm sample, exploration is positively related to nuances in causal
understanding of the market, competition and attribution of newspaper success. To
some extent, the openness, flexibility and novelty seeking of explorers (Martinsen
1995) might explain why exploration seems to facilitate issue sorting and causal
understanding. Being less bound by rules and existing schemas, managers with
explorative cognitive styles might go beyond simple categories and surface
characteristics of issues and engage in more mindful information processing than
assimilators (those low on exploration). Consequently, they might be better able to
recognize subtle differences between developments, trends or events in issue sorting
and be open to multiple cause-effect relationships in causal understanding. Finally,
the finding that differentiation is positively related to nuanced casual causal
understanding of free papers, supports previous findings that cognitively complex
managers are more likely to redefine problems rather than accept them exactly as
presented (Lepsinger et al. 1989; Merron, Fisher, and Torbert 1987) and demonstrate
more tolerance for ambiguity and diversity (Streufert, Streufert, and Castore 1968)
than cognitively less complex managers.
Finally, differentiation is relatively strongly positively related to data search. Thus,
the present investigation supports previous findings in the laboratory on the link
between cognitive complexity and data search. Besides, differentiation seems to be a
stronger predictor for additional data and new data than core data. Although this
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picture is not very clear, the findings do not rule out the suggestion that cognitively
complex managers not only search for more data, but also that they are more actively
oriented and search for more novel data (e.g. Streufert and Swezey 1986).
Hypotheses Cognitive style
Table .8.6:Hypotheses and results for cognitive style and strategic issue diagnosis
H R Sample ·and significance levelStrategic issue diagnosis
H3aevl Exploration
Social complexity
Differentiation
H3bevl Exploration
Social complexity
Differentiation
H3cEVI Exploration
Social complexity
Differentiation
H3aEVl Exploration
Social complexity
Differentiation
Exploration
Social complexity
Differentiation
Exploration
Social complexity
Differentiation
H3bev2
Positive-gain
Controllability
Opportunity-extremity
Negative-loss
Uncontrollability
Threat-extremity
+
+
+
O
O
+ Small firms**
O
+ Small firms+
O
O
O
+ Small firms**
+ Small firms**+
+
+
Large firms* *
O
+ Small firms+
+/- Small] (+), large* (-)
O
+ Small firms*
Large firms*
O
H3als Exploration
Social complexity
Differentiation
H3b1s Exploration
Social complexity
Differentiation
H3cIs Exploration
Social complexity
Differentiation
H3acu Exploration
Social complexity
Differentiation
H3bcu Exploration
Social complexity
Differentiation
H3aos Exploration
Social complexity
Differentiation
H3bos Exploration
Social complexity
Differentiation
H3cos Exploration
Social complexity
Differentiation
Operational importance
Strategic importance
Unfeasability
Free papers
Market, comptetion, ...
Core.data
Additional data
New data
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ Large firms*
O
O
+ Small* and large** firms
O
O
O
O
O
+
+
+
+
+
+
O
O
+ Large firms**
+ Large firms***
O
O
O
O
O
+
+
+
+
+
+
O
+ Large firms+
+ Small firms*
O
O
+ Large firms**
O
O
+ Small+ and large* firms
t: <.15; *: p<.I0; **: p<.05; ***: p<.OI
H: Hypothesized relationship, R: Results
To summarize, while previous studies occupied with effect valence variables have
found that individual characteristics do not play a significant role in strategic issue
diagnosis (e.g. Schneider and DeMeyer 1991; Thomas, Clark, and Gioia 1993;
Thomas, Shankster, and Mathieu 1994), the present study demonstrates that cognitive
style might. be related to effect valence as well as other forms of strategic issue
diagnosis. Moreover, except from effect valence, most significant findings are in
hypothesized direction. Thus, cognitive styles, particularly exploration and
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differentiation, seem to be important predictors of strategic issue diagnosis.
Furthermore, and contrary to what was suggested by Hitt and Tyler (1991), these
findings indicate that selection and socialization processes for top management
positions do not narrow individual cognitive differences between managers to an
extent where "managers do not matter". Table 8.6 provides an overview of all
hypotheses between cognitive styles and strategic issue diagnosis.
8.4 Relative andmoderating effects
The' results of the hierarchical regression analyses suggest that the contextual
variables do a better job in predicting strategic issue diagnosis than the cognitive
variables. Particularly, the contextual variables seem to be important predictors of
effect valence for managers in small firms. But, the hypotheses testing of single
independent variables demonstrated that two of the cognitive variables, exploration
and differentiation, were good predictors of strategic issue diagnosis, particularly in
relation to issue sorting, causal understanding and data search. Relatively weaker
relationships between these two cognitive variables and effect valence might be
explained by two related mechanisms. First, the "organizational lenses" provided by
the organizational context might simply overshadow individual characteristics during
strategic interpretation of opportunities and threats (Thomas, Shankster, and Mathieu
1994). Second, categorization of issues in terms of threats and opportunities might
represent a relatively simpler cognitive task than issue sorting, causal understanding
and data search do, and therefore be less influenced by variation in cognitive styles.
Nevertheless, contrary to previous findings and assumptions, the present investigation
clearly demonstrates that individual differences in terms of cognitive styles do playa
significant role in strategic issue diagnosis.
Turning to the question of whether the effects of the cognitive variables are
moderated by the level of the contextual variables, the moderated regression analysis
suggests that such moderating effects exist. Besides, the subsample analysis revealed
a relatively clear pattern in the large firm sample that calls for further speculation.
Twenty out of twenty-three significant moderating effects found in the large firm
sample suggested that high levels of organizational information processing had
detrimental effects on the relationship between the cognitive variables on one side,
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and effect valence and issue sorting on the other. This finding might suggest an
information overload effect. Consequences of information overload include
satisfaction, confidence, lack of accurate identification of relevant cues and loss of
priorities (e.g. O'Reilly 1980; Schick, Gordon, and Haka 1990), which may be
consistent with decreased and negative effect valence and reduced ability to
differentiate between strategic issues.
In the large firm sample, all of the contextual variables, except from customer
information acquisition frequency and use, seem to have the same effect on the
. .
relationship between the cognitive variables and strategic issue diagnosis. According
to theory, it is not surprising that general information acquisition frequency and
information availability might create information overload effects (e.g. Schneider
1988). However, existing theories suggest that high participation and flexibility in top
management team information processing structures increase the team' s capacity to
process non-routine information (Duncan 1973; Duncan 1974; Galbraith 1973) and
make the members of such teams less vulnerable to information overload (e.g.
Mintzberg 1983). On the other hand, increased capacity to process information
facilitates or impedes the use of data, stimuli, information and perspectives in
strategic issue diagnosis (e.g. Daft and Lengel 1986; Thomas and McDaniel 1990;
Thomas, McDaniel, and Anderson 1991). Thus, high flexibility and participation
might create a context where the volume and differentiation of information exceeds
managers' ability to effectively process that information.
Given that information overload is a possible explanation of the pattern obtained in
the data, why would this be a problem for managers with high levels of exploration
and differentiation? Early interactive complexity theory (Schroder, Driver, and
Streufert 1967) assumed that more cognitively complex individuals will perform
optimally at a higher level of information load than less complex individuals.
Similarly, Streufert and Swezey (1986) suggested, that where the abilities, limitations,
and styles of individuals match an organization's characteristics and needs, the liaison
between person and organization will more likely be happy and productive. Hence, it
would be expected that high levels of cognitive complexity and high levels of
organizational information processing create an effective combination. However, the
data in the present study suggest otherwise. In contexts characterized by high
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information load, managers with high levels of differentiation might seek more
information than they can effectively process. Supporting this assumption, the
hypothesis testing demonstrated that differentiation was positively related to data
search, and table 7.18 revealed that this relationship (for additional data and new data)
was stronger for high levels of organizational information processing (flexibility). At
the same time, high levels of organizational information processing seem to have a
negative effect on these managers' effect valence and issue sorting. Thus, among
large firms, managers with high levels of differentiation might experience information
overload under conditions of high levels of the organizational information processing.
The tendency to seek more than optimal levels of information can not explain
decreased effect valence, reduced ability to differentiate between strategic issues and
reduced data search for high levels of organizational information processing among
explorers. The finding that exploration is not significantly related to the data search
variables and that explorers search for less data for high levels of organizational
information processing, suggests an alternative explanation. A possible suggestion is
that the uncertainty reducing effect of two of the scanning variables (information
availability and general information acquisition frequency) and the information
processing structures variables discussed earlier, reduces the openness, flexibility and
novelty seeking behavior of explorers. Exploration is a cognitive style measure of
preferences for problem solving, opening up -for influence of other styles than the
most preferred one. Perhaps conditions of high organizational information processing
may lead to a shift away from an explorative style. Consequently; under such
conditions explorers might have confidence in their organization's ability to deal with
or control the environment and invest less cognitive effort in understanding strategic
issues. This more subtle kind of information overload might have the same
consequences as indicated above, i.e. lack of accurate identification of relevant cues
and loss of priorities, in addition to restricted information. processing behavior
(Schneider 1988). An information overload effect based on variations in cognitive
.effort might correspond with previous findings that demonstrate that explorers do
better for both practical (Martinsen 1993) and analytic insight problems (Martinsen
1994) when they have less rather than more relevant experience.
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The interactive effects discussed here were found in the large firm sample and for all
moderating variables except from customer information acquisition frequency and
use. In the small firm sample, it is harder to find any clear pattern. Only fourteen out
of twenty-six interactive effects show the same pattern as in the large firm sample, i.e.
a decreasing effect of exploration and differentiation on the dependent variables for
high values of the organizational information processing variables. It is possible that
information overload effects might be less prominent among small firms since they
scan the environment less extensively than large firms do. However, managers in
small firms report higher levels of participation and roughly the same level of
flexibility as managers in large firms (see table 1 in appendix B). Thus, one would
expect that participation and flexibility moderates the relationships between the
cognitive variables and dependent variables in the same pattern for small firms as for
large firms. For both participation and exploration, this is the case for three out of four
moderating effects. Thus, it is not unlikely that the interaction between the cognitive
variables and the information processing structure variables have an information
overload effect. Moreover, three out of four moderating effects of customer
information acquisition frequency and use have the opposite effect on the relationship
between the cognitive variables and the dependent variables. Thus, it is possible that
the interaction between this scanning variable and the cognitive variables is less likely
to produce information overload effect. Furthermore, information availability seems
to be .an important moderator for exploration in the small firm sample. First, the
positive relationships between exploration and positive-gain and exploration and
negative-loss are higher in the low information availability group than in the high
information availability group. Second, the significant positive relationship between
exploration and causal understanding of free papers in the low information
availability group is significantly negative in the high information availability group.
Thus, exploration seems to have positive effects on positive-gain, negative-loss and
causal understanding of free papers for low levels of information availability, while
these relationships turn negative or become weaker for high levels of information
availability, thus supporting the information overload hypothesis. Finally, the
relationship between differentiation and causal understanding is moderated by several
contextual variables without providing any clear pattern.
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In conclusion, except from customer information acquisition frequency and use, it
seems that high levels of organizational information processing might have a negative
impact on the effect of the cognitive variables on effect valence and issue sorting.
This potential effect might be explained by information overload and seems most
likely to take place in large firms.
8.5 Comments on organizational size
Organizational size was originally not included as an independent variable in the
present investigation. However, due to its empirically demonstrated importance in
relation to strategic issue diagnosis, the direct and moderating effects of
organizational size are briefly summarized and discussed below.
As far as directs effects are concerned, organizational size seems to enhance
opportunity interpretation (particularly controllability) and causal understanding of
the market, competition and attribution of success. This finding may be explained by
the advantages usually associated with large size, i.e. economies of scale, experience,
diversity, brand name recognition, market power and organizational slack (e.g.
Bourgeois 1981; Chen and Hambrick 1995; Hambrick, MacMillan, and Day 1982;
Thomas, Shankster, and Mathieu 1994; Woo and Cooper 1981). Moreover, it
contradicts the finding. that that large firms are more likely to perceive threat and
small firms more likely to perceive opportunity (Denison et al. 1996). Therefore, the
results obtained in the present study also question the explanations that threat
orientation can be traced to internal complexity (e.g. Lant, Milliken, and Batra 1992)
and that opportunity orientation is enhanced by structural simplicity (e.g. Ketchen,
Thomas, and McDanieI1996).
Turning to moderating effects, a more complex picture emerges. First, the influence
of organizational size on some strategic issue diagnosis variables appears to be
different for small and large firms. For instance, size seems to positively influence
issue sorting (operation importance and unfeasibility) for small firms, and negatively
influence issue sorting (strategic importance) for large firms. Thus,' for small firms,
increasing size seems to enhance the ability to differentiate between issues in terms of
operational importance and unfeasibility. For large firms, increasing size appears to
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decrease this ability in terms of strategic importance. Hence, it seems that managers in
medium sized firms are more selective in terms of sorting the wheat from the chaff in
strategic issue diagnosis. Possibly, managers in very small firms to a greater extent
see issues as equally (un)important and (un)feasible due to the resource constraints,
workload and lack of strategic planning (e.g. Wilberg 1994a). Similarly, the same
pattern may emerge in very large firms due to greater diversity in terms of the
complexity and volume of their activities (e.g. Thomas, Shankster, and Mathieu
1994).
Furthermore, it appears to be a general pattern that the relationships between the
scanning variables and strategic issue diagnosis (especially effect valence and data
search) are much stronger for small firms than for large firms. A possible explanation
for this pattern is that the level of organizational scanning is generally higher among
large firms and that the variation in scanning between firms is smaller among large
than small firms (see table 1 in appendix B). Another possibility is that large firms
pay less attention to environmental developments, trends and events due to
complacency, inertia, insularity and resistance to adaptation (Aldrich and Auster
1986; Chen and Hambrick 1995; Hannan and Freeman 1984; March 1981). However,
the fact that managers in large firms report significantly higher levels of effect
valence than managers in small firms (see table 1 in appendix B), and the direct
effects of organizational size on opportunity interpretation, contradict such an
explanation.
Finally, the detrimental influence of high levels on organizational information
processing (except customer information acquisition and use) on the relationship
between the cognitive variables and strategic issue diagnosis was consistent only in
the large firm sample. This would suggest that information overload might be a
problem mainly in large firms, possibly because it is in these firms that combinations
of high levels of information processing and differentiators/explorers are found.
8.6 Implications for theory
In response to the general research question raised in the present study, the conclusion
is that the cognitive styles of managers, the information processing structure of an
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organization's top management tearn, and the organizational scannmg of an
organization, each uniquely affect managers' strategic issue diagnosis. This finding
suggests that any attempt to explain or predict managers' strategic issue diagnosis is
incomplete unless it addresses sources of influence from different levels of analysis.
In addition to this general implication, the most important of the more specific
contributions and implications are highlighted below.
The importance o/ cognitive styles in strategic issue diagnosis
Previous studies have established the. importance of the organizational and group
contexts on strategic issue diagnosis (e.g. Denison et al. 1996; Thomas and McDaniel
1990; Thomas, Shankster, and Mathieu 1994) but have not found any effects of
individual characteristics. Hence, the present investigation contributes to strategic
issue diagnosis research by empirically demonstrating the importance of cognitive
variables. Specifically, it was found that the cognitive variables were relatively more
important predictors of issue sorting, causal understanding and data search, than of
effect valence. A potential explanation of this finding it that categorization of issues in
terms of threats and opportunities represents a relatively simpler cognitive task than
issue sorting, causal understanding and data search do, and therefore is less influenced
by differences in cognitive styles.
Forms and functions a/organizational scanning and strategic issue diagnosis
Previous scanning literature has mainly been occupied with individual and/or problem
oriented modes of scanning, or to assess the state-of-the-art of organizational scanning
arnong different organizations. Hence, the present study adds directly to this literature
as well as to strategic issue diagnosis research by investigation institutionalized and
monitoring modes of organizational scanning as an antecedent to strategic issue
diagnosis. Overall, the main contribution is that the three organizational scanning
variables seems to be important predictors of all the strategic Issue diagnosis
variables.
Descriptive as well as normative literature stress the importance of monitoring and
analyzing the external environment in order to provide early warning signals from
emerging developments, trends and events, to create a better understanding of the
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environment, and to increase organizational responsiveness (e.g. Daft and Weick
1984; Stoffels 1994). However, the data in the present investigation suggests that not
all forms of scanning fulfill these purposes. At least for two of the dependent
variables, effect valence and data search, it seems that only the most directed and
delimitated form of scanning has such an effect. On the other hand, the scanning
variables related to broader information categories and to simply the availability of
information seem to reduce managers' uncertainty about the environment. Thus, when
Hambrick (1982) suggests that the significance of organizational scanning derives
from the notion that managers can only interpret, disseminate and analyze data and
stimuli that enter the organization, findings from the present study suggest the
managers' environmental uncertainty might also be reduced by simply knowing that
information is available or that information acquisition is being taken care of and
institutionalized.
Moreover, the data analysis suggests that the uncertainty reducing effect might
actually decrease managers' awareness and attention. This interpretation fit in with
the negative relationships between general information acquisition frequency and the
level of flexibility in the top management team on the one side, and threat
interpretation and data search on the other. Additionally, the interactive effects of the
two scanning variables related to broader information categories and to the
availability of information and the two information processing structure variables on
the relationship between cognitive style and effect valence and issue sorting, also
lends support to such an effect of uncertainty reduction. Although these two quite
different functions of organizational scanning (uncertainty reduction and attention)
have been discussed in the literature (e.g. Huber and Daft 1987), an empirical study
demonstrating different functions of different forms of scanning seems to be a novel
contribution.
Interactions of cognitive and contextual variables and strategic issue diagnosis
.In addition to demonstrating that antecedents at different levels of analysis influence
strategic issue diagnosis, the present study contributes. to the literature by exploring
interactions between cognitive and contextual variables.
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First, taken the conservative method applied in order to detect interactive effects into
consideration, it might be concluded that the effect of the cognitive variables on
strategic issue diagnosis is moderated by contextual variables at the group and
organizational level. Second, at least for managers in large firms, there seem to be a
consistent pattern in the nature of the moderating effects. Specifically, high levels of
organizational information processing (with the exception of the most directed and
delimitated scanning variable) tends to systematically detriment the effects of
differentiation and exploration on effect valence and issue sorting. This finding may
be explained by an information overload effect, which fit in with the uncertainty and
attention reducing effects of two of the scanning variables and the information
processing structure variables discussed above.
Extending previous conceptualizations of strategic issue diagnosis
The present study contributes to the issue interpretation literature by extending
previous conceptualizations of strategic issue diagnosis. First, the examination of
threat and opportunity as separate dimensions revealed asymmetric results with
respect to several independent variables. Typically, while some independent variables
predicted opportunity interpretation (information availability, participation and
differentiation) others predicted threat interpretation (general information acquisition
frequency, flexibility, exploration and social complexity). Thus, future researchers
should include both scales in studying effect valence.
The inclusion of several strategic issue diagnosis dimensions adds to the existing
literature by linking strategic issue diagnosis closer to effectiveness in strategic
decision making. Particularly issue sorting and causal understanding are diagnosis
dimensions that could be interpreted normatively, i.e. that it is important for managers
to sort the wheat from the chaff in the fields of potential issues facing managers and
that nuanced causal understanding in terms of being open to multiple cause-effect
relationships will most likely be more effective than understanding issues in terms of
universal, unambiguous or simple one-to-one causal relationships. Additionally, since
the raw material of interest in strategic issue diagnosis .is complex and unique
environmental situations that are difficult to isolate and understand, it is reasonable to
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assume that the use of large amounts and different types of data will improve strategic
issue diagnosis.
8.7 Implications for practice
The findings of this research may also have implications for executives and decision-
makers. First, since organizational and group contexts influence strategic issue
diagnosis and both organizational scanning and the structure of the top management
team are administrative controllable phenomena, top managers may benefit by
consciously designing and adjusting these contexts. For instance, normative literature
describes in detail frameworks for designing and managing environmental scanning
systems to capture strategically valuable signals of changes early enough· to gain
advantage from them (e.g. Segev 1977; Stoffels 1994). More specifically, the present
investigation suggests that directed scanning towards the customer sector increase
managers' environmental awareness and attention. On the other hand, scanning
related to broader information categories and to the availability of information, along
with participation and flexibility, seems to reduce uncertainty interms of increasing
controllability interpretation and reducing threat interpretation. Thus, organizational
scanning and the structure of top management teams might be adjusted according to
different levels of environmental turbulence to search for a balance between
environmental awareness and uncertainty reduction. However, it should be noted that
directed scanning towards the customer sector is the only contextual variable that
seems to increase managers' .awareness and attention. Hence, to search for such a
balance, top managers should pay particular attention to this kind of scanning, an
implication that might be particularly relevant for small firms. Moreover, the strong
indications of an uncertainty reducing effect of general information, information
availability, participation and flexibility, with the possible implication of
overconfidence, must be kept in mind. This is particularly important in an
"information revolution age" where the Internet and different executive information .
systems (EIS) make almost unimaginable amounts of information available to
managers.
Another implication of the finding that organizational and group contexts influence
strategic issue diagnosis, is that top managers can consider the use of systematic
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process aids (e.g. devil's advocacy and dialectical inquiry (Cosier and Schwenk 1990;
Schweiger, Sandberg, and Rechner 1989» to improve the level of independence of
issue interpretation from the context in which managers are embedded (e.g. Denison,
Hooijberg, and Quinn 1995).
Finally, the finding that differentiation and exploration predicts strategic Issue
diagnosis signal that recruitment, carrier development and training policies in
organizations might pay more attention to cognitive styles. For instance,
"differentiators" seems to be opportunity oriented, nuanced in causal understanding
and have strong preferences for information, while explorers tends to be threat
oriented, able to discriminate among issues and nuanced in causal understanding.
Thus, a top management team consisting of some managers with high levels of
exploration and some with high levels of differentiation might constitute a fruitful mix
of information processing strategies. However, top managers of large firms should be
aware of the possibility of an information overload effect under conditions of high
levels of organizational information processing.
8.8 Validity of findings
This study has several limitations that should be considered when interpreting the
results obtained. Below, these limitations are considered along four dimensions of
validity; statistical conclusion validity, internal validity, construct validity of putative
causes and effects, and external validity (Cook and Campbell 1979).
8.8.1 Statistical conclusion validity
Statistical conclusion validity refers to the approximate validity of results based on the
sensitivity and statistical power of the performed analyses. Hence, it refers to
inferences about whether it is reasonable to presume covariation between variables
(Cook and Campbell 1979).
Among the threats to statistical conclusion validity discussed .by Cook and Campbell
(1979) is low statistical power. Given the number of respondents and the indication
and discussion of findings with significance levels lower than 15%, the regression
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analyses on the full sample should have sufficient statistical power l l both in terms of
testing R2 and individual independent variables (Cohen and Cohen 1983; Tabachnick
and FidelI 1996). However, based on a "critical-n-analysis", the splitting of the
sample into small and large firms should substantially lower the power of the
analyses. On the other hand, the sample split was conducted due to different
relationships between some of the independent and dependent variables for different
levels of organizational size. Thus, analyzing small and large firms separately made
some of the bivariate relationships closer to the assumptions of linearity and generally
improved estimation as indicated by improvements in R2 as well as increasing the
. .
magnitude of several relationships.
Low reliability of measures is another threat to statistical conclusion validity since it
inflates error variance and decreases the chance of obtaining true differences (Cook
and Campbell 1979; Peter 1979). Although some of the measures suffered from less
than ideal coefficient alphas, they were acceptable for explorative and theoretical
purposes according to most conventions and standards.
Moreover, the selection of a homogeneous respondent population (the Norwegian
newspaper industry) eliminated error variance due to industry characteristics. Thus, in
conclusion, the likelihood of making Type II errors (making incorrect no-difference
conclusions) should 'not be considered as a serious threat to statistical conclusion
validity. Besides, in the discussion of the results, lack of empirical support for
hypotheses has not been treated as verification of the null hypothesis or falsification
of theoretical relationships.
Finally, anotherthreat to statistical conclusion validity that should be discussed is the
likelihood of falsely concluding that covariation exists when it does not (Type I error) .
.In this respect, the indication and discussion of findings with .significance levels lower
than 15% and several instances of insignificant regression models clearly represent
threats to statistical conclusion validity. On the other hand, the discussion of the
results obtained has mainly focused on consistent patterns of findings, i.e. across the
liAs a rough indication; a power value of .95 for the F test of the significance of R2 with eight
independent variables requires a sample size of 138, given a significance criterion of .05 and a
167
two subsamples or consistent patterns for individual independent or dependent
variables.
8.8.2 Internal validity
Although the hypotheses in the present study only predicted covariation between
variables, the theoretical interest is in casual relationships. Internal validity refers to
the approximate validity with which statements can be made about whether there is a
causal relationship from one variable to another in the form in which the variables
were manipulated "ormeasured (Cook and Campbell 1979). Thus, having" established
that several of the independent and dependent variables covary, it remains to be
discussed whether it can be inferred that the observed relationships are causal."
Generally, it is difficult to determine the internal validity of a cross sectional study. It
does not permit formal test of causality since causes and effects are not separated in
time and because all other factors can not be ruled out as rival explanations of
observed associations between independent .and dependent variables. Thus, the
strongest proof of time order in the present study have to be based on previous theory
and empirical research that posit an association between conceptually similar
variables (e.g. Hitt and Tyler 1991; Thomas, Clark, and Gioia 1993; Thomas and
McDaniel 1990; Thomas, Shankster, and Mathieu 1994). However, previous research
does not rule out the possibility that strategic issue diagnosis influences organizational
scanning, information processing structure of top management teams, and managers'
cognitive styles. It simply provides arguments that the opposite direction of causal
influence is more plausible.
An obvious threat to the internal validity of the present investigation is the clear
limitations in terms of controlling for the possibility that relevant third variables may
affect relations between independent and dependent variables. The single control
variable included does not rule out the effects of known and unknown third variables
that might be related to the relations under investigation. Hence, it must be concluded
population effect size of .15 (Cohen and Cohen 1983).
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that it cannot be unambiguously inferred that the observed relationships are causal in
the hypothesized direction.
8.8.3 Construct validity of putative causes and effects
The construct validity of putative causes and effects-refers to the approximate validity
with which we can generalize from the employed research operations to the higher-
order constructs of interest (Cook and Campbell 1979). Hence, the question of
construct validity is not limited to the discussion of different methods for estimating
degrees of validity after an instrument has been used to collect data. Rather, it is
concerned with the whole research process from planning to data analyses and tests of
measures (Cook and Campbell 1979).
Following established frameworks for the measurement process (Churchill 1979;
Fredrickson 1986b), efforts were made at a~li1evlng higlvi:~=~Tty;, This is a
.>---~--"7-qualitative type of validity where the domain of a construct is made clear and the
analyst judges whether the measures fully represent the domain (Bollen 1989).
Particularly, the measurement process aimed at combining input from theory and
industry expertise in order to bridge the gap between theory and respondents (see
paragraph 5.4), i.e. between research operations and the higher-order constructs of
interest.
With respect to convergent and discriminant validity, which are important elements of
Construct v~i~t~lCook and Campbell 1979), factor analyses and reliability analyses
-"'-,-----, ..,<-'-~~'-
of the multidimensional constructs were conducted as a proximation to the assessment
of these forms of validity. While reliability analysis does not assess the convergence
of results across methods, it provides some evidence on convergent validity as it
estimates convergence across different variations of the same method represented by
items with different wordings tapping into different parts of the construct domains
(Lines 1992). Furthermore, the patterns of factor loadings may be tak-en as indicators
of whether items reflect different dimensions of constructs in a way which is
postulated by theory (e.g. Carmines and Zeller 1979; Dess and Beard 1984; Nunnally
and Bernstein 1994) ..
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Despite the efforts described above, other threats to construct validity may be
identified. First, since data on all (at different levels of analysis) variables were
collected from the same respondents with the same questionnaire, there is a possibility
of mono-method bias. Thus, collecting data using multiple measures from multiple
respondents would probably have strengthened the study. On the other hand, to
strengthen the conformity between the conceptual and empirical level when
measuring organizational scanning and the information processing structure of top
management team, questions directed respondents' attention to the group and
organizationallevel respectively. Besides, the extent of agreement among managers
from the same organizations and top management teams were assessed and found
acceptable. It should also be noted that data on most of the dependent variables relied
on questionnaire responses to hypothetical, though very realistic, cases, not through
actually observing managers' strategic issue diagnosis. Moreover, since single case
scenarios were used to measure several dependent variables and the content of the
case scenarios might have influenced managers' responses, mono-operation bias may
threaten the construct validity. Hence, using several case scenarios to measure each
strategic issue diagnosis variable would have strengthened the present research.
However, due to the already heavy demand placed on respondents in terms of time
needed to complete the questionnaire (see appendix A), this option was ruled out.
As a general conclusion on problems related to variance attributable to measurement
methods and operations -rather than the variables of interest in self-report
questionnaires, resent research suggests that percept-percept inflation may be more
the exception than the rule (Crampton and Wagner 1994; Spector 1987).
8.8.4 External validity
External validity refers to the approximate validity with which conclusions can be
drawn about the generalizability of the inferred relationships to and across
populations of persons, settings, and times (Cook and Campbell 1979)",
The first question is whether the results obtained can be generalized to Norwegian
newspaper managers. Since respondents from 73 out of 106 newspaper firms with a
circulation of more than 5000 were included, and the non-responding newspaper firms
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did not differ much from the responding firms with regard to size and competitive
posture, the results should be representative for managers employed in Norwegian
newspaper with a circulation ofmore than 5000. Since some of the case scenarios are
of current interest, and due the changes in information technology combined with the
interest in organizational information processing in the present investigation, the
generalizability across time is more questionable. Nevertheless, the reason to conduct
a single-industry study was not to be able to generalize to that particular industry, but
rather to improve statistical conclusion validity (by eliminating error variance due to
industry characteristics) and construct validity of putative causes and effects (by
improving measurement).
The most interesting question, however, is to what extent the results can be
generalized to managers across industries. Unfortunately, this question is difficult to
answer. The newspaper industry is an intriguing industry and it is difficult to rule out
the possibility that the investigated relationships may differ in other types of
industries as well as in other countries. Thus, future studies should use the present
findings to guide research conducted in several industries to test generalizability.
Finally, relationships and mechanisms between strategic issue diagnosis and different
contextual variables have previously been found for managers in different industries
and contexts like hospitals (Thomas, Clark, and Gioia 1993; Thomas and McDaniel
1990), colleges and universities (e.g. Gioia and Thomas 1996; Thomas, Shankster,
and Mathieu 1994), as well as across industries (e.g. Denison et al. 1996). In this
respect, the present study contributes to the generalizability of the field of strategic
issue diagnosis research.
8.9 Suggestions and opportunities for further research
Finally, some suggestions and opportunities are discussed that may provide some
directions for future attempts at building a richer or a more precise understanding of
strategic issue diagnosis.
First, cognitive variables were found to be important predictors of strategic issue
diagnosis. An implication of this finding is that future strategic issue diagnosis
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research should not replace cognitive variables with demographic variables - or at
least not conclude that individual characteristics do not matter if only demographic
variables are examined. Moreover, an interesting topic for future studies on the
relative influence of individual and contextual variables is to include different
dimensions of strategic issue diagnosis that vary in terms of the cognitive load they
place on managers. Hence, the proposition that cognitive variables are relatively more
important predictors for complex strategic issue diagnosis than less complex forms of
sensemaking could be more thoroughly explored.
The present study did not measure cognitive integration, which is considered the most
promising candidate in predicting an ill-structured managerial task like strategic issue
diagnosis. The most appropriate measure of integration as well as differentiation,
known as the "Sentence Completion Test" or "Paragraph Completion Test", is
sensitive to test time limitations and should only be used when the researcher has
controlover respondents (Streufert and Nogarni 1989). Thus, smaller scale studies
using this instrument is needed to improve the knowledge of potential effects of
managers' cognitive complexity on strategic issue diagnosis.
The data analysis suggests that the uncertainty reducing effects of broader and less
directed organizational scanning and "organic" information processing structures
decrease managerial awareness and attention. Since these findings and speculations
seem most appropriate for only two of the dependent variables (effect valence and
data search), further studies on the relationship between organizational scanning,
strategic issue diagnosis and measures of environmental awareness and attention
should be conducted before any firm conclusion can be drawn on this matter.
Moreover, including organizational responsiveness and action in such studies would
increase our understanding of the effects of organizational scanning as well as the
implicationsof strategic issue diagnosis.
The possibility of an interactive information overload effect has important
implications for cognitive style and complexity research. Specifically, the explorative
findings in the present study might contradict the typical assumption that cognitively
complex individuals perform better at higher levels of information load than less
complex individuals. Hence, further studies on the joint effects of cognitive style and
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complexity variables and information load should be conducted. Given the
complexity of the nature and study of interactive effects, studies where different
levels of load are manipulated experimentally might be particularly interesting in this
regard.
The data analysis did not make clear whether the effect valence extremity variables
really captured overly positive or overly negative interpretations and in consequent
represent counterproductive dimensions of strategic issue diagnosis. Hence, an
interesting topic for further investigations would be to keep trying to link research on
positivity biases (e.g. Dunegan 1994; Gooding and Kinicki 1995), threat-rigidity
effects (e.g. Fitzpatrick and Carroll 1991; Staw 1981) and the influence of positive
versus negative affective states (e.g. Kaufmann and Vosburg 1997) to strategic issue
diagnosis. In general, issue interpretation research would benefit from the
development of "new" dimensions of strategic issue diagnosis and their links to
individual, group and organizational variables. Finally, of critical importance is going
deeper into the question of how different antecedents to strategic issue diagnosis, as
well as different diagnosis dimensions, affect effectiveness in strategic decision
making and organizational performance.
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Bård Kuvaas, Handelshøyskolen BI og Norges Handelshøyskole
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• Denne undersøkelsen har som formål å belyse ulike sider ved hvordan ledere i norske
avisbedrifter vurderer og oppfatter ulike strategiske situasjoner.
• Svarene som avgis i skjemaet vil bli analysert under ett. På denne måten vil det sikres fuU
konfidensialitet.
• Vær vennlig å fyll ut spørreskjemaet i henhold til de instruksjoner som blir gitt underveis. En
hovedregel når du fyller ut, er at den umiddelbare reaksjonen på spørsmålene er den riktigste.
Det skal ikke være nødvendig å skatTe til veie andre opplysinger enn dem man ''har i hodet" for
.å svare på spørsmålene.
• Spørreskjemaet er basert på eksisterende internasjonal forskning og alle spørsmålene er på
forhånd testet ut blant Dere norske avisledere. Fordi du skal svare ved hjelp av faste
svaralternativer, vil du allikevel kunne oppleve at det for noen spørsmål er vanskelig å tinne et
alternativ som stemmer helt overens med din oppfatning eller situasjon. I slike tilfeller er det
viktig at du prøver å velge det svaralternativet som ligger nærmest det du mener er det riktige
svaret for deg, og at du ikke unnlater å svare. Du kan dessuten, dersom du ønsker det, gi
kommentarer eller utfyllende opplysninger på spørreskjemaets siste side.
• Når skjemaet er ferdig utfylt, vær vennlig å returnere det i den vedlagte frankerte
svarkonvolutten. Om du skulle miste denne, vær vennlig å returnere skjemaet til:
Bård Kuvaas
Handelshøyskolen BI
Postboks 580
1361 SANDVIKA
• Dersom du har spørsmål angående undersøkelsen, ta gjerne kontakt på telefon nr. 67 57 09 00,
på fax nr. 67 57 08 54 eller ved hjelp av e-mail adressen "bard.kuvaas@bi.no".
- 1 -
Aller først ønsker vi at du svarer på spørsmål om din stilling, arbeidserfaring, utdannelse, alder og kjønn. Du svarer
ved å sett kryss i den ruta som er riktig eller som passer best og fyller ut for antall år der det spørres om det.
1. Nåværende stilling? (Sett bare ett kryss)
D Ansvarlig redaktør eller sjefredaktør
D Administrerende direktør eller disponent
DEnleder
D Redaksjonell stilling som ikke er ansvarlig redaktør eller sjefredaktør
D Lederstilling som ikke er administrerende direktør eller disponent
D Annet, spesifiser stilling: _
2. Arbeidserfaring?
a) Antall år i nåværende stilling: L..--.-JL....-...JI år
L..--.-JL....-...JI årb) Antall år i nåværende bedrift:
c) Antall år i mediebransjen (trykte medier, TV/radio, reklame, informasjon):
d) Arbeidserfaring fra andre bransjer enn mediebransjen med varighet på minst ett år?
Spesifiser bransje og antall år: _
Spesifiser bransje og antall år: _
Spesifiser bransje og antall år: _
3. Høyeste fullførte utdanning? (Sett bare ett kryss).
D 9-årig grunnskole, real- eller middelskole eller kortere
D Ett eller to-årig videregående skole
D 3-årig videregående skole (gymnas, handelsskole eller yrkesskole)
D Fullført utdanning ved høyskole eller universitet av 1-2 års normert varighet
D Fullført utdanning ved høyskole eller universitet av 3-4 års normert varighet
D Fullført utdanning ved høyskole eller universitet av minst 5-6 års normert varighet
4. Faglig eller tematisk spesialisering på hØyeste fullførte utdanning?
D Journalistikk
D Grafisk
D Samfunnsfag (f.eks. statsvitenskap, sosiologi, historie, sosialøkonomi, jus)
D Bedriftsøkonomi, ledelse eller markedsføring
D Ingeniørfaglig eller naturvitenskapelig
D Annet, spesifiser spesialisering: _
5. Kjønn: MannD Kvinne D 6. Alder:
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Denne delen inneholder 34 utsagn som beskriver forskjellige oppfatninger, preferanser og atferdsmåter i arbeid og
fritid. Noen av utsagnene vil du umiddelbart oppfatte som meget gode beskrivelser av dine oppfatninger, preferanser
eller atferd. Andre vil være meget lite beskrivende og ikke passe i det hele tatt. Atter andre vil oppfattes som
moderat gode eller dårlige beskrivelser. Når du skal ta stilling til utsagene, prøv å tenke deg hvilke oppfatninger,
preferanser og atferds måter du pleier å ha. Du skal altså vurdere om hver av setningene nedenfor MEST TYPISK
eller Ta VANLIG beskriver dine oppfatninger, preferanser og atferd. Sett en sirkel rundt det ene tallet som står i
den kolonnen som passer best for deg. Det er viktig at du besvarer alle spørsmålene.
Passer Passer
svært Passer Passer svært
dårlig dårlig Nø~tral godt godt
1. Jeg foretrekker detaljearbeide som krever god orden 1 2 3 4 5
2. Jeg liker best å arbeide uten å ha en på forhånd fastsatt plan 1 2 3 4 5
3. Jeg prøver meg ofte frem uten å planlegge systematisk 1 2 3 4 5
4. Jeg foretrekker å arbeide uten å ha klare retningslinjer å holde meg til 1 2 3 4 5
5. Jeg liker godt situasjoner hvor det er nødvendig å bryte med aksepterte
oppfatninger 2 3 4 5
6. Jeg kommer best til min rett i situasjoner som er ordnede og
oversiktlige 1 2 3 4 5
7. Jeg foretrekker situasjoner hvor en må arbeide etter bestemte regler 1 2 3 4 5
8. Jeg foretrekker å planlegge og strukturere det jeg skal gjøre 1 2 3 4 5
9. Jeg egner meg best til arbeid som krever systematikk og nøyaktighet 1 2 3 4 5
10. Jeg foretrekker å improvisere i forhold til mine gjøremål 1 2 3 4 5
11. Jeg foretrekker arbeid med faste rutiner 1 2 3 4 5
12. Jeg foretrekker å ha klare retningslinjer å holde meg til i arbeidet 1 2 3 4 5
13. Jeg kommer best til min rett i uoversiktlige situasjoner 1 2 3 4 5
14. Jeg liker best å utforske nytt terreng 1 2 3 4 5
15. Jeg foretrekker situasjoner hvor det finnes ett problem med en mulig
løsning 1 2 3 4 5
16. I sosiale aktiviteter, ved tilstelninger og på jobben, liker jeg å omgås en
person om gangen, og helst en person som er lik meg selv 1 2 3 4 5
17. I sosiale aktiviteter, ved tilstelninger og på jobben, liker jeg å prøve å
blande sammen noe forskjellige personer 1 2 3 4 5
18. I sosiale aktiviteter, ved tilstelninger og på jobben, liker jeg å blande
sammen helt forskjellige personer 1 2 3 4 5
19. Som grunnlag for vennskap, foretrekker jeg personer som likner meg
selv i verdier og oppfatninger 1 ~ 3 4 5
20. Som grunnlag for vennskap, foretrekker jeg personer som er klart
forskjellig fra meg selv i verdier og oppfatninger 1 2 3 4 5
21. Som grunnlag for vennskap, foretrekker jeg en blanding av personer
hvor noen er like og andre ulike meg selv i verdier og oppfatninger 1 2 3 4 5
22. Som grunnlag for vennskap, bruker jeg flere kriterier, hvor likhet i
verdier og oppfatninger ikke er spesielt betydningsfullt for meg 1 2 3 4 5
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Passer Passer
svært Passer Passer svært
dårlig dårlig Nøytral godt godt
23. I valg av omgangskrets, trives jeg sammen med personer som er ganske
lik meg og min egen personlighet 1
24. I valg av omgangskrets, trives jeg sammen med personer med klart
forskjellige personligheter 1
25. I valg av omgangskrets, trives jeg sammen med noen som er like og
noen som er helt ulike 1
26. I valg av omgangskrets, bruker jeg mange kriterier, hvor likhet i
personlighet ikke er spesielt betydningsfullt for meg 1
27. Stilt overfor problemer og situasjoner, hender det ganske ofte at jeg
nøler med å løse problemer som omfatter flere ulike synspunkter 1
28. Stilt overfor problemer og situasjoner, foretrekker jeg ganske ofte
problemer som omfatter flere ulike synspunkter 1
29. Stilt overfor problemer og situasjoner, liker jeg meget godt problemer
som krever flere ulike synspunkter 1
30. I forvirrende og usikre situasjoner, betrakter jeg mange sider ved
problemet, og kommer deretter fram til en foreløpig beslutning som
godt kan bli endret når jeg betrakter problemet på nytt 1
31. Når jeg står overfor en ny eller endret situasjon, unngår jeg vanligvis å
diskutere situasjonen med personer som har andre oppfatninger, siden
dette bare bidrar til å gjøre saken mer uklar 1
32. Når jeg står overfor en ny eller endret situasjon, søker jeg ulike
oppfatninger og foretar som regel flere ulike vurderinger som eventuelt
kan endre mitt opprinnelige syn på saken 1
.33. Når betydelige mengder ny og tilsynelatende motstridende informasjon
kommer frem i en sak hvor jeg har sterke meninger, bruker jeg
informasjonen til å utvikle enda flere synspunkter om saken, som igjen
kan føre til at jeg vil se saken i et annet lys 1
34. Jeg synes det er helt i orden at forskjellige mennesker har ulike
oppfatninger. Jeg synes imidlertid at de oftere burde holde
oppfatningene sine for seg selv og ikke bry andre med dem 1
2 53 4
2 3 54
2 3 4 5
2 3 54
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 53 4
2 3 54
2 3 54
2 3 54
2 53 4
2 53 4
-4-
Denne delen inneholder korte beskrivelser av fire tenkte situasjoner og 9 spørsmål til hver av situasjonene.
Spørsmålene har til hensikt å avdekke din vurdering av hvordan de ulike situasjonene vil ha betydning for din
bedrift. Det finnes med andre ord ingen "riktige" eller "gale" svar.
Vi ønsker at du først leser beskrivelsen av situasjon A og svarer på spørsmålene som følger umiddelbart etter
situasjonsbeskrivelsen - og deretter gjør det samme for situasjon B, C og D. For alle spørsmålene benyttes det en
skala som går fra 1 til 7, hvor 1 betyr "i meget liten grad", og 7 betyr "i meget stor grad" .
. Eksempel: I spørsmål l under, spørres det.om i hvilken grad du tror det vil komme noe fordelaktig ut av situasjon A
for din bedrift. Dersom du tror det i meget stor grad vil komme noe fordelaktig ut av situasjonen for din bedrift, sett
en sirkel rundt tallet 7, dersom du tror det i stor grad vil komme noe fordelaktig ut av situasjonen, sett en sirkel
rundt tallet 6, og dersom du tror det i noe stor grad vil komme noe fordelaktig ut av situasjonen, sett en sirkel rundt
tallet 5. Dersom du er usikker på om det i noe stor eller noe liten grad vil komme noe fordelaktig ut av situasjonen,
sett en sirkel rundt tallet 4, osv.
Situasjon A
Tenk deg følgende situasjon. Stortinget har nylig vedtatt avgiftsreduksjoner på bil og privateiendom. For biler
vil avgiftsreduksjonen tilsvare ca. 12.000 kr. for en gjennomsnittsbil. For privateiendom er det vedtatt at
dokumentavgiften til staten skal reduseres fra 2,5 % av eiendommens omsetningsverdi til 1,5 %. De fleste eksperter
er enige om at avgiftsreduksjonene vil gi klare økninger i omsetningen av biler og privateiendom, og dermed for
volumet av annonser for tilsvarende produkter. I tillegg er hovedkonklusjonene i de siste rapportene fra Norges
Bank og OECD at norsk økonomi vil oppleve en jevn og stabil positiv konjunkturutvikling de nærmeste årene.
For hvert av de 9 spørsmålene under, sett en sirkel rundt det ene tallet som best indikerer din vurdering av hvordan
'Situasjon A vil ha betydning for din bedrift. Det er viktig at du besvarer alle spørsmålene.
I meget I meget
liten stor
grad grad
I hvilken grad ••••
1. tror du det vil komme noe fordelaktig ut av situasjon A for din
bedrift? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. tror du at fremtiden for din bedrift vil bli betydelig enklere
som følge av situasjon A? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. ser du situasjon A som en kilde til potensiell gevinst for din
bedrift? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. ser du situasjon A som noe svært positivt for din bedrift? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. tror du situasjon A vil ha mer positive implikasjoner for din
bedrift enn for andre avisbedrifter? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6. ser du situasjon A som en strategisk mulighet som er særlig
viktig for akkurat din bedrift? 1 2 3· 4 5 6 7
7. tror du det er meget høy sannsynlighet for store gevinster for
din bedrift som følge av situasjon A? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8. mener du at din bedrift har de nødvendige ressurser til å
utnytte situasjon A på en effektiv måte? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
9. mener du at din bedrift kan utnytte situasjon A på en effektiv
måte uten store anstrengelser? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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SituasjonB
Tenk deg følgende situasjon. Landets største eiendomsmeglere og bilforhandlere (som til sammen utgjør ca. 70
% av den totale årlige omsetningen av bil og privateiendom) har nylig etablert en landsomspennende
annonsesammenslutning for salg og kjøp av biler og privat eiendom. Hensikten med etableringen har vært å danne
en organisasjon for elektronisk formidling av biler og eiendom. Det forventes at de vil ha en Internett-løsning klar
allerede om et par måneder. Samtidig arbeider de med fellessystemer tilrettelagt for·tekst-TV og lokal-TV. Nyvalgt
leder for annonsesammenslutningen har uttalt at målet på lengre sikt er å erstatte annonser i avisene. I en
prøveperiode vil det imidlertid i hovedsak fungere som et tillegg til avisannonser. Sammenslutningen har også som
målsetning å inkludere formidling av andre varer og tjenester, hvor stillingsannonser fremheves som spesielt
interessant.
For hvert av de 9 spørsmålene under, sett en sirkel rundt det ene tallet som best indikerer din vurdering av hvordan
situasjon B vil ha betydning for din bedrift. Det er viktig at du besvarer alle spørsmålene.
I meget I meget
liten stor
grad grad
I hvilken grad••••
1. tror du det vil komme noe ufordelaktig ut av situasjon B for
din bedrift? 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. tror du at fremtiden for din bedrift vil bli betydelig
vanskeligere som følge av situasjon B? 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. ser du situasjon B som kilde til et potensielt tap for din
bedrift? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. ser du situasjon B som noe svært negativt for din bedrift? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. tror du situasjon B vil ha mer negative implikasjoner for din
bedrift enn for andre avisbedrifter? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6. ser du situasjon B som en strategisk trussel som er særlig
viktig for akkurat din bedrift? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7. tror du det er meget høy sannsynlighet for store .tap for din
bedrift som følge av situasjon B? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8. mener du at din bedrift mangler de nødvendige ressurser til å
håndtere situasjon B på en tilfredsstillende måte? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
9. mener du at din bedrift bare kan håndtere situasjon B på en
tilfredsstillende måte med meget store anstrengelser? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Situasjon C
Tenk deg at du nettopp har mottatt økonomiske nøkkeltall for siste halvår for din bedrift. Her fremgår det at
driftsresultatet er hele 12 prosent lavere enn hva som var budsjettert for perioden. En av styrets representanter har
tydelig uttrykt misnøye med dette resultatet. Han har derfor foreslått strammere budsjettfokusering, hyppigere
rapportering til eierne om avisens økonomi og noen konkrete rasjonaliseringstiltak. En nærmere analyse av
nøkkeltallene viser at nesten hele budsjettsprekken skyldes en kraftig økning i kostnader til overtid og vikarer, noe
man ikke forutså på budsjetteringstidspunktet. Ellers har opplagsutviklingen for de siste tre årene vært positiv, og
vist en jevn årlig økning på omtrent samme størrelse som for sammenliknbare aviser. Annonseutviklingen har også
vært positiv, og lønnsomheten er god. Tidligere og nåværende diskusjoner om kostnadskutt og rasjonalisering har
imidlertid fått flere i 'avisen, både blant grafisk og redaksjonelt ansatte, til å murre. Misnøyen kommer i hovedsak til
uttrykk på to måter. For det første er det et uttalt ønske fra de ansatte om å få en større andel av bedriftens
overskudd. For det andre hevder flere at en for sterk sparekultur vil kunne gå utover avisens redaksjonelle kvalitet.
For hvert av de 9 spørsmålene under, sett en sirkel rundt det ene tallet som best indikerer din vurdering av hvordan
situasjon C vil ha betydning for din bedrift. Det er viktig at du besvarer alle spørsmålene.
I meget I meget
liten stor
grad grad
I hvilken grad ....
1. ser du situasjon C som en viktig sak for din bedrift? 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. tror du fremtiden for din bedrift blir endret som følge av
situasjon C? l 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. ser du situasjon C som en hastesak for din bedrift? l 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. bør situasjon C plasseres høyt på bedriftens dagsorden? l 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. vil du beskrive situasjon C som en rutinesak for din bedrift? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6. betrakter du årsakssammenhengene l situasjon C som
oversiktlige? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7. besitter din bedrift tilstrekkelig kunnskap til å forstå situasjon
C? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8. mener du at din bedrift har de nødvendige ressurser til å
håndtere situasjon C på en effektiv måte? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
9. bør bedriften investere ressurser i nærmere undersøkelse av
situasjon C? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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SituasjonD
Tenk deg at du nettopp har mottatt resultatene fra en markedsundersøkelse foretatt for din avis. En av flere
konklusjoner er at lesernes tillit til avisen er noe redusert. Mer konkret innebærer dette at tallet for de som har
krysset av for høy eller meget høy tillit til avisen er 12 prosentpoeng lavere i dag enn for to år siden. Det er usikkert
om dette er et generelt fenomen for aviser flest. Du har ingen faste holdepunkter som gir klare indikasjoner på om
tillitsendringen er tilfeldig, om det er en trend eller om den har med forhold knyttet til tidspunktet for
markedsundersøkelsen å gjøre. Videre er det vanskelig å peke på klare årsaker til endringen. Det er også uklart
hvilke implikasjoner denne endringen vil ha, om noen i det hele tatt. Opplagsutviklingen for de siste tre årene har
vært positiv, og vist en jevn årlig økning på omtrent samme størrelse som for sammenliknbare aviser.
Annonseutviklingen har også vært positiv, og lønnsomheten er god.
For hvert av de 9 spørsmålene under, sett en sirkel rundt det ene tallet som best indikerer din vurdering av hvordan
situasjon D vil ha betydning for din bedrift. Det er viktig at du besvarer alle spørsmålene.
I meget I meget
liten stor
grad grad
I hvilken grad ••••
1. ser du situasjon D som en viktig sak for din bedrift? 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. tror du fremtiden for din bedrift blir endret som følge av
situasjon D? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. ser du situasjon D som en hastesak for din bedrift? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. bør situasjon D plasseres høyt på bedriftens dagsorden? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. vil du beskrive situasjon O som en rutinesak for din bedrift? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6. betrakter du årsakssammenhengene i situasjon D som 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
oversiktlige?
7. besitter din bedrift tilstrekkelig kunnskap til å forstå situasjon
O? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8. mener du at din bedrift har de nødvendige ressurser til å
håndtere situasjon O på en effektiv måte? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
9. bør bedriften investere ressurser i nærmere undersøkelse av
situasjon O? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Denne delen inneholder en kort beskrivelse aven tenkt situasjon og 14 spørsmål som lister opp ulike
informasjonskilder som kan være relevante i forbindelse med situasjonen. Les først situasjonsbeskrivelsen. Indiker
deretter i hvilken grad du tror du ville ha søkt og innhentet informasjon fra de ulike kildene for bedre å forstå og
definere situasjonen. Også nå benyttes det en skala som går fra l til 7, hvor 1 betyr i meget liten grad, og 7 betyr i
meget stor grad.
Situasjonsbeskrivelse
Tenk deg følgende situasjon. I løpet av de siste månedene har to relativt store annonsører varslet en kraftig
reduksjon i kjøp av annonseplass i din avis. Annonseansvarlig i avisen har gitt uttrykk for at den ene annonsøren er i
ferd med å evaluere sin salgs- og markedsføringsprofil, men at den kanskje kommer sterkere tilbake senere. Du har.
ingen informasjon om hvorfor den andre annonseren har valgt å kutte ned på annonseringen. Du har heller ikke
mottatt informasjon som tilsier at de to kundene har klaget eller på annen måte gitt uttrykk for manglende service
eller kvalitet ved de tjenester din avis har levert. Det du vet, er imidlertid at begge de to annonsørene relativt nylig
har blitt kunder hos reklamebyrået Beta, som er kjent for sin satsing på direktereklame og produksjon av'
radioreklame.
Ellers har det i løpt av det siste året vært brukbar tilgang på nye annonsører, noe som sannsynligvis skyldes den
økte satsningen på markedsføring av avisen som annonseorgan. Det har imidlertid vært noe høyere avgang enn
tilgang, slik at de totale annonseinntektene fra forretningsdrivende og offentlige annonsører er noe lavere enn for et
år siden.
For hvert av spørsmålene under, sett en sirkel rundt det ene tallet som best indikerer i hvilken grad du tror du ville
søkt og innhentet informasjon fra de ulike kildene. Husk på at søking og innhenting av informasjon i virkelige
situasjoner er ressurskrevende i form av tid og penger. Det er viktig at du besvarer alle spørsmålene.
I meget I meget
liten stor
grad grad
I hvilken grad tror du at du ville ha ••••
l. sørget for et møte med de to annonsørene? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. søkt etter mer informasjon om reklamebyrået Betas strategi,
produkter og tjenester? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
.3. undersøkt .historisk informasjon som fmnes internt i din
bedrift om de to annonsørenes oppfatning av service, levering,
pris og liknende ved annonsering i din avis? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. skaffet til veie de siste statistikkene fra mediebyråene om
fordeling av reklameformidling mellom avis, radio og TV? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. skaffet til veie en eksisterende rapport fra en
markedsundersøkelse som har sammenliknet hva annonsører
får igjen ved bruk av henholdsvis avisannonser, kundeavis
som innstikk iavis og kundeavis i postkassen'? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6. undersøkt historisk informasjon som fmnes internt i din
bedrift om øvrige forretningsdrivende og offentlige
annonsørers oppfatning av service, levering, pris og liknende
ved annonsering i din avis? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7. sørget for at det ble iverksatt en ny' undersøkelse av gruppen
forretningsdrivende og offentlige annonsørers oppfatning av
service, levering, pris og liknende ved annonsering i din avis? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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I meget
liten
grad
I meget
stor
grad
I hvilken grad tror du at du ville ha ••••
8. undersøkt historisk informasjon som finnes internt i din
bedrift om avgang og tilgang blant forretningsdrivende og
offentlige annonsører de siste årene?
9. forsøkt å skaffe til veie informasjon om flere av de
forretningsdrivende og offentlige .annonsørene har opprettet
eller har planer om å opprette nærmere relasjoner til
reklamebyrået Beta?
10. skaffet til veie historisk informasjon om mulige strukturelle
endringer i annonsemarkedet?
11. søkt etter informasjon om fremtidige mulige utviklingstrekk i
annonsemarkedet?
12. søkt etter informasjon om mulige kundegrupper
annonsemarkedet som avisen i dag ikke dekker?
13. skaffet til veie informasjon om måter og kostnader ved å
gjennomføre effektmålinger av annonser ideres avis?
14. forsøkt å skaffe til veie informasjon om forretningsdrivende
og offentlige annonsørers planer for fremtidig
markedsførings- og annonseringsmix?
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
6 7
6 7
6 7
6 7
6 7
6 7
6 7
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Denne delen inneholder 23 påstander om interne og eksterne forhold som kan være relevante for avisbedrifter. Vi
ønsker at du leser hver påstand, og for hver av dem setter en sirkel rundt den ene bokstaven som best indikerer hvor
riktig du mener påstanden er.
Det benyttes nå en skala som går fra A til D, hvor A betyr at du mener at påstanden er riktig, B betyr at du mener at
påstanden kan være både riktig og uriktig, C betyr at du mener at påstanden er uriktig og D betyr at du ikke har noen
mening om hvorvidt påstanden er riktig eller ikke. Sett sirkel rundt D bare når du er helt sikker på at du ikke. har
noen mening om påstandens riktighet. Det er viktig at du tar stilling til alle påstandene.
PÅSTANDEN
kan være Har
er både riktig er ingen
riktig og uriktig uriktig mening
1. Økt utbredelse av gratisaviser i Norge vil helt klart føre til
en mindre differensiert pressestruktur enn i dag A B C D
2. Det finnes flere grunner til at økt utbredelse av gratisaviser
i Norge vil kunne slå både positivt og negativt ut i forhold
til en differensiert pressestruktur A B C D
3. Gratisaviser representerer utelukkende en trusel for norsk
dagspresse A B C D
4. Økt utbredelse av gratisaviser vil helt klart føre til lavere
konsum av tradisjonelle aviser A B C D
5. Det at en avis er gratis, er ensbetydende med lavere grad
av redaksjonell uavhengighet A B C D
6. Det finnes flere grunner til at 'det at en avis er gratis, vil
kunne ha både positive og negative implikasjoner for
avisens redaksjonelle uavhengighet A B C D
7. Det er en klar og relativt entydig positiv sammenheng
mellom et godt ..redaksjonelt produkt og lønnsomhet i
avisdrift A B C D
8. Internett kan allerede i dag avskrives som en seriøs
konkurrent til aviser A B C D
9. Det er allerede i dag klart at Internett vil bli avisenes
viktigste konkurrent i løpet av noen få år A B C D
10. Pressestøtten er helt klart hovedårsaken til at vi fortsatt har
dagspressekonkurranse i Norge i dag A B C D
11. Økt konkurranse mellom aviser er helt klart negativt i
forhold til en mangfoldig dagspresse A B C D
12. Økt konkurranse mellom aviser vil ha både positive og
negative effekter i forhold til en mangfoldig dagspresse A B C D
13. Hvis en avis opplever opplagsøkning vil hovedårsaken
alltid være at avisproduktet er blitt bedre A B C D
14. Den viktigste årsaken til opplagsnedgang for en avis vil
alltid være negative endringer i eksterne rammebetingelser A B C D
15. Det er vanskelig å peke på entydige og allmenngyldige
årsaker til positive og negative endringer i avisopplag A B C D
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riktig
PÅSTANDEN
kan være
både riktig
ogurlktig
er
uriktig
Har
ingen
mening
16. At det norske folk oppfatter aviser som det mest troverdige
mediet er et entydig bevis på kvaliteten til norske aviser
17. At en avis oppfattes som troverdig blant sine lesere er en
absolutt forutsetning for avisens overlevelse på sikt
18. Et statlig oppnevnt medieombud vil helt klart føre til
politisk styring av pressen
19. Dagens ordning med Pressens Faglige Utvalg er absolutt
den beste måten å fremme den etiske og faglige standard i
norsk presse på
20. Direktereklame har for dårlig markedsføringseffekt til at
det noen gang vil utgjøre noen seriøs konkurrent til aviser
som annonsemedium
21. Den økende eierkonsentrasjonen norsk avisbransje er
utelukkende positivt for bransjen
22. Den økende eierkonsentrasjonen norsk avisbransje er
utelukkende negativt for bransjen
23. Det finnes flere grunner til at den økende
eierkonsentrasjonen i avisbransjen har både positive og
negative effekter
A B c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
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A B
A B
A B
A B
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Denne delen inneholder spørsmål om bedriftens innsamling, tilgjengelighet og bruk av informasjon om bedriftens
eksterne omgivelser som for eksempel markedsinformasjon og informasjon om konkurrenter. Først stilles 18
spørsmål om bedriftens innsamling av informasjon, deretter følger 20 spørsmål om tilgjengelighet og bruk av slik
informasjon.
A: Bedriftens innsamling av informasjon
Det er vanlig å samle inn informasjon om forhold utenfor bedriften for å planlegge for fremtiden eller for å være
oppdatert om forhold som kan være relevant for bedriften. Her ønsker vi å avdekke den delen av slik
informasjonsinnsamling som foretas på en systematisk eller formalisert måte. Det er ikke av betydning om det er
bedriften selv eller andre som står for informasjonsinnsamlingen. Den kan like gjeme skje i samarbeid eller i regi av
andre aktører, som for eksempel andre aviser, reklamebyråer, bransjeorganisasjoner, konsulenter etc., som av
bedriften selv. Innsamling av informasjon som er rettet mot håndtering av konkrete problemer eller spesielle
situasjoner, skal imidlertid ikke skal tas med når du svarer på spørsmålene under.
Mange bedrifter skaffer mesteparten av slik informasjon på mer uformelle måter enn det som søkes avdekket
gjennom spørsmålene under. Det er derfor ikke uten videre gitt at bedrifter som samler inn mye informasjon på en
systematisk eller formalisert måte er bedre informert eller oppdatert enn andre.
Skalaen som benyttes nå går fra 1 til 6, hvor l betyr at bedriften "meget sjeldent eller aldri" samler inn den type
informasjon det spørres om, og 6 betyr at bedriften samler inne den aktuelle informasjonen "ukentlig eller oftere".
Les hvert utsagn og sett en sirkel rundt det ene tallet som best beskriver hvor ofte din bedrift samler inn ulike typer
av informasjon. Det er viktig at du besvarer alle spørsmålene.
HVOROFfE?
Meget Mindre Omtrent
sjeldent enn en Omtrent Noen få en gang Ukent-
eller gang i en gang ganger i måned- Jigeller
aldri året i året i året en oftere
Vår bedrift samler systematisk inn informasjon om ••••
1. hvordan andre aviser dekker annonsemarkedet 1 2 3 4 5 6
2. egenskaper ved eksisterende lesere så som holdninger og
kjøpevaner 1 2 3 4 5 6
3. rettsavgjerelser.som kan være relevante i forbindelse med
avisdrift 1 2 3 4 5 6
4. befolkningens lesevaner 1 2 3 4 5 6
5. utviklingen av nye materialer, produksjonsteknikker og
metoder knyttet til avisproduksjon 1 2 3 4 5 6
6. endringer i andre avisers image eller profil 1 2 3 4 5 6
7. befolkningens forbruk av andre medier enn aviser 1 2 3 4 5 6
8. potensielle leseres holdning til avisen vår 1 2 3 4 5 6
9. taktikk og strategi til andre medieaktører enn avisbedrifter 1 2 3' 4 5 6
10. hvordan andre medier enn aviser dekker annonsemarkedet 1 2 3 4 5 6
11. konkurrerende eller sammenliknbare avisbedrifters taktikk
og strategi 1 2 3 4 5 6
12. eksisterende leseres demografiske egenskaper (f.eks. alder,
inntekt, utdanning etc.) 1 2 3 4 5 6
13. alternativer til eksisterende underleverandører av varer og
tjenester 1 2 3 4 5 6
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HVOROFfE?
Meget Mindre Omtrent
sjeldent enn en Omtrent Noen få en gang Ukent-
eller gang i en gang ganger i måned- lig eller
aldri året i året i året en oftere
Vår bedrift samler systematisk inn informasjon om....
14. eksisterende leseres holdning til avisen vår 1 2 3 4 5 6
15. nøkkeltall for utviklingen av norsk økonomi 1 2 3 4 5 6
16. våre annonsørers holdninger og tilfredshet 1 2 3 4 5 6
17. offentlige myndigheters planer og politikk for
mediemarkedet 2 3 4 5 6
18. andre avisers leserprofiler 1 2 3 4 5 6
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B: Tllgjengelighet og bruk av informasjon
Under stilles 20 spørsmål som har til hensikt å avdekke tilgjengelighet og bruk av informasjon i bedriften.
Informasjon som først og fremst har med journalistisk virksomhet å gjøre skal ikke tas med.
Nå benyttes det igjen en skala som går fra 1 til 7, hvor 1 betyr i meget liten grad, og 7 betyr i meget stor grad. Les
hvert utsagn og sett en sirkel rundt ene tallet som best beskriver tilgjengelighet og bruk av informasjon i bedriften.
Det er viktig at du besvarer alle spørsmålene.
Imeget
liten
grad
Imeget
stor
grad
Ihvllken grad ....
1. brukes systematisk innsamlet informasjon om eller fra
eksisterende underleverandører for å øke forståelsen av
underleverandørmarkedet og dets utvikling?
2. er oppdaterte nøkkeltall for norsk økonomi lett tilgjengelig for
ledelsen i din bedrift?
3. er informasjon om nye materialer, produksjonsteknikker og
metoder knyttet til avisproduksjon lett tilgjengelig for
ledelsen i din bedrift?
4. er informasjon om avisleseres egenskaper og holdninger lett
tilgjengelig for ledelsen i din bedrift?
5. er informasjon om annonsemarkedet lett tilgjengelig for
ledelsen i din bedrift?
6. brukes systematisk innsamlet informasjon om
annonsemarkedet for å møte eksisterende og potensielle
annonsørers ønsker og behov?
7. brukes systematisk innsamlet informasjon om lesernes
demografiske egenskaper (f.eks. alder, inntekt, utdanning
etc.) l kommunikasjon med eksisterende og potensielle
.annonsører?
8. er informasjon om konkurrenter lett tilgjengelig for ledelsen i
din bedrift?
9. er vitenskapelige og populærvitenskapelige tidsskrifter lett
tilgjengelig for ledelsen i din bedrift?
10. er informasjon om underleverandører lett tilgjengelig for
ledelsen i din bedrift?
11. brukes systematisk innsamlet informasjon om annonse-
markedet for å avdekke fremtidige trusler og muligheter?
12. er generelle økonomi og ledelsestidsskrifter (som f.eks.
Økonomisk Rapport, Kampanje, Kapital, Fortune, The
Economist, Business Week etc.) lett tilgjengelig for ledelsen i
din bedrift?
13. brukes systematisk innsamlet informasjon om egenskaper ved
leserne så som holdninger og -kjøpevaner i· kommunikasjon
med eksisterende og potensielle annonsører?
14. er tidsskrifter, nyhetsskriv, forsknings- og utredningsrapporter
fra konsulenterlkonsulentbyråer, forsknings- og utrednings-
institutter lett tilgjengelig for ledelsen i din bedrift?
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1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
6 7
6 7
6 7
6 7
6 7
6 7
6 7
6 7
6 7
6 7
6 7
6 7
6 7
6 7
I meget I meget
liten stor
grad grad
I hvilken grad••••
15. har de ansatte i ledelsen i din bedrift egen tilgang til Internett? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
16. brukes systematisk innsamlet informasjon om utviklingen av
mediemarkedet for å møte fremtidige trusler og muligheter? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
17. brukes systematisk innsamlet informasjon om avisens
annonserer til å utvikle planer for· hvordan annonsemarkedet
skal betjenes i fremtiden? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
18. er tidsskrifter, nyhetsskriv, forsknings- og utredningsrapporter
i regi av offentlige myndigheter lett tilgjengelig for ledelsen i
din bedrift? 2 3 4 5 6 7
19. brukes systematisk innsamlet informasjon om avisens lesere
til å utvikle scenarier og markedsplaner? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
20. er bransjetidsskrifter og rapporter fra bransjeorganisasjoner
(som f.eks. Dagspressen, Pressens Tidning, Dansk Presse etc.)
lett tilgjengelig for ledelsen i din bedrift? 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Denne delen inneholder 9 spørsmål som omhandler ulike sider ved hvordan "ledergrupper" behandler strategiske
situasjoner. Med strategiske situasjoner menes begivenheter, hendelser, trender og fenomener som vil kunne ha
betydning for bedriftens posisjon i markedet, bedriftens lønnsomhet, eller som kan være viktig i forhold til
bedriftens mål og visjoner. Med ledergruppe menes de personer som rapporterer direkte til avisens redaktør eller
disponent og som vanligvis er involvert i behandling av strategiske spørsmål.
Også nå benyttes det en skala som går fra 1 til 7, hvor 1 betyr i meget liten grad, og 7 betyr imeget stor grad. Les
hvert spørsmål og sett en sirkel rundt ene tallet som best beskriver hvordan ledergruppen i din bedrift behandler
strategiske situasjoner. Deter viktig at du besvarer alle spørsmålene.
I meget
liten
grad
I meget
stor
grad
I hvilken grad ••••
1. er det vanlig at alle gruppemedlemmene deltar aktivt i
strategisk planlegging og beslutningstaking?
2.' hender det at man avviker fra fast opplagte prosedyrer og
møteplaner når gruppen behandler strategiske spørsmål?
3. kan strategisk planlegging og beslutningstaking i gruppen
karakteriseres som en reell gruppeaktivitet?
4. er det uformell kontakt mellom gruppemedlemmene utenfor
møtesituasjoner?
5. kan strategisk planlegging og beslutningstaking i gruppen
karakteriseres som regelbundet?
6. er det fri og åpen utveksling av ideer mellom
gruppemedlemmene når strategiske spørsmål behandles?
7. er det karakteristisk for gruppen at gruppemedlemmene har
mulighet til å påvirke hverandre gjensidig?
8. er det karakteristisk for gruppen at ett eller to
gruppemedlemmer dominerer behandlingen av strategiske
spørsmål?
9. følges ett bestemt sett av møteprosedyrer og regler når
gruppen behandler strategiske spørsmål?
1 2 73 4 65
1 2 6 73 4 5
1 2 6 73 4 5
2 6 73 4 5
1 6 72 3 4 5
1 2 6 73 4 5
1 2 74 63 5
1 2 6 73 4 5
1 2 74 63 5
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Dersom du ønsker å gi utfyllende opplysninger til noen av spørsmålene eller eventuelt har andre kommentarer til
undersøkelsen, kan du bruke den ledige plassen under eller eget ark.
Tusen takk for hjelpen. Vennligst returner skjemaet iden vedlagte frankerte svarkonvolutten.
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Appendix B
Descriptive statistics and univariate differences for the subsamples
Correlation matrixes
Moderated regression analyses
Table 1: Descriptive statistics and univariate differences for the subsamples
Mean S.D. Skewness Kurtosis Univariate
Small Large Small Large Small Large Small Large diff [F(sig.)]
Effect valence
Positive-gain 4.30 4.69 1.26 1.22 -.47 -.44 .28 .03 3.91 *
.Controllability 4.54 4.90 1.28 1.32 -.34 -.95 -.05 .76 3.08*
Extremity (opportunity) 2.87 3.48 1.29 1.40 .47 .14 -.46 -.72 8.55***
Negative-loss 4.29 4.24 1.28 1.20 -.47 -.43 -.11 .15 .05
Uncontrollability 3.81 3.73 1.10 1.25 -.51 .08 .28 -.24 .19
Extremity (threat) 2.85 3.30 1.26 1.42 .32 .03 -.42 -.92 4.40**
Issue sorting
Operational importance (inversed) .50 .51 .06 .09 -.47 .16 1.75 2.68 .75
Strategic importance (inversed) .48 .47 .09 .10 -.1.12 -.30 1.48 1.99 .40
Unfeasibility (inversed} .39 .39 .10 .10 -.26 .08 -.67 -.75 .01
Causal understanding
Free papers 1.86 1.95 .45 .44 -.25 -.24 -.81 -.68 1.68
Market, competition and attribution-of success 2.13 2.28 .31 .33 -.21 -.28 .11 -.38 8.25***
Datasearch
Core data (reflected and square root transf.) l.55 l.50 .31 .25 .38 -.02 l.01 -.45 l.65
Additional data 4.69 4.63 1.16 l.21 -.47 -.34 .42 -.22 .11
New data 4.87 4.94 1.19 1.03 -.40 -.29 .67 -.15 .16
Organizational scanning
Customer information acquisition frequency & use -.46 .45 .93 .85 -.67 .07 -.19 -.37 41.32***
Information availability 4.58 4.82 1.07 .90 -.49 -.75 -.07 l.06 2.48
General information acquisition frequency 2.91 3.30 .79 .78 .48 .20 .60 -.22 9.57***
TMT information processing structure
Participation 5.10 5.00 1.03 1.00 -.53 -.56 .18 .62 .42
Flexibility 4.13 4.21 1.39 1.35 .14 .03 -.60 -.62 .12
Cognitive style
Exploration 2.80 3.06 .46 .55 .18 -.06 -.42 -.48 10.32***
Social complexity 3.39 3.29 .51 .43 -.06 -.20 .41 -.58 1.89
Differentiation 3.80 3.99 .47 .38 -.25 .05 .32 -.17 8.46***
Organizational size
Circulation size small firms 43' 22' .22 -.85
Circulation size large f!.rms (inversed) .05 .03 -.26 -.98
*: p<.10; **: p<.05;***: p<.01
Table 2: Bivariate cerrelanons among dependent and independent variables
All firms (n = 162) CIAF&U lA OlAF PART FLEX EXPL SC DIFF SIZE"
Positive-gain .28** .21 ** .17* .02 -.10 .06 .00 .19* .27**
Controllability .31 ** .34** .19* .26** -.04 .08 .12 .12 .30**
Extremity (opportunity) .39** .25** .21 ** .09 -.09 .13 -.03 .16* .34**
Negative-loss .21 ** .15 .06 .14 -.14 .01 -.10 .05 .09
Uncontrollability .00 -;)3 -.08 .00 -.19* .03 -,05 -oe -.03
Extremity (threat) .23** .15 .02 .03 -.15 .04 -.16* .05 .20*
Operational imp. (inv.) .01 -.04 -ca .04 .07 -.07 -.08 .11 ;03
Strategic imp. (inv.) -.12 -.17* -.18 * .01 .05 -.20* -.13 -.11 .03
Unfeasibility (inv.) -.04 -.11 -.05 -.04 -.11 -.06 -.04 -.04 -.03
Causal understanding 1 .06 .07 .15 .10 -.07 -.05 .00 .22** .06
Causal understanding 2 .22** .14 .08 .09 .20* .37** -.04 .14 .27**
Core data (inv.) -.19* -.25** -.03 -.19* .10 .01 -.12 -.21 ** -.10
Additional data .14 .16* .14 .06 -.17* -.10 .07 .18* -.03
New data .16* .18* .13 .13 -.33** -.07 .16* .24** .00
Small firms (n = 80) CIAF&U lA OlAF. PART FLEX EXPL SC DIFF SIZE
Positive-gain .35** .27* .21 .04 -.05 .12 .07 .32** .23*
Controllability .28* .34** .20 .22* .01 .09 .19 .13 .30**
Extremity (opportunity) .34** .20 .16 .03 -.10 .03 -.08 .20 .01
Negative-loss .36** .16 .11 .22 -.21 .11 .01 .05 .18
Uncontrollability .25* .02 .04 .13 -.23* .07 .10 .03 .17
Extremity (threat) .34** .19 .06 .10 -.10 .08 -.11 -.05 -.01
Operational imp. (inv.) -.10 -.02 -.08 .07 .03 .02 .06 .05 -.29*
Strategic imp. (inv.) -,21 -.23* -.10 .05 -.07 -.22 -.13 -.08 .04
Unfeasibility (inv.) -.13 -.23* -.02 -.04 -.13 -.04 -.08 -.08 -.21
Causal understanding 1 .11 .11 .08 .25* -.15 -.02 .05 .21 .01
Causal understanding 2 -,03 .07 -.11 -,09 .21 .18 -.10 .07 .11
Core data (inv.) -.11 -.20 .12 -.19 .11 .09 -.05 -.24* -.02
Additional data .18 .21 .09 .13 -.18 -.18 -.02 .11 -.08
New data .25* .25* .08 .31 ** -.41 ** -.10 .15 .25* -.03
Large fmns (n = 82) CIAF&U lA OlAF PART FLEX EXPL SC DIFF SIZEb
Positive-gain .11 .11 .06 .02 -.16 -.06 -.06 -.06 -.18
Controllability .27* .33** .12 .33** -.11 .02 .09 .05 -.26*
Extremity (opportunity) .33** .27* .16 .17 -.10 .11 .07 .01 -.37 **
Negative-loss .12 .15 .02 .05 -.07 -.08 -.24* .05 -.12
Uncontrollability -.20 -.27* -.18 -.12 -.16 .02 -.21 -.15 .06
Extremity (threat) .02 .08 -.08 -.02 -.21 -.06 -.17 .07 -.18
Operational imp. (inv.) .03 -.08 -.11 .02 .11 -.16 -.18 .13 -.01
Strategic imp. (inv.) -.02 -,09 -.23* -.04 .16 -.17 -.14 -.12 -.16
Unfeasibility (inv.) .04 .02 -.08 -.04 -.09 -.09 .01 .00 -.08
Causal understanding 1 -.10 -.01 ,19 -.04 .01 -.12 -.03 .21 .12
Causal understanding 2 .29** .18 .15 .28* .19 .45** .07 .12 -.25*
Core data (inv.) -.24* -.29** -.17 -.21 .10 -.04 -.27* -.13 -.06
Additional data .15 .12 .21 .00 -.17 -.03 .18 .29** .02
New data .06 .08 .18 -.06 -.25* -.05 .19 .22* .21
*: p<.05; **: p<.OI (2-tailed)
"Logarithmic transformation
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Moderated regression analysis • Exploration as independent variable
Table 3: AD independent variables regressed onto effect valence variables, moderated by contextual variables
Smallfirms Large firms
Dependent variable: Explor- Inter- Explor- Inter-
Positive-gain R2 F ~F ation action R2 F ~ ation action
Original model .276 2.84*** .08 .086 .75 -.06
+ Expl.* C IAF&U .283 2;61 ** .68 .08 -.10 ,087 .67 .03 -sa .02
+Expl.* lA .307 2.92*** 2.93* .06 -.21 * .096 .74 .73 -.06 .10
+Expl.* OlAF .280 2.57** .38 .06 - -.O? .087 .67 :08 -.06 -;04
+ Expl. * Part. .291 2.71 *** 1.41 .08 -.14 .092 .71 .47 -.09 -.08
+ Expl, * Flex. .277 2.53** .08 .08 -.04 .218 1.95* 11.77 *** -.01 -.40***
+ Expl. * Size .284 2.62** .72 .10 .11 .086 .66 .01 -.06 -.01
Dependent variable: Explor- Inter- Explor- Inter-
Controllability R2 F ~F ation action R2 F ~F ation action
Original model .264 2.67** .10 .212 2.13** -.06
+ Expl. * C IAF&U .271 2.45** .61 .15 .09 .213 1.89* .02 -.07 .02
+ Expl.* lA .275 2.50** 1.01 .09 -.12 .217 1.94* .45 -.06 -.08
+Expl.* OlAF .268 2.42** .37 .13 .07 .214 i.91 * .16 -.06 -.05
+ Expl. * Part. .266 2.40** .21 .10 -.05 .230 2.10** 1.65 -.11 -.14
+ Expl. * Flex. .268 2.42** .35 .12 .07 .221 1.99** .81 -.05 -.11
+Expl.* Size .273 2.48** .80 .12 .11 .213 1.89* .05 -.07 .03
Dependent variable: Explor- Inter- Explor- Inter-
Opportunity-extr. R2 F ~F ation action R2 F ~F ation action
Original model .215 2.04** .01 .215 2.16** .02
+ Expl. * C IAF&U .231 1.98** 1.38 .07 .14 .236 2.16** 1.86 .06 -.15
+ Expl.* lA .223 1.89* .64 .02 .10 .223 2.01 ** .68 .02 -.09
+Expl.* OlAF .248 2.18** 2.87* .07 .20* .254 2.38** 3.61 * .01 -.21 *
+ Expl. * Part. .235 2.03** 1.70 .00 -.16 .250 2.33** 3.20* -.04 -.20*
+ Expl, * Flex. .230 1.97* 1.26 -.02 -.15 .243 2.25** 2.59t .05 -.I9t
+ Exøl." Size .215 1.81* .02 .00 -.02 .245 2.27** 2.73t -.04 .20t
Dependent variable: Explor- Inter- Explor- Inter-
Negative-loss R2 F ~F ation action R2 F ~ ation action
Original model .273 2.79*** .27** .134 1.22 -.07
+ Expl.* C IAF&U .273 2.48** .02 .26* -.02 .135 1.10 .08 -.06 -.03
+Expl.* lA .304 2.88*** 2.91 * .24** -.21 * .135 1.10 .01 -.07 -.01
+Expl.* OlAF .279 2.55** .55 .24* -.08 .135 1.10 .07 -.07 -.03
+ Expl. * Part. .296 2.77*** 2.16t .27** -.I7t .159 1.33 2.06 -.12 -.17
+ Expl. * Flex. .273 2.48** .00 .27** .00 .246 2.28** 10.35 *** -.02 -.37***
+Expl.* Size .273 2.48** .00 .27** .01 .154 1.27 1.60 -.12 .16
Dependent variable: Explor- Inter- Explor- Inter-
Uncontrollability R2 F ~F ation action R2 F ~F ation action
Original model .227 2.19** .21 * .163 1.54 .15
+ Exp1:* C IAF&U .233 2.00** .50 .16 ~:09 .163 1.37 .{)1 .16 -.01
+ Expl.* lA .231 1.99** .37 .20t -.08 .172 1.45 .73 .16 .10
+Expl.* OlAF .229 1.96* .13 .I9t -.04 .180 1.53t 1.41 .15 -.14
+ Expl. * Part. .229 1.96* .15 .20t -.05 .164 1.38 .10 .16 .04
+ Expl. * Flex. .249 2.'18** 1.90 .18 -.18 .Hi8 1.42 .44 .14 .08
+ Expl.* Size .246 2.15** 1.65 .I8t -.16 .186 1.60* 1.97 .10 .17
Dependent variable: Explor- Inter- Explor- Inter-
Threat-extr. R2 F ~F ation action R2 F ~F ation action
Original model .229 2.22** .21 * .143 1.32 .01
+ Expl. * C IAF&U .232 2.00** .24 .23* .06 .167 1.40 1.98 .05 -.16
+ Expl.* lA .235 2.03** .50 .22* .09 .181 1.55t 3.27* .00 -.21 *
+Expl.* OlAF .242 2.10** 1.08 .24* .12 .166 1.39 1.89 .01 -.16
+ Expl. * Part. .243 2.12** 1.17 .20t -.13 .215 1.92* 6.39** -.08 -.29**
+ Expl. * Flex. .254 2.25** 2.19t .17 -.19t .172 1.45 2.4ot .04 -.I9t
+ Expl.* Size .237 2.05** .66 .I9t -.10 .155 1.29 .99 -.03 .13
Significance levels: t<.I5; *p<.I0; **p<.05; ***p<.OI
Table 6: All independent variables regressed onto data search variables, moderated by contextual variables
Smallfirms Largefirms
Dependent variable: Explor- Inter- Explor- Inter-
Coredata" R2 F t1F ation action R2 F t1F ation action
Original model .163 1.45 .02 .170 1.59t .03
+ Expl.* C IAF&U .172 1.37 .77 -.04 -.11 .181 1.52 .93 .06 -.11
+Expl.* lA .201 1.66t 3.19* .05 .23* .172 1.43 .20 .03 -.05
+Expl.* GIAF .167 1.32 .34 .04 .07 .170 lAI .00 .03 -.01
'+ Expl. * Part. .179 1.44 1.36 .02 .14 .171 1.42 .10 .02 -.04
+ Expl. * Flex. .184 1.49 1.77 -.01 -.18 .170 1.41 .00 .03 .m
+ Expl.* Size .163 1.29 .06 .01 -.03 .170 1.41 .01 .03 .02
Dependent variable: Explor- Inter- Explor- Inter-
Additional data R2 F t1F ation action R2 F t1F ation action
Original model .098 .81 -.16 .162 1.51 -.06
+ Expl.* C IAF&U .108 .80 .71 -.22t -.11 .163 1.34 .04 -.05 -.02
+ Expl.* lA .127 .96 2.15t -.19 -.20t .163 1.34 .05 -.06 .03
+Expl.* GIAF .099 .73 .07 -.17 -.03 .178 1.50 1.33 -.07 -.14
+ Expl. * Part. .099 .73 JJ7 -.16 -.03 .169 1.41 .57 -.09 -.09
+ Expl. * Flex. .116 .87 1.35 -.14 .16 .166 1.38 .31 -.07 .07
+ Exnl, * Size .099 .73 .08 -.17 -.04 .193 1.65t 2.64t -.11 .20t
Dependent variable: Explor- Inter- Explor- Inter-
New data R2 F t1F ation action R2 F t1F ation action
Original model .300 3.19*** .04 .213 2.10** -.01
+ Expl. * C IAF&U .305 2.89*** .43 .08 .08 .216 1.90* .27 .00 -.06
+Expl.* lA .312 2.99*** 1.11 .03 -.13 .223 1.98** .90 -.02 -.11
+Expl.* GIAF .306 2.92*** .60 .07 .09 .215 1.87* .08 -.02 -.03
+ Expl. * Part. .306 2.91 *** .58 .05 .09 .238 2.15** 2.26t -.07 -.I7t
+ Expl. * Flex. .301 2.84*** .05 .05 .03 .219 1.93* .54 .00 -.09
+Expl.* Size .314 3.02*** 1.35 .06 .14 .231 2.07** 1.61 -.06 .15
"Reversed
Significance levels: t<.15; *p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.OI
Table 4: All independent variables regressed onto issue sorting variables, moderated by contextual variables
Smallfirms Large firms
Dependent variable: Explor- Inter- Explor- Inter-
Operational imp." R2 F !iF ation action R2 F !iF ation action
Original model .113 .93 .02 .134 1.21 -.23*
+ Expl. * C IAF&U .122 .90 .67 -.03 -.11 .145 1.17 .91 -.26** .11
+ Expl.* lA .123 .91 .79 .01 -.12 .146 1.18 .92 -.23* .11
+Expl.* G IAF .158 1.22 3.48* -.04 -.23* .183 1.54t 4.08** -.22* .24**
+ Expl. * Part. .124 .92 .85 .02 ".12 .137 L09 .21 -.25* -.06
+ Expl. * Flex. .129 .96 1.23 .05 -.15 .145 1.17 .84 -.22* -.11
+Expl.* Size .119 .93 .44 .04 .09 .134 1.07 .01 -.23* -.01
Dependent variable: Explor- Inter- Explor- Inter-
Strategic imp." R2 F !iF ation action R2 F !iF ation action
Original model .187 1.69t -.23* .201 1.96* -.25**
+ Expl. * C IAF&U .252 2.19** 5.62** -.36*** -.29** .205 1.78* .33 -.27** .07
+Expl.* lA .211 1.74* 1.93 -.25* -.18 .203 1.76* .13 -.25** .04
+Expl.* GIAF .212 1.75* 2.06 -.28** -.17 .258 2.40** 5.29 ** -.24** .26 **
+ Expl. * Part. .197 1.59t .74 -.23* -.11 .202 1.74* .04 -.24* .02
+ Expl. * Flex. .191 1.53t .27 -.22* .07 .204 1.77* .21 -.26** .06
+Expl.* Size .189 1.51 .12 -.22 .05 .220 1.94* 1.61 -.21 * -.16
Dependent variable: Explor- Inter- Explor- Inter-
Unfeasibility" R2 F !iF ation action R2 F !iF ation action
Original model .211 1.96* .00 .043 .35 -.Il
+ Expl.* C IAF&U .219 1.83* .67 -.05 -.10 .052 .38 .66 -.13 .10
+Expl.* lA .212 1.74* .03 -.01 -.02 .044 .32 .10 -.11 .04
+Expl.* G IAF .211 1.74* .01 -.01 -.01 .045 .33 .14 -.11 .05
+ Expl. * Part. .211 1.74* .00 .00 -.01 .050 .36 .47 -.08 .08
+ Expl. * Flex. .229 1.93* 1.50 -.03 -.16 .062 .45 1.36 -.13 .15
+Expl.* Size .212 1.75 .10 -.01 -.04 .044 .31 .03 -.11 .02
aReversed
Significance levels: t<.15; *p<.1O; **p<.05; ***p<.OI
Table 5: All independent variables regressed onto causal understanding variables, moderated by contextual variables
Smallfirms Largefirms
Dependent variable: Explor- Inter- Explor- Inter-
Causal undo I R2 F !iF ation action R2 F !iF ation" action
Original model .125 1.07 .01 .182 1.76* -.09
+ Expl.* C IAF&U .132 1.00 .50 -.03 -.09 .182 1.56t .00 -.10 .00
+ Expl.* lA .213 1.79* 7.36*** -.03 -.35*** .195 1.70* 1.14 -.10 -.12
+Expl.* GIAF .132 1.01 .54 -.02 -.09 .182 1.56t .03 -.09 .02
+ Expl. * Part. .127 .96 .10 .01 -.04 .196 1.71 * 1.21 -.13 -.13
+ Expl. * Flex. .126 .95 .02 .01 .02 .185 1.59t .23 -.09 -.06
+ Expl.* Size .156 1.22 2.42t .04 .21 t .194 1.68t 1.02 -.06 -.13
Dependent variable: Explor- Inter- Explor- Inter-
Causal undo II R2 F !iF ation action R2 F !iF arion" action
Original model .148 1.29 .18 .283 3.12*** .35***
+ Expl.* C IAF&U .149 1.16 .13 .20 .05 .283 2.77*** .01 .35*** -.01
+ Expl.* lA .154 1.21 .53 .16 -.10 .284 2.77*** .05 .35*** -.03
+Expl." G IAF .155 1.21 .57 .15 -.09 .284 2.78*** .07 .35*** .03
+ Expl. * Part. .172 1.37 1.91 .18 .17 .284 2.78*** .07 .34*** -.03
+ Expl. * Flex. .151 1.17 .26 .19 .Q7 .285 2.79*** .20 .36*** -.05
+ Expl.* Size .152 1.18 .33 .17 -.08 .290 2.86*** .64 .38*** -.09
Significance levels: t<.15; *p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.OI
Moderated regression analysis - Differentiation as independent variable
Table 7: All independent variables regressed onto effect valence variables, moderated by contextual variables
Smallfirms Large firms
Dependent variable: Differen- Inter- Differen- Inter-
Positive-gain R2 F 8F tiation action R2 F 8F tiation action
Original model .276 2.84**" .30** .086 .75 -.06
+ Diff. * C IAF&U .276 2.52** .00 .30** .00 .104 .81 1.35 -.16 .18
+ Diff.* lA .280 2.57** .37 .31 ** .07 .097 .75 .79 -.09 .11
+ Diff. * G IAF .276 2.52** .00 .30** -.01 .086 .66 .00 -.06 .01
+ Diff. * Part. .287 2.65*** 1.00 .29** -.11 .110 .86 1.85 -.08 .17
+ Diff. * Flex. .276 2.52** .00 .30** .00 .087 .67 .07 -.05 .03
+ Diff. * Size .287 2.66*** 1.04 .33** .14 .117 .93 2A2t -.14 .21 t
Dependent variable: Differen- Inter- Differen- Inter-
Controllability R2 F 8F tiation action R2 F 8F tiation action
Original model .264 2.67** .02 .212 2.13** .00
+ Diff.* C IAF&U .269 2043** .48 .06 .10 .214 1.91* .15 -.03 .06
+ Diff.* lA .272 2046** .68 .03 .10 .214 1.90* .11 -.01 .04
+ Diff. * G IAF .265 2.38** .06 .03 .03 .213 1.89" :04 .01 -.03
+ Diff. * Part. .276 2.51·· 1.05 .01 -.12 .227 2.05** 1.30 -.02 .13
+ Diff. * Flex. .264 2.37** .00 .02 -.01 .223 2.01 ** .95 -.01 -.11
+ Diff. * Size .267 2040** .27 .00 -.01 .215 1.92* .24 -.02 .06
Dependent variable: Differen- Inter- Differen- Inter-
Opportunity-extr. R2 F 8F tiation action R2 F 8F tiation action
Original model .215 2.04** .30** .215 2.16** -.03
+ Diff.* C IAF&U .245 2.14** 2.57t 040*** .23t .218 1.96* .29 -.07 .08
+ Diff.* lA .226 1.92* .89 .32** .12 .216 1.93* .11 -.02 -.04
+ Diff. * G IAF .231 1.99** lAO .37** .16 .226 2.04** .98 .03 -.14
+ Diff." Part. .225 1.92" .89 .30** -.11 .220 1.98** AS -.04 .08
+ Diff. * Flex. .215 1.81* .02 .30** .02 .228 2.07** 1.20 -.02 .13
+ Diff. * Size .236 2.04*" 1.80 .34** .19 .272 2.61 *** 5045** -.14 .29**
Dependent variable: Differen- Inter- Differen- Inter-
Negative-loss R2 F 8F tiation action R2 F 8F tiation action
Original model .273 2.79*** -.03 .134 1.22 .07
+ Diff. * C IAF&U .275 2.51 ** .21 -.01 .06 .147 1.21 1.03 -.02 .15
+ Diff.* lA .285 2.63*** 1.12 -.02 .13 .138 1.l2 .26 .05 .06
+ Diff. * G IAF .276 2.52** .33 -.07 -.08 .137 I.l l .23 .10 -.07
+ Diff. * Part. .281 2.58** .76 -.04 -.10 .134 1.09 .00 .07 .00
+ Diff. * Flex. .297 2.78*** 2.22t -.04 -.17t .140 1.l4 047 .06 -.08
+ Diff.* Size .293 2.73*** 1.86 -.08 -.18 .145 1.19 .87 .02 .12
Dependent variable: Differen- Inter- Differen- Inter-
Uncontrollability R2 F 8F tiation action R2 F 8F tiation action
Original model .227 2.19** -.02 .163 1.54 -.11
+ Diff.* C IAF&U .229 1.96* .17 .01 .06 .176 1.50 1.13 -:02 -.16
+ Diff.* lA .245 2.14** 1.56 .00 .15 .168 1.42 043 -.09 -.08
+ Diff. * G IAF .227 1.94* .04 .00 .03 .169 1.43 .53 -.06 -.11
+ Diff. * Part. .227 1.94* .01 -.01 .01 .205 1.81* 3.72* -.08 -.23·
+ Diff. * Flex. .236 2.03** .74 -.02 -.10 .172 1.45 .71 -.12 -.10
+ Diff.* Size .240 2.09** 1.l4 -.05 -.15 .177 1.50 1.17 -.16 .14
Dependent variable: Differen- Inter- Differen- Inter-
Threat-extr. R2 F 8F tiation action R2 F 8F tiation action
Original model .229 2.22** -.09 .143 1.32 .11
+ Diff.* C IAF&U .243 2.12** 1.23 -.02 .16 .161 1.34 1.47 .01 .18
+Diff.* lA .244 2.13** 1.29 -.07 .14 .158 1.32 1.25 .07 .14
+Diff.* GIAF .229 1.97* .01 -.08 .01 .148 1.21 .37 .07 .09
+ Diff. * Part. .230 1.97* .02 -.09 -.02 .145 1.l9 .17 .12 -.05
+ Diff. * Flex. .234 2.02** Al -.09 -.08 .149 1.22 .46 .12 .08
+ Diff. * Size .230 1.97* .07 -.08 .04 .184 1.58t 3.52* .01 .24*
Significance levels: t<.15; *p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01
Table 8: AU independent variables regressed onto issue sorting variables, moderated by contextual variables
Smallfirms Larse ffrms
Dependent variable: Differen- Inter- Differen- Inter-
Operational imp.' R2 F M tiation action R2 F .1F tiation action
Original model .113 .93 .03 .134 1.21 .16
+ Diff.* C IAF&U .117 .87 .36 .07 .09 .134 1.07 .00 .16 -.01
+Diff.* lA .114 .84 .10 .04 .04 .145 1.17 .88 .13 .12
+ Diff.* G IAF .114 .84 .13 .01 -.05 .140 1.12 .44 .20t -.10
+ Diff. * Part. .127 .94 1.05 .04 .13 .139 1.11 .36 .15 .07
+ Diff. * Rex. .124 .92 .84 .03 -.12 .136 1.09 .17 .16 -.O?
+ Diff. * Size .158 1.22 3.50* .09 .28* .134 1.07 .01 .16 .01
Dependent variable: Differen- Inter- Differen- Inter-
Strategic imp.' R2 F .1F tiation action R2 F M tiation action
Original model .187 1.69t .05 .201 1.96* -.08
+ Diff.* C IAF&U .189 1.52 .15 .03 -.06 .202 1.74* .02 -.09 .02
+Diff.* lA .196 I.S9t .73 .04 -.11 .206 1.79* .41 -.10 .08
+ Diff. * G IAF .191 I.S3t .28 .02 -.07 .219 1.94* 1.58 .00 -.18
+ Diff. * Part. .189 1:51 .12 .05 .04 .209 1.82* .64 -.09 .{)9
+ Diff. * Rex. .188 1.50 .03 .05 .02 .224 1.99** 2.03 -.06 .17
+ Diff. * Size .192 I.S4t .33 .07 .08 .230 2.06** 2.S4t .00 -.20t
Dependent variable: Differen- Inter- Differen- Inter-
Unteasibility" R2 F .1F tiation action R2 F .1F tiation action
Original model .211 1.96* -.06 .043 .35 .01
+ Diff.* C IAF&U .212 1.75* .05 -.07 -.03 .044 .32 .06 .03 -.04
+Diff.* lA .212 1.75* .05 -.06 .03 .043 .31 .01 .02 -.01
+Diff.* GIAF .222 1.85* .87 .00 .13 .046 .34 .22 -.02 .07
+ Diff. * Part. .228 1.92* 1.42 -.05 .14 .043 .31 .01 .01 -.01
+ Diff. * Rex. .225 1.88* 1.12 -.05 .13 .054 .40 .81 .00 -.12
+Diff.* Size .329 3.18*** 11.39*** .04 .44*** .061 .45 1.30 .08 -.16
"Reversed
Significance levels: t<.IS; *p<.IO; **p<.OS; ***p<.OI
Table 9: AU independent variables regressed onto causal understanding variables, moderated by contextual variables
Smallfirms Laraefirms
Dependent variable: Differen- Inter- Differen- Inter-
Causal und. I R2 F .1F tiation action R2 F .1F tiation action
Original model .125 1.07 .17 .182 1.76* .22**
+ Diff.* C IAF&U .201 1.66t 6.28** .02 -.37** .204 1.79* 1.91 .11 .20
+Diff.* lA .141 1.09 1.24 .15 -.15 .204 1.79* 1.90 .I8t :16
+ Diff. * G IAF .191 I.S6t 5.38** .03 -.21 ** .185 I.S9t .26 .I9t .07
+ Diff. * Part. .162 1.27 2.86* .15 -.21 * .185 I.S9t .28 .21 * .06
+ Diff. * Rex. .161 1.27 2.81 * .18 .21 * .184 I.S8t .21 .23** .05
+ Diff. * Size .127 .% .14 .18 .06 .209 1.85* 2.38t .30** -.20t
Dependent variable: Differen- Inter- Differen- Inter-
Causal undo II R2 F .1F tiation action R2 F .1F tiation action
Original model .148 1.29 .07 .283 3.12*** .06
+ Diff.* C IAF&U .222 1.89* 6.35** .23t .36** .283 2.77*** .00 .06 -.01
+Diff.* lA .187 1.52 3.23* .10 .23* .284 2.77*** .04 .07 -.02
+ Diff. * G IAF .203 1.68t 4.57** .20 .29** .297 2.96*** 1.36 .13 -.16
+ Diff. * Part. .207· 1.73* 4.97** .10 .26** .283 2.77*** .00 .06 .00
+ Diff. * Rex. .206 1.71* 4.87** .06 -.26** .284 2.78*** .09 .06 -.03
+ Diff. * Size .206 1.72* 4.88** .00 -.31 ** .284 2.77*** .04 .05 .03
Significance levels: t<.IS; *p<.I0; **p<.OS; ***p<.OI
Table 10: All independent variables regressed onto data search variables, moderated by contextual variables
Small firms Large firms
Dependent variable: Differen- Inter- Differen- Inter-
Core data" R2 F ~F tiation action R2 F ~F tiation action
Original model .163 1.45 -.22* .170 1.59t -.05
+ Diff.* C IAF&U .167 1.32 .31 -.19 .08 .170 1.42 .07 -.08 .04
+ Diff.* lA .163 1.29 .04 -.22t .03 .170 1.41 .01 -.06 .01
+ Diff. * G IAF .174 1.39 .91 -.16 .13 .171 1.42 .12 -.03 -.05
"+ Diff.* Part. .178 1.43 1.20 -.21 t .13 .223 1.98** 4.73** -.09 .25**
+ Diff. * Flex. .164 1.29 .10 -.22t .04 .170 1.41 .00 -.06 .00
+ Diff. * Size .165 1.30 .16 -.23* -.06 .197 1.69t 2.33t .02 -.20t
Dependent variable: Differen- Inter- Differen- Inter-
Additional data R2 F ~F tiation action R2 F ~F tiation action
Original model .098 .81 .17 .162 1.51 .26**
+ Diff.* C IAF&U .101 .74 .21 .14 -.07 .171 1.43 .73 .19 .13
+ Diff.* lA .098 .72 .00 .17 -.01 .163 1.34 .01 .26** -.01
+ Diff. * G !AF .104 .76 .40 .13 -.09 .163 1.34 .04 .24* .03
+ Diff. * Part. .110 .81 .84 .16 -.12 .163 1.34 .04 .26** -.02
+ Diff. * Flex. .101 .75 .24 .17 -.06 .268 2.52** 9.91 *** .30*** .36***
+ Diff. * Size .099 .72 .04 .17 -.03 .174 1.46 .99 .21 t .13
Dependent variable: Differen- Inter- Differen- Inter-
New data R2 F ~F tiation action R2 F ~F tiation action
Original model .300 3.19*** .18t .213 2.10** .19*
+ Diff.* C IAF&U .302 2.86*** .18 .16 -.06 .219 1.94* .57 .13 .11
+ Diff.* lA .312 3.00*** 1.19 .20t .13 .214 1.88* .13 .I8t .04
+ Diff.* G IAF .302 2.86*** .20 .21 t .06 .213 1.86* .00 .19t .00
+ Diff. * Part. .327 3.21 *** 2.65t .17 -.I8t .224 1.99** 1.01 .21 * -.12
+ Diff. * Flex. .300 2.83*** .03 .I8t -.02 .237 2.15** 2.23t .21 * .17t
+ Diff. * Size .303 2.87*** .30 .17 -.07 .217 1.91* .40 .16 .08
"Reversed
Significance levels: t<.15; *p<.I0; **p<.05; ***p<.OI
